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Summary 
 
This thesis examines British scholarly perceptions of Greek colonisation from the eighteenth 
century to the present.  Beginning with a study of the ancient sources for Greek colonisation 
and the key themes which preoccupied ancient authors, the thesis proceeds to argue that, 
modifying recent interpretations of work from this age of empire, British scholarship did not, 
as a whole, simplistically distort ancient evidence so as to create a version of Greek 
colonisation which mirrored, in a self-congratulatory way, contemporary British experiences.  
We should therefore position this scholarship within its appropriate historical context (with 
special attention to politics, empire, colonisation, and perceptions of antiquity). In addition to 
enabling us to trace the impact of  the  great events of the modern era upon classical 
scholarship, in doing so we can also gain insight into the complexities, hopes, and anxieties 
which characterised British thinking about such themes as empire, colonisation, political 
freedom, and the place of Western civilisation in historical perspective.  
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Section I: Introduction, Current Debate, and the Ancient View 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
This thesis originates from resurgence in the study of what has traditionally been 
known as Greek colonisation, and an increasing awareness of a relationship between 
antiquity and modern European imperialism, colonialism, and colonisation.  The revival of 
interest in Greek colonisation has been a direct result of recent tendency to question the 
underpinning assumptions of the subject, in particular assumptions derived from what was 
the formative period of not only classical scholarship, but also modern European imperialism.   
From the late eighteenth century, but especially from the nineteenth century, classical 
scholarship emerged as a discipline of both significant prestige and explanatory power.  In 
the eighteenth century antiquity was used to debate the pressing constitutional issues of the 
day, issues which often crossed the boundaries of domestic, international, and imperial or 
colonial politics.  Come the nineteenth century, Greek history emerged as the most prescient 
way of framing arguments in favour of the reformist politics of the day, thus supplanting 
Rome as the dominant point of comparison for Britain in the domestic, if not imperial, 
sphere.   
The first studies of Greek colonisation were made in the later eighteenth century when 
Britain‟s empire, based on naval power, commerce, and colonies of European settlers  
required a different model to that offered by Rome, and a different field of past experiences 
to interrogate for useful lessons.  From then on, chapters on Greek colonisation became 
standard practice in all the great histories of Greece, a practice which continued from the 
eighteenth century, throughout the nineteenth, and up to the present day.  Those studies of 
Greek colonisation written during the late eighteenth century were inevitably influenced by 
the defining colonial and constitutional concerns of the day, such as the American and French 
Revolutions – indeed it was their very purpose to relate to and comment upon such events.  
Accounts of Greek colonisation written during the early to mid nineteenth century, when the 
American colonies had been lost, coincided with the gradual expansion of Britain‟s white 
settler colonies in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and displacement of indigenous 
peoples.  Into the late nineteenth century, the example of Greek colonisation was actively 
invoked in debates about a „Greater Britain‟, or an „Imperial Federation‟: conceptions 
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designed to overcome Britain‟s perceived geopolitical weakness in the face of vast territorial 
empires.   
At all times after the loss of the American colonies, discussions of Greek colonisation 
took place within a context of two very different conceptions of what the British Empire was: 
the white settler colonies on the one hand – free, increasingly self-governing, and 
representing the extension of Anglo-Saxon freedoms abroad – and the empire of rule on the 
other – centred on India, despotic, militaristic, yet the basis of Britain‟s power in the world.  
Irrespective of the period in question, studies of Greek colonisation were conducted at a time 
when British colonisation played an important if changing role in British visions regarding 
empire and their place in the world, not even diminishing significantly in the period after the 
Second World War when European solutions offered themselves.   
The key question is the extent to which conceptions of Greek colonisation were 
influenced by this British colonial context – and if so, how?  The dominant perspective 
among recent scholarship is that it most certainly was influenced by contemporary British 
experiences, and this is one of the key reasons why the subject has come under renewed 
scrutiny; the term colonisation itself has been brought into question, and earlier scholarship 
interrogated for contemporary „colonial‟ or „imperial‟ attitudes which distorted antiquity and 
created mentalities which still pervade and distort our perspectives of ancient Greece to this 
day.  This study aims to examine more closely what British scholars wrote about Greek 
colonisation from the late eighteenth to late twentieth centuries, taking into account the 
particular political, imperial, and colonial context at work at the time of writing.  It is only by 
a fuller contextual discussion such as this that we can truly judge the extent of „colonial‟ or 
„imperial‟ influences on the study of this aspect of Greek antiquity.  The contextual 
discussion is intended to be a study in itself, tracing the way antiquity was a major means of 
expressing responses to contemporary political, imperial, and colonial debate.  Thus while the 
primary aim of this thesis is to consider the extent contemporary ideas influenced the study of 
Greek colonisation, it is also the intention to be able to place that understanding within the 
wider context of British perceptions of antiquity and address the importance of the latter in 
shaping the British historical imagination – in other words the role of antiquity in forming 
British visions of the past, present, and future of Western civilisation.   
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Chapter 2: Current scholarship on Greek colonisation and its earlier historiography 
 
If the ancient sources for Greek colonisation are generally considered problematic, the  
interpretation of this evidence by British scholars in the modern age has been the subject of 
equal if not harsher scrutiny.  The literary evidence is usually later and often anachronistic in 
its reading of events, in many cases giving events of the eighth century a very contemporary 
fifth century flavour.
1
  It is perhaps inevitable that much of the modern scholarship has come 
to be scrutinised in much the same way.   
This criticism has not come exclusively from British scholars, as debate about Greek 
colonisation, and thus its historiography, is international.  However international the debate 
may be, much of it has been conducted in the English language and by scholars connected to 
British universities, or those of the English speaking world.  As a result, a great deal of this 
discussion has been conducted within the intellectual sphere of Anglo-Saxon approaches to 
the imperial past, and has thus been influenced by post-colonial thought relating to the former 
imperial possessions of above all the British Empire. 
It is perhaps natural that an increased interest in the historiography of colonisation 
followed in the wake of important reinterpretations of both the scholarship and the ancient 
evidence.  Such reinterpretations began to be published in earnest in the 1990s, and what 
follows is a thematic breakdown of some of the main issues raised.  What scholars currently 
think about colonisation and what they think of earlier work is a subject necessarily 
intertwined.  Much in the way of new approaches and new ideas about the nature of Greek 
colonisation stem from a renewed interest in the subject.  This is itself a direct result of a 
more critical attitude towards traditional scholarship late to feel the impact of approaches 
long since felt in the field of modern history.   
First will be a discussion of two very important elements essential in understanding 
recent debate about Greek colonisation: terminology and methodology.  Then there will 
follow a review of some of the key themes to emerge from modern debate about Greek 
colonisation and its historiography: colonisation as an act of state, colonial dependence, and 
colonists and natives.  Current views on Greek colonisation are invariably linked to criticisms 
of earlier ones.  These thematic subheadings are intended to reflect the manner in which 
current scholarship, in forming new interpretations of Greek colonisation, arguably do so in 
                                                 
1
 J-P. Wilson, „Ideologies‟ of Greek colonization, in G. Bradley and J.-P. Wilson (eds.), Greek & Roman 
Colonization: Origins, Ideologies, and Interactions (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2006), 26. 
5 
 
an oppositional way with earlier work serving as a misguided imperial benchmark.  Finally, 
there will be a summarised assessment of current ideas and approaches. 
 
Terminology 
 
 Several recent works on Greek colonisation and its historiography have included 
comment on the distorting potential of using the term „colony‟ to describe what Greeks of the 
Classical period referred to as apoikia.  We are told of the Roman origin of the term colony: 
colonia.  The literary evidence of Cicero (De Lege Agraria, 2.27.73-75, ) and Aulus Gellius 
(Attic Nights, 16.13.8-9) suggests that the founding of colonia in the late Republican and 
Imperial period was an act of state for reasons of state and a correspondingly centralised 
affair.  Contemporary practice is thought to have coloured what such authorities had to say of 
the earlier Republican colonia, which in turn has influenced, some might say distorted, our 
own views, imbuing the early colonia with statist qualities.  Understood as such, the term 
provided fitting parallel to European settlements abroad from the early modern period 
onwards, and thus the term colonia fell into common usage as colony (or indeed une colonie, 
ein coloni, una colonia).
2
  In this process of giving us our modern word – used to describe a 
whole range of European experience overseas, from the settler colonies of America and 
Australasia to those (less successful) in Africa, and indeed the word colonialism, often a 
byword for imperialism used without much discrimination – the term colonia, and quite 
casually with it its supposed Greek equivalent apoikia, transmogrified into something with 
very modern connotations it may never have originally possessed.  In short, in giving us our 
modern word, it lost its original meaning – and so did apoikia by association, an association 
imposed by the traditional modern European practice of treating Greek and Roman cultures 
as a Classical Greco-Roman whole.   
Over the centuries, various imperialisms and colonising experiences interacted with 
the idea of colonia and apoikia.  In the latter case mainly that of Great Britain, with a 
perceived equivalence between ancient Greek apoikia and Britain‟s own white settler 
colonies.  One of the objects of this chapter will in due course be to address the issue of how 
deeply, how, or indeed whether that imperialism impacted upon that nation‟s scholarship of 
the Greek apoikiai (or perhaps more accurately of early settlements overseas thought of as 
                                                 
2
 For the term „colony‟ and appropriation into English see R. Osborne, „Early Greek colonization?‟ in N. Fisher 
& H. Van Wees (eds.), Archaic Greece: New Approaches and New Evidence (London, Swansea: Duckworth 
and The Classical Press of Wales, 1998), 252. 
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apoikiai in the Classical period) but current scholarly consensus appears to be that it did.  A 
significant part of that assumption seems to be based on the idea that an association, or a 
tendency to see an easy equivalence between colonia and apoikia and thus colony and 
apoikia, is responsible for a traditional British scholarly perspective in which Greek overseas 
settlement is seen as akin to that of Britain in several important ways.  Greek settlement 
overseas was an act of state, Greeks were often superior to the native, colonial Greeks were 
culturally dependent on their mother-cities, and Greek were agents of cultural change – 
civilising the natives.  As so much of current scholarly work is grounded in a reaction against 
traditional interpretations, it is very natural that these perceived similarities form the 
subheadings of the discussion below, centring on the key debates, or areas of criticism, in 
recent scholarship.  However, before we turn to those themes, it is necessary to trace in more 
detail the development of the debate about terminology as it is of central importance to the 
way Greek colonisation is studied. 
Debate appears to centre on whether or not it is appropriate to use the term 
colonisation to refer to Greek settlements overseas.  The main ground of contention concerns 
its use for settlements established in the Archaic period, as it seems to be much less 
controversial to suggest that settlements of the Classical period can be seen as colonies in 
something approaching the modern – or (perceived) Roman – sense; that is as something 
established by a state for strategic reasons and often exhibiting the exploitation of indigenous 
peoples.
3
  When Osborne calls for the eradication of chapters on Greek colonisation, he is 
advocating their disappearance from books on early Greece.
4
  Purcell labels Greek 
colonisation as an anachronistic construct made up of on one hand ancient literary evidence 
amounting to no more than literary tradition, and on the other more recent colonisations.  To 
pursue „this construct‟, he claims, is „as complete a subordination of archaeology to the 
slavery of text-based history as one could imagine‟.5  Yet one must note that his criticism 
appears to be directed more towards the use of later literary evidence to guide the 
                                                 
3
 F. De Angelis, „Colonies and Colonization‟, in The Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 51; Wilson (2006); Osborne (1998), 251-269. 
4
 Osborne (1998). 268-69.  As we shall see, he is in fact willing the eradication of a two hundred year old 
tradition which has not yet passed; See C.M. Antonaccio, „Colonization: Greece on the Move, 900-480‟, in H.A. 
Shapiro, The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 201-224.  Ten years later, such chapters remain. 
5
 N. Purcell, „Review of Gocha R. Tsetsckhladze & Franco De Angelis (ed.) The archaeology of Greek 
colonisation: essays dedicated to Sir John Boardman‟ (Monograph 40), x+149pp. 1994. Oxford: Oxford 
University Committee for Archaeology, in Antiquity, Vol. 71, March 1997, 500-501. 
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archaeology – perhaps implying that colonisation, more modern distortions notwithstanding, 
is not necessarily an anachronistic construct if used for the fifth century.  Indeed, scholars 
have been loath to abandon the terms colony, colonisation, colonial and colonialism.  Whitley 
sees colonisation as „as good a term as any‟,6 and effort has gone into defining it, and its 
siblings colonial and colonialism.   
Colonialism Van Dommelen defines as the presence of a foreign group with 
asymmetrical relations between it and indigenous peoples.
7
  De Angelis, critical of attempts 
by scholars of the ancient world to define colonialism in a way which allows the inclusion of 
Greek colonisation, claims that such exercises do not make the problem go away, and that the 
correct definition of colonialism is that of Jürgen Osterhammel, which he quotes at length: 
 
Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly 
imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders.  The fundamental 
decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented 
by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant 
metropolis.  Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the 
colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate 
to rule.
 8
 
 
De Angelis goes on to comment that „for the early Greek world, there existed very little true 
colonialism as just defined, general conditions being not at all conducive, and it is only in 
exceptional circumstances, usually after about 500 BCE, that this definition may sometimes 
be satisfied.‟9  The notion that no true colonisation occurred before the fifth century is by 
now commonplace, but it is worth noting that De Angelis, and also Osterhammel it seems, 
assume that in order for a settlement to „colonial‟  it must have been founded by a state and 
for reasons of state.  This is in effect an example of theory being used to discount a historical 
possibility – that settlements founded more by private initiative than by state interest can see 
                                                 
6
 J. Whitley, The Archaeology of Ancient Greece (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
124-25. 
7
 P. van Dommelen, „Colonial Constructs: Colonialism and Archaeology in the Mediterranean‟, in World 
Archaeology 28, 306. 
8
 Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialsim: A Theoretical Overview.  Translated by S.L. Firsch (Princeton, 1997), 16-
17.  Quoted in F. De Angelis, „Colonies and Colonization‟, in G. Boys-Stones, B. Graziosi, and P. Vasunia, The 
Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 51. 
9
 F. De Angelis, „Colonies and Colonization‟, in G. Boys-Stones, B. Graziosi, and P. Vasunia, The Oxford 
Handbook of Hellenic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 51. 
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the creation of colonial, that is unequal and exploitative, situations between themselves and 
the native peoples of the areas in which they have settled; in short the very kind of situation 
in keeping with Van Dommelen‟s freer definition.  One may also question whether we ought 
to insist upon one definition of colonialism as being more correct than all others, especially 
when it is so specific. 
 De Angelis hopes to move away from colonialism altogether, and describes how a 
scholar of North America argued that the term „colonialism‟ should supplant „culture contact‟ 
as the former was the primary historical reality.  De Angelis, „in a similar vein‟, argues that 
„we, as scholars of the ancient Greek world, should be using more frequently the term 
“culture contact” to describe the historical reality we study, for that was the main historical 
reality in our time-periods.  He goes on to argue that the onus should be on scholars who 
want to use the term „colonialism‟ to „prove its existence, instead of batting the term about 
because it is fashionable‟.  There may be problems with both these suggestions and the 
practices they relate to.  A term such as colonialism is laden with connotations, and while 
using „culture contact‟ as a neutral term, assuming neither colonial oppression nor peaceful 
interaction, would be a useful approach, it might be argued that it is unclear whether it would 
be taken as such.  In moving away from „looking for colonialism‟, as it were, there is a 
danger that scholars will instead look for peaceful „culture contact‟.  If „culture contact‟ were 
misunderstood in such a way, then a possible consequence of using one term or the other – 
that is „colonialism‟ or „culture contact‟ – is that a self-fulfilling prophecy would be enacted, 
and the use of the one or the other is in danger of being determined more by the historical 
reality we wish to see rather than that which might be uncovered by a more open and less 
unilaterally theoretical approach.  In the North American case, contemporary scholarship 
reacting against traditional interpretations might be expected to emphasise the oppressive and 
indeed exterminationist nature of white settlement, and thus be inclined to use colonialism to 
drive the point home.  Reaction to traditional scholarship regarding the Greek world has 
different concerns, namely in rejecting the appropriations of the ancient past and retrojections 
of an imperial present onto that past by traditional scholarship.  Therefore current scholarship 
can be expected to adopt the term culture contact precisely because, if sufficiently 
misunderstood, it furthers this agenda.  Of course, as mentioned previously, De Angelis is not 
arguing for our acceptance of peaceful contact of equals as the norm.  Rather, he advocates 
„culture contact‟ as a more neutral term – a „first and general level of description‟ used before 
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we move on to „distinguish between the possible types of encounter.‟10  Moreover he clearly 
appreciates how it is not only earlier but also present scholarship which is affected by 
contemporary conditions, suggesting that it is „only by discussing the nature of previous 
scholarship that we can combat this problem and avoid letting the present creep into the study 
of the past‟,11 yet perhaps „culture contact‟ as a term may yet acquire as much baggage as 
„colonialism‟. 
There is also a somewhat circular aspect to part of the argument – that we should 
adopt „culture contact‟ as it was the most common historical reality (even though it is 
supposed to be a first level of description) suggests having decided what the historical reality 
is before deciding upon a theoretical framework to examine it.  Moreover it can be seen that 
the belief in „culture contact‟ as the most common historical reality stems from an 
oppositional attitude towards earlier scholarship which saw relations between newcomers and 
natives as colonial.  As Tsetskhladze says, „the then interpretation of that ancient colonialism 
was just as liable to be influenced by the imperial mindset as it may now be by an anti-
imperial one.‟12  The strange fact in this case is that the exigencies of post colonial thought 
requires that anti-imperial mindset deny imperialism, or in this case colonialism, ever existed 
– imperialism implies superiority of power even if not of virtue – and that is too much for 
some.  As De Angelis rightly said, we need to adopt a „first and general level of description‟, 
but we need to be aware that connotations may unwittingly accompany such terms as „culture 
contact‟, or „cultural interactions‟ as they do the term colonisation – for good or for ill, they 
stem from a rejection of colonial assumptions, and will tend to approach and interpret 
evidence accordingly.   Therefore perhaps a better way of going about it would be to ask in 
what sorts of circumstances Greeks who settled overseas found themselves, whether they 
settled and lived amidst or separately from indigenous peoples, what sort of relations were 
there between Greek newcomers and the former, and how such relations came into being, 
developed, and were reinforced.  It is only then, and after extensive and equally open minded 
research of a wide variety of sites that we can suggest a more overarching description of what 
kind of world the Archaic Mediterranean was – and what kinds of settlements and 
interactions occurred. 
                                                 
10
 Quoted in De Angelis (2009), 51. 
11
 F. De Angelis, „Ancient past, imperial present: the British Empire in T.J. Dunbabin‟s The Western Greeks‟, in 
Antiquity 72 (1998), 548. 
12
 G. R. Tsetskhladze, „Revisiting Ancient Greek Colonisation‟, in G.R. Tsetskhladze (ed.), Greek colonisation: 
an account of Greek colonies and other settlements overseas, Vol. 1 (Leiden; Boston, Mass.: Brill, 2006), xxvii. 
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Perhaps it would be beneficial to drop the terms „colony‟, and colonisation, but before 
we replace them with „apoikia‟, or „settlement‟, and „founding apoikiai‟, or „settlement 
overseas‟, we should consider very carefully whether we should take for granted such terms 
and what they imply.  Terms such as apoikia are derived from later literary sources – and so 
it is not simply a matter of whether it had the same meaning in the eighth century as it did in 
the fifth; can we truly know how eighth-century Greeks referred to their homes overseas?  As 
a home away from home, apoikia seems neutral enough, but the only possible literary 
evidence for the eighth century exists in the Homeric epics – and the term apoikia does not 
appear.  Instead Nauthisous „raises up‟ or „transplants‟ (anastesas/ἀλαζηήζαο, ἀλίζηεκη) 
people from Hypereia and „sits them down‟, or „places‟ them in (eisen/εἷζελ, ἵδσ) Scheria 
(Homer, Odyssey, 6.2-11).  Of course, this is more reminiscent of one individual making a 
decision to move people – and in that sense appears „statist‟, but can be explained by the fact 
that Homeric epics are about individuals heroes and will explain things in that manner.  What 
is perhaps significant is that the term apoikia does not appear.   It seems that the earliest 
mention of the term apoikia appears in Herodotus (e.g. 6.150).  There is a danger that if we 
persist in thinking of what were the relations between Greek apoikiai and indigenous peoples 
– regardless of whether we see colonial or more equitable relations – we are still thinking in 
terms of separate settlements, separate communities, separate and perhaps immutable 
ethnicities and identities.  Therefore, if we think that terms such as „colony‟ and colonisation 
ought to be dismissed because they have laden with connotations stemming from modern 
colonisation and imperialism, then what is the justification in retaining 5
th
 century Greek 
terminology, itself potentially as laden with such connotations as the modern terminology?  
There is a case for dispensing of both sets of terminology, and for adopting our own, as 
devoid of connotations as possible.  But which terms should we use?   
The adoption of such terms as „Greek settlement overseas‟, „Greek settlers‟, and „to 
settle‟ may offer a more connotation and baggage free way of approaching and talking about 
the subject.  Nevertheless, perhaps it would be wise to keep the idea of a colonial situation as 
an interpretive question, or colonialism as an interpretive concept, and feel free to ask of the 
evidence whether colonial situations arose in the wake of the various instances of Greeks 
settling in Sicily and southern Italy.  We cannot assume there to have been unequal relations 
between early Greek settlers and native peoples, but equally, in the case of those settlements 
which were founded, we cannot assume, as De Angelis seems to imply, that simply because 
they were not founded as a matter of deliberate policy by distant states, that colonial 
situations never arose.  To reiterate it is suggested here that we rid ourselves of anachronistic 
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terminology be it modern or ancient – being careful of course not to rid ourselves with terms 
broadly contemporary (such as those used in the Homeric epics) – but keep colonialism and 
the notion of colonial situations as possible interpretive concepts.   
 
Methodology 
 
Now to turn to the methodology: in 1997 Nicholas Purcell outlined what would 
become regarded as something of a truism in the study of Greek settlement overseas.  
Purcell‟s criticism was twofold: Greek colonisation is an anachronistic construct made up of 
on one hand ancient literary evidence amounting to no more than literary tradition, and on the 
other more recent colonisations.  Furthermore, and this is the point with which we are 
presently concerned, he claimed that to pursue „this construct‟ is „as complete a subordination 
of archaeology to the slavery of text-based history as one could imagine‟.13  The problem 
with „Greek colonisation‟ is not just that it is distorted by traditional scholarship – it runs 
much deeper, and although it encompasses terminology it goes much further, to the ancient 
evidence itself.  As John-Paul Wilson has shown, not only has literary evidence been 
privileged over the archaeology, but that literary evidence is itself of a much later period than 
the events it purports to describe.  To complicate matters further, the literary evidence, most 
of it fifth century or later, was in fact written in an age in which the establishment of 
settlements overseas for imperialistic reasons was a practice common to several Greek 
states.
14
  Thus the distortions of traditional scholarship written in the age of nineteenth and 
twentieth century European imperialism is complemented if not intertwined and difficult to 
disentangle from those of ancient authors writing in the age of fifth and fourth century Greek 
imperialism.  A problem not dissimilar to that already mentioned in relation to Roman 
coloniae – we must contend with the distortions of both ancient and modern authors writing 
in imperial eras.  It is this literary evidence, fraught with difficulties, which Purcell sees 
earlier scholarship as having used to guide archaeological research.   
This view is echoed in most recent works on the subject.  For example Owen agrees 
with Purcell‟s contention that traditional interpretations are the result of privileging the 
literary over the archaeological.
15
  Allowing the former to guide the latter perpetuates the idea 
                                                 
13
 Purcell (1997), 500-501. 
14
 See Wilson (2006). 
15
 S. Owen, „Analogy, Archaeology and Archaic Greek Colonization‟, in H. Hurst and S. Owen (eds.), Ancient 
Colonizations, Analogy, Similarity & Difference (London : Duckworth, 2005), 6-7.  Purcell (1997), 500-501. 
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of colonisation as an event, not a process.  As Burgers states; the literary tradition records an 
„histoire événementielle‟.  Ridding ourselves of this tendency to subordinate material to 
literary would enable us to look at „longer-term social processes‟ leading up to such events, 
and a more archaeological approach would also provide a different view on issues of 
ethnicity and relations between Greek newcomers and native peoples.
16
  De Angelis credits 
the „independent study of material culture‟ (in addition to postcolonial perspectives) with 
demonstrating how earlier scholarship was infused with notions worthy of but a „limited 
place in the early Greek world.‟17  He characterises early works (that is up to the mid 
nineteenth century) such as those of William Mitford and George Grote (of whom a full 
discussion will follow later) as being quite naturally based on literary evidence – as the 
archaeological evidence was lacking.  As is well known, when this deficiency was finally 
addressed with the development of Classical archaeology, the material evidence was usually 
used to corroborate the literary.
18
  The various effects of this emphasis on the literary 
evidence are evidently not lost on scholars.  De Angelis mentions Hall‟s argument that 
Hellenocentrism will endure since there are Greek written sources, and material evidence for 
non-Greeks will never be able to redress this imbalance.
19
  Similarly, Lomas remarked how 
native Italic peoples, their cultures being largely non-literate, are at a disadvantage as „most 
of the surviving evidence other than the purely archaeological is filtered through Greek or 
Roman perspectives, frequently hostile in nature.‟20  If recognition of this Hellenocentrism is 
widespread, there is possibly less consensus regarding how this awareness should direct 
further study.  Responding to Spivey and Stoddart‟s contention that the literary evidence 
should be set aside, and Italian history written using only material evidence, Lomas argued 
that abandoning the literary evidence altogether is not a realistic option.  Better to recognise 
its limitations and use it in combination with a „theoretical approach‟ to material evidence, 
„interpreting material culture not just in terms of a diffusion of a dominant culture but in 
terms of interchange between cultures and in terms of two-way processes.‟21  This is probably 
                                                 
16
 Owen (2005), 7-8.  G.-J. Burgers, „Western Greeks In Their Regional Setting: Rethinking Early Greek-
Indigenous Encounters In Southern Italy‟, Ancient West and East Vol. 3, Issue 2 (2004), 252.  See I. Malkin‟s 
criticisms in the Bryn Mawr Classical Review, 2008.11.08. 
17
 De Angelis (2009), 49. 
18
 De Angelis (2009), 54.  Citing B.G. Trigger, A History of Archaeological Thought (Cambridge: 2006). 
19
 De Angelis (2009), 55.  Citing J.M. Hall, A History of the Archaic Greek World ca. 1200-479 BCE ( 2007), 
288-9. 
20
 K. Lomas, „Greeks, Romans and Others: problems of colonialism and ethnicity in southern Italy‟, in J. 
Webster & N. Cooper, Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives (Leicester: School of Archaeological 
Studies, University of Leicester, 1996), 141. 
21
 K. Lomas (1996), 143. 
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the most sensible course of action.  Clearly something has to be done to redress the imbalance 
caused by there being literary evidence for later Greeks, but not for earlier Greeks and 
indigenous peoples.  This may well require what modern historians may call „reading against 
the grain‟ of the literary evidence, and a theoretically informed approach to the material 
evidence.  In seeking to redress the imbalances relating to indigenous peoples, and, again, I 
would stress early Greeks, we ought not go from one extreme to the other and regard literary 
sources as useless fabrication even for the period in which they were written, and ignore the 
history of Greek settlers.  In doing so we would be replacing one fixation with another, and in 
circumstances where colonial type situations are acknowledged, absolve ourselves of 
studying how such situations arise and are maintained – an important aspect.   
 
We have seen how current scholarship regards the terminology and methodology used 
when studying Greek settlement overseas as having led to anachronistic readings of the past, 
contributing to overarching approaches unlikely to produce anything but such readings.  
Terminology and historical narratives dating from the Classical period have been taken as 
valid for the Archaic.  In turn these terms and narratives, interacting with modern colonial 
ideas, experiences, and terms, have lead to a two-fold, mutually reinforcing construct, 
through which the material evidence and Archaic history was interpreted. Consequently, it is 
believed, we were left with an image of early Greek settlement overseas which is 
overwhelmingly state-driven, exhibiting unequal relations between advanced Greeks and 
underdeveloped indigenous peoples: acts of colonisation resulting in truly colonial situations 
and examples of a Greek colonialism.  As with so many revisionist approaches in their early 
stages, the current one can at times be characterised as inverting such an image, hence 
offering instead a portrait of individual enterprise, Greeks drawn into indigenous societies on 
terms either equal or detrimental to themselves, their coming hardly acts of colonisation, and 
consequently their presence did not in result colonial situations or colonialism – denying their 
existence is currently de rigeur.  This denial is supported by the belief that without state 
driven colonisation there cannot be colonial situations, and also the current trend to see the 
period as one of cultural contact rather than of conflict and an innate Greek superiority.  One 
might well ask why cultural contact and conflict are irreconcilable in the same historical 
environment, and why conflict, even if it results in Greek conquest, need necessarily mean 
accepting nineteenth century notions of Greek superiority.   
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State or Individual, Event or Process? 
 
 Two of the main shifts which have come in the wake of our criticism of past 
terminology and past approaches have been in the degree of state involvement we attribute to 
early Greek settlement overseas, and in the way in which we see relations between those 
settlers and indigenous peoples.  Linked to the two is the issue of what kinds of settlements 
eighth-century Greek settlers lived in.  Indeed the three are in fact very difficult to separate, 
as the reasons for going overseas, what kind of settlement in which one finds oneself when 
there, and whether or not one lives with indigenous peoples in one‟s midst, or at arm‟s length, 
are evidently part of the same story.  As this is a discussion of scholarship, however, a 
division will be made: here will be discussed recent views regarding state involvement and 
settlement as an event or process.  This will be followed by views concerning colonial 
dependence, or the relations between Greek settlements overseas and their places of origin, 
and then finally the rather more politically charged issue of relations with indigenous 
peoples.
22
  
 In one of the most important recent works on colonisation, Osborne contended that 
fifth and fourth century settlements abroad, for instance those established by the Athenians, 
can „look quite like Roman colonies‟ due to the degree of state involvement.  Arguing that in 
the sixth century one can detect a „city community‟ sending settlers for military or agrarian 
reasons, but that in this period one can also detect evidence of attempts by notable individuals 
to lead „unofficial enterprises‟ to establish a settlement abroad, he suggests that it is 
reasonable to ask whether this classical model of overseas settlement can be retrojected into 
the earlier Archaic period – classical sources thought contemporary practice to have had a 
long history. Instead of beginning at the end, with the (dubious) benefit of the classical 
sources, Osborne instead starts at the beginning, using both literary and archaeological 
evidence.
23
  He begins by showing how Homer presents a world of mobility, individual 
initiative, and an awareness of what it is to settle a new site.
24
  He proceeds to demonstrate 
through a discussion of Megara Hyblaia and other southern Italian and Sicilian sites how the 
archaeology does not clearly distinguish between settlements scholars call colonies and 
others which they do not, that a „precise moment‟ of colonisation cannot be distinguished 
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archaeologically in any fashion other than arbitrary.  Instead becoming a Greek settlement 
should be seen as „gradual process‟, becoming an apoikia as having more to do with „the 
invention of a past than with a historical moment of invention.‟  Further evidence against the 
notion of a colonising event is found in co-existence with the native population; this 
„discourages big bang theories – for increasingly little sign is to be found that those there 
already felt any bang.‟25  Osborne‟s argument can be seen as a cornerstone of the revisionist 
position, arguing as it does for mobility and individual initiative in an eighth-century process 
of Greek settlements overseas.  More purely archaeologically oriented scholars may dismiss 
his use of literary evidence such as that of Homer, but otherwise Osborne‟s views hold much 
that is common with other recent contributions to the field. 
 As we have seen, Osborne‟s views, in seeing Archaic settlers as enterprising 
individuals, goes hand in hand with seeing settlement itself as a process and not an event.  
Individuals settling evokes a trickle of settlers, different people from different places and at 
different times, and so a single event of settlement would be much more difficult to identify.  
As we have seen in the above discussion of methodology, scholars such as Burgers and Owen 
indicate that it is text which is more likely to see events in the past, real or not, whereas 
archaeology is more likely to be able to identify longer term processes.
26
  Malkin, however, 
countered some of Owen‟s suggestions by arguing that there has been too sharp a swing 
against the notion of foundation events (and in fact events more generally). He cites Megara 
Hyblaia as an early (c.725) example of a planned settlement, and that within a wider context 
of a large number of new settlements created within a short period of time.  He also questions 
whether the „fragmented and processual‟ nature of the „events leading up to colonization‟ 
makes the end-result any less an event. „Aside from destruction‟, he argues that „archaeology 
in general has difficulties in identifying any historical events.‟27  Therefore it seems that 
whereas there may be a general consensus in that most scholars agree that there are problems 
with terminology, with literary evidence, and the retrojection of modern (and later ancient) 
ideas onto the Archaic past, there is still debate about how we should see early Greek 
settlement as occurring.   
 It may be that the way forward is to be as flexible as possible.  Perhaps a productive 
starting point would be not to think of state-sanctioned action and foundation events, nor 
individual initiative and longer term processes, as inseparable.  Likewise it might be a good 
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idea, however archaeological our approach, to be open to the possibility that certain processes 
are sufficiently short to be perceived as definable events by the individuals who experienced 
them.  For example, hypothetically speaking, an indigenous inhabitant immediately inland of 
what became Megara Hyblaia may have remembered „when the Greeks started settling in the 
area‟, or „when the Greeks built their own settlement‟.  Equally, accepting individual 
enterprise as a more likely concept than Archaic states making state decisions to establish 
settlements abroad does not discount the possibility that an individual, perhaps a less god-like 
but more realistic Homeric-style warlord, could lead a large group of followers overseas and 
settle a site within a very short space of time.  Archaeology may, after all, be able to identify 
the processes of exchange and interaction between Greeks and indigenous peoples which 
preceded this event.  Individual initiative, events and processes, are by no means 
irreconcilable. 
 
Colonial Dependence 
 
De Angelis wisely wrote that it is not only earlier but also present scholarship which 
is affected by contemporary condition, suggesting that it is „only by discussing the nature of 
previous scholarship that we can combat this problem and avoid letting the present creep into 
the study of the past‟.28  His criticism of earlier scholarship had a direct influence on his own 
vision of Greek colonisation.  The 1930s inspired outlook of Dunbabin, and the very 
identification of the Greek apoikiai in the West as colonies with all the accompanying 
baggage the term brings, led to the view that Western Greek settlements were culturally 
dependent and thus their study „secondary and derivative to the study of the polis‟ in 
mainland Greece.
29
  Not only culturally dependent, but De Angelis asserts that Dunbabin 
„smoothed over‟ the differences that existed in the British Empire,30 leading to ideas of 
cultural unity which Greco believed to exist only in the modern imagination.
31
  These strands 
were brought together by De Angelis to create an image of a Greek world in which the 
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Western settlements and those of mainland Greece, such as Megara Hyblaia and Megara, 
developed into poleis concurrently,
32
 with the settlements of the West exhibiting differences 
the result of the very different and varied contexts in which their development took place.
33
  
This vision can be seen as having gained from a critical study of earlier scholarship with its 
assumptions of „colonies‟ culturally dependent on mother cities, aping what existed in the 
latter, and in which the unifying proclivities of the imperial mind was applied onto the past as 
well as the present. 
For De Angelis, „earlier generations of scholars tended to equate the Greek cities 
founded outside Greece in the 8
th
 to 6
th
 centuries BC with modern European colonies.‟  They 
fail to recognise, he claims, how great were the differences.  Greek cities formed separate, 
independent, entities, as, he points out, Finley and Graham knew.
34
  As we shall see, it is not 
so clear cut that earlier scholarship was guilty of such distortions, but that is a later 
discussion.  There lies within the study of Greek settlement overseas a further distortion 
which is particular to British scholars, or more correctly, those from the British Empire.  T.J. 
Dunbabin, as De Angelis argued, regarded indigenous peoples to be of little note, and thus it 
is implied inferior to the Greek settlers; yet that between the colonist and the colonised, to use 
the older terminology, were not the only hierarchical distinctions made.  Dunbabin, an 
Australian himself, saw Greek colonies as culturally dependent on the mother city, a 
distortion which as De Angelis rightly states finds resonance in 1930s attitudes concerning 
the dominions and their relationship with Britain.
35
  Therefore the hierarchy was seen as one 
of native – Greek colonist – mainland Greek (in ascending order).   
This notion of hierarchy is most clearly demonstrated in Gillian Shepherd‟s 
discussion of nineteenth and earlier twentieth century British views on Greek, and by 
extension, English colonisation.  Shepherd demonstrated how the British, or rather English, 
considered colonisation to be a phenomenon almost synonymous with themselves and 
connected with the very vigour of their race.  The urge to classify resulting from an age of 
expansion and the social (mis)application of Darwin‟s ideas led to the notion that the Anglo-
Saxon peoples occupied the apex of humanity.  In terms of historical writing, modern analogy 
fused with such ideas so that in the ancient world the Greeks and Romans („depending upon 
                                                 
32
 De Angelis (2003), 204. 
33
 De Angelis (2003), 206. 
34
 De Angelis (1998), 539.  See M.I. Finley, „Colonies – an attempt at a typology‟, Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society 26 (1976), 167-88, The Ancient Greeks (1971), and A.J. Graham, Colony and Mother City in 
Ancient Greece (Chicago: 1983), xvii, 5. 
35
 T.J. Dunbabin, The Western Greeks (1948), vi, cited in De Angelis (1998), 542.  
18 
 
the period under discussion‟) occupied the same elevated positions as the English did in the 
modern.  Analogies derived from this source also enveloped the study of colonisation.  If 
Owen is concerned about the distorting assumptions of asymmetrical power relations, then 
Shepherd more so with hierarchy within the „colonial‟ world, and in this work she focuses on 
how British (and indeed „colonial‟) scholars saw not only native peoples, but also „colonial‟ 
Greeks as subservient and culturally inferior to or dependent upon those of the mainland – 
reflecting, it is argued, their own views on the white settler colonies.  The use of analogy 
distorted the ancient reality.
36
 
 Shepherd‟s points are supported by reference to the writings of Gwynn (1918), 
Dunbabin (1948) and Woodhead (1962) on the Western Greeks and the analogies they 
consciously drew between the British Empire and Greek colonisation, leading to misleading 
notions of native inferiority to colonising Greeks themselves culturally subordinate to those 
of the mainland.  This theme of colonial dependence is further supported analysis of 
Dinsmoor‟s study of Greek architecture (1927,1950) and his apparent surprise at the Western 
Greek achievement in temple building, something swiftly followed by explaining it away as 
merely provincial ostentation polluted by barbaric native influences.
37
  E.A. Freeman, in 
particular his history of Sicily, is given substantial attention for his apparent application of 
imperial and racial ideas.
38
  As I shall argue in due course, although largely correct in 
recognising that Freeman distorts Sicilian Greek history by applying contemporary ideas, this 
treatment of Freeman needs more contextualisation: Freeman‟s racial and so called imperial 
ideas are imperfectly understood and he had more to contribute to the study of colonisation 
than is at first apparent.  The notion that British scholars wrote of Greek colonisation as 
though it were like British colonisation in the sense that colonies were dependent, at times 
inferior, to their mother cities is overall presented as some kind of coherent, consistent theme.  
Whether it stands up to scrutiny involving sources other than such late scholars as Dunabin 
and those mentioned above will soon be addressed.  In fact, their views on how „statist‟ 
British colonisation was will surprise us.   
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 G. Shepherd, „The Advance of the Greek: Greece, Great Britain and Archaeological Empires‟, in H. Hurst and 
S. Owen (eds.), Ancient Colonizations: Analogy, Similarity & Difference (London: Duckworth, 2005), 23-44. 
37
 Shepherd (2005), 29-43. 
38
 Shepherd (2005), 25-28. 
19 
 
Colonist and Native 
 
The subject of relations between Greek settlers and indigenous peoples has been at the 
centre of recent works about colonisation.
39
  This is due in no small part to the influence of 
postcolonial approaches which seek to unseat the dominance of colonialist writings about the 
past by demonstrating that they are no more than representations with a vested interest in 
depicting the colonised „other‟ as inferior.  Postcolonial ideas first made an impact in other, 
more modern fields of research, but ever since the revived interest in colonisation scholars 
have not been slow to identify distortions caused by a colonialist mindset in earlier 
scholarship.  De Angelis refers to how T.J. Dunbabin assumed the native people of Sicily to 
have been of little note, or rather read the evidence in a way which suited his more general 
outlook – he found „little to suggest that the Greeks mixed much with Sikel or Italian peoples, 
or learnt much from them‟.40  Another clearly influenced by such ideas is Dougherty, who 
claims that Greek stories about sixth century colonisation in Sicily or the Black sea in the 
seventh century are „no less culturally constructed than nineteenth century British tales of 
empire in India or Africa; they are every bit as much about power, language, and cultural 
appropriation.‟41  This is a very explicit comparison between what she sees as two colonialist 
sets of writings, and the debt is clearer still in that she regards her work to be about the 
„representation‟ rather than the „realia‟ of colonisation;42 representations because her source 
material (Greek texts) cannot be anything more than constructs.  We see two things in these 
relatively early works by Dougherty and De Angelis.  Firstly ancient Greek sources are 
thought to be colonialist in perspective and thus in terms of what they say about indigenous 
peoples amount to no more than representation.  Secondly, earlier scholarship, predictably 
based on such ancient sources, apply a second layer of distortion derived from modern 
colonial prejudices. 
 In The Poetics of Colonization  Dougherty draws attention to the violence she sees as 
inherent in a colonising venture, violence that can be gleaned above all from a reading of the 
literary evidence, be it Mimermos‟ description of a violent colonisation of Colophon (Strabo 
14.1.4), the fact that ancient texts refer to founders such as Syracuse‟s Archias as murderers 
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(Plutarch, Moralia 772-773b), that Thucydides sees the Greek settlers as expelling natives 
from Ortygia (Thuc. 6.3.2), or that colonisation is frequently expressed in gendered terms 
with the violent act of colonisation mirroring marriage and symbolising the taming or 
civilising of what is wild and virgin – landscape or woman (Pindar, Pythian 9).43  The 
problem is, of course, that such literary evidence is later than the earliest cases of Greek 
settlement overseas.  While the poets in question, Archilochos and Mimnermos (dated c.650 
and 600 respectively),
 
were indeed contemporary with some acts of colonisation, they 
certainly were not contemporary with eighth-century settlement. Later scholarship adds a 
further dimension to such postcolonial inspired interpretations: Dougherty tells us important 
things about how Greeks of the later Archaic and Classical periods saw colonisation, but it 
does not, of course, follow that earlier Archaic reality must also have seen similar violence 
and what Owen, critical of our assumption of it, termed „asymmetrical power relations‟.44 
 Owen co-edited one of the most recent volumes on the subject of ancient colonisation 
and its historiography, contributing an article on „Analogy, Archaeology and Archaic Greek 
Colonization‟.  The discussion centres on the harmful influence of analogies with modern 
European colonialism, which it is claimed has led scholars to adopt a series of assumptions 
about ancient Greek colonisation owing more to the modern than the ancient world.  Owen 
summarises traditional views of Greek colonisation as follows: it is an organised act of 
individual or state for „specific ends‟ (land or trade), indigenous inhabitants are deprived of 
their land by foul means enabled by the „military and cultural superiority of the Greeks‟, 
natives attempt to imitate Greek culture, and what intermarriage there is involves Greek men 
and local women – „symbolic of this asymmetrical relationship.‟45  It seems that for Owen, 
the latter is one of the key problems with traditional assumptions, and should be questioned.
46
  
In keeping with the broader shift against literary evidence, she contends a more 
archaeological approach would provide a different view on issues of ethnicity and relations 
between Greek newcomers and native peoples.
47
  Her work on Thrace represents such a 
revisionist approach, acting against the prevailing Greco-centric trends in Bulgarian 
scholarship which deny the Thracians „agency‟.  By taking a long term archaeological 
perspective Owen seeks to demonstrate that ideas of asymmetrical power relations with 
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Greeks imparting their culture to others does not apply.  Instead the emphasis is on a 
„complex model of social change which results, finally, in the drawing in of Greeks (among 
others) into social networks of exchange.  It was social change within Thracian society itself 
which led to it becoming outward looking, initiating contacts with other peoples – in stark 
contrast to the idea „that contact with Greeks leads to social change.‟  Cultural interactions 
with Greeks happened before Greek settlement, and their pottery was not seen as exotic but 
rather for everyday use.  When they did come, Greeks fitted in to the existing religious 
landscape.
48
 
 Owen‟s use of the term „agency‟ is telling, as it is a key concept in postcolonial 
approaches as it is used to demonstrate how those once regarded as inferior, more recently 
downtrodden, but in both cases passive victims, were in fact nothing of the sort – but had 
agency.  In fact Owen‟s work seems to mirror the periphery versus metropolis debate in 
modern imperial history centring on the issue of whether events on the periphery or the 
imperial center determined the development of imperialism.  The most radical version of the 
interpretation which emerged following decolonisation is that „the fundamental cause of 
imperialism is to be found on the periphery itself.‟  This view is not without its critics, with 
Cain and Hopkins, authors of a major reappraisal of British Imperialism, suggesting it fails to 
distinguish symptoms from causes.
49
  Such approaches, and that of Owen, have their merits 
in attempting to redress an imbalance, but it is worth asking whether they are in fact going 
too far.  Owen‟s Thracians, here cast into the role of what one may call the „new natives‟, 
agents of their own destiny, are in fact those responsible for the Greek involvement – it is 
„complex‟ developments within their own society which draws the Greeks in.  The danger 
with these approaches is that we substitute one set of assumptions, comprising of Greek 
cultural superiority and asymmetrical power relations, with another, where we assume, and 
our interpretations are guided by the assumption, that asymmetrical power relations were 
unlikely, that Greeks, wherever they went, were reacting to the initiative of indigenous 
peoples.  This brings to mind John Boardman‟s recent criticism that if anything, there exists 
an anti-Greek prejudice in current archaeology.
50
 
 In her critique of Boardman‟s views, probably inspired as much by his recent 
criticisms as his now (in)famous statement (of many years ago) that „in the west the Greeks 
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had nothing to learn, much to teach‟51, Hodos states that Boardman‟s view is an „essentialist‟ 
one, with „little consideration of acts of agency on the part of non-Greeks, nor of any 
reciprocity.‟52  Boardman‟s views fitted onto the broader canvas of Hellenisation, itself 
imbued with similar ideas such as „a passive acceptance of Greek material goods and 
ideologies‟ by non-Greeks, and a lack of  agency for the latter nor reciprocity between them 
and the Greeks.  The onset of postcolonial approaches, Hodos argues, has resulted in a more 
nuanced view of the Greeks overseas; especially of the „responses of other cultures to the 
Greeks‟ resulting from direct contact.  She continues to describe how the „ideologies of 
postcolonial scholarship strive to articulate the active histories of the colonised and to 
deconstruct the binary models of colonized and colonizers.‟  Boardman‟s criticisms that we 
have merely replaced old prejudices with new ones are dismissed as ignoring the „fact‟ that 
postcolonial scholarship does not deny the impact of colonising culture, but rather continues 
to „assess their influences‟, now taking into account „notions of agency, reciprocity and 
hybrid developments in the process.‟53   
Boardman‟s views may be considered old-fashioned, and it may be tempting to read 
into his comments a disinclination on the part of a more traditional scholar to adapt to current 
thinking.
54
  However his criticisms deserve more than such a dismissal.  It is unclear that he 
ignores the fact that postcolonial scholarship acknowledges colonial impact; rather it seems 
more a case of attempting to argue that „old prejudices‟ have been replaced by modern ones, 
leading to too radical a swing towards indigenous agency in the pendulum of Greek-
indigenous relations.
55
  After all, postcolonial writing is as embedded in a charged political 
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context as is colonial writing.  That the impact of colonising (or settling) cultures is still taken 
into account is scarcely surprising – there would be little validity to what would otherwise be 
a very incomplete account of indigenous-settler relations (which may or may not take the 
form of colonial situations).  Without doubt a greater consideration of what part the 
indigenous played in bringing about foreign settlement (and colonial situations, for they are 
not necessarily the same thing), and how indigenous peoples perceived and acted in response 
to that situation can only give a more accurate picture, but the point which Boardman raises 
remains salient: can it not be argued that owing to their ideological and scholarly debt to 
postcolonial writings born of anti-colonial struggle, modern scholars are predisposed to 
privilege non-Greek agency, influence, and achievement? Admitting as much would not be to 
dismiss the value of postcolonial perspectives, but rather add greater depth to them, 
demonstrating them to be products of certain historical contexts imbued with their own 
concerns and preoccupations which both contribute to and limit their value as interpretive 
concepts for viewing the past. 
Another recent example of the application of postcolonial ideas to Greek colonisation 
is Irad Malkin‟s „Postcolonial Concepts and Ancient Greek Colonization‟.  One of his main 
points of contention is quite similar to De Angelis‟ ideas about „culture contact‟: colonialism 
is not a good way of looking at the archaic Greek past.  Malkin‟s reasoning is that the 
colonialism implies a form of „binarism‟, and as a creation of a Judeo-Christian-Islamic 
monotheistic past „binarism‟ is not appropriate for the period shortly before Aristotle, who 
was among the first to fit Greeks and barbarians into an oppositional model.
56
  Instead Malkin 
argues for a world which was concerned less about ethnic divisions, and instead exhibited 
fluidity.  „Binarism‟ is inappropriate as there was no central Greek “place”, but instead 
hundreds of Greek city-states.  Accordingly, other peoples were not “others” as „their lands 
possessed a familiar, even expected, environment‟.  In such a world Archaic Greek identity 
was „neither formed nor reinforced oppositionally‟.57  Rather, it was a world in which an 
aristocratic, nonethnic, network was easily extendable whether or not one‟s ally was a 
Greek.
58
  This lack of exclusivity in terms of ethnicity was mirrored in terms of belief, as 
polytheism was a „world system of diverse sameness‟ – in contrast to the European conquest 
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of the New World – and we should „look for a more sophisticated difference within a 
“sameness,” as the Greeks seem to have done.‟59   
He argues that Athenian Klerouchoi were the closest that Greeks ever came to a 
colonial situation,
60
 and that „Greek colonies never became so predominant as to change the 
cultures and languages of local populations fundamentally.... instead of domination, 
especially during the Archaic period, what characterized contact with local populations was 
cultural negotiation and mediation.‟ In this his views, and application of postcolonial ideas 
from other disciplines, coincide with those of De Angelis: „What characterized such early 
colonial encounters was therefore not conquest and domination but the emergence of a 
material and cultural Middle Ground.‟ 61  
 The „Middle Ground‟ was coined by historian Richard White in his work on relations 
between Indians and Europeans in the Great Lakes region of North America from the 
seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries.
62
  White argued that this specific historical 
context was not one of sweeping conquests and the destruction of natives but rather the lack 
of an all powerful authority.  This appealed to Malkin, who drawing on other historical 
parallels from such sources as the Medieval period and the work of Robert Bartlett,
63
 
commented that „too often we think of colonization in terms of the conquest that it became in 
later generations.  But it is the inability to dictate, that is, the lack of hegemonic control over 
vast territories, that lies at the heart of the colonial experience.‟64  Instead of seeing things in 
terms of an all powerful coloniser the emphasis should be on the limits of colonial power, and 
the „Middle Ground‟, as a concept, allows a more sophisticated view: „each side plays a role 
dictated by what it perceives as the other‟s perception of it, resulting from the mutual 
misrepresentation of values and practices‟.  These misunderstandings create a third 
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civilisation, neither native nor foreign, and there is a „shift in the conventions of both 
colonizer and colonized‟.65   
 For Malkin the „Middle Ground‟ is an useful tool for „problematizing the relationships 
of colonists and indigenous populations‟ as it insists on „historical contextualization and 
careful study of social practices and representations‟66  We may also infer he sees it as 
providing sufficient „agency‟ to indigenous peoples, and is part of a move away from 
approaches in which „ancient Greeks are treated as though they were both “white” and 
“European,” the people who both put together and kept rocking the cradle of Western 
civilisation.‟67  That cradle is to be replaced by that of the Mediterranean itself, that great 
network of exchanges, and as such a concept which discourages the idea of Greeks simply 
imparting to natives and vice versa.
68
  This idea of the Mediterranean, no doubt influenced by 
The Corrupting Sea,
69
 finds expression in the interconnectedness of Greek states.  Greek 
colonisation inevitably forms part of this network, but it is not the same as more modern 
examples of extensive networks of trade and settlement: 
 
Greek colonization illustrates the prior existence of modalities different from 
modern colonialism.  Although often treated in modern scholarship as “Western” 
in culture and conduct, Greek colonization indicates, on the contrary, the 
existence of a world diametrically opposed to the hierarchical, centralized, 
concept of the Christian-territorial kingdom or empire... Nonhierarchical and 
nonexclusionary, Greek colonization shared in a wide-ranging network that 
included various native populations and other maritime colonists, such as the 
Phoenicians and the Etruscans. 
 
All in all a different world to that of the European imagination, and Malkin speaks of the 
contemporary need to theorize our postcolonial world – casting doubt on essentialism and 
accepted hierarchies.
70
  He also speaks of his doubt that „such helpful concepts could have 
emerged without changes in our own prisms of observation and new questions posed by 
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postcolonial theorists.  These now allow (and are prodding) historians of antiquity to see 
ancient colonization in a different light.‟71   
One wonders, however, whether Malkin appreciates that it was changes in the prism 
of their observation which led earlier scholars to see the ancient world in the way they did.  
That aside, if „culture contact‟ is not a neutral term, then „Middle Ground‟ is most certainly 
not.  Rather it suggests accommodation, conciliation, or indeed, a „middle ground‟(!).  That 
ancient societies were not hierarchical and exclusionary on grounds of ethnicity, for example, 
does not mean that colonial type (i.e. exploitative) relations between newcomers and prior 
inhabitants could not occur.  To discount the possibility of ethnic conflict is also dubious – it 
can at times be expedient and intertwined with status (e.g. Spartans and Helots).  Therefore 
while the substance of the „Middle Ground‟, that is the way that cultures can change in 
interaction with one another, shaping themselves in relation to their misconceived notions of 
„the other‟, may be useful, the term itself could potentially lead us to the same trap as „culture 
contact‟, and approaches stemming from postcolonial ideas more generally.  We might make 
ourselves intent on not seeing colonialism precisely because it is undesirable.   
 
A Summary 
 
   In this discussion I have attempted to give a fair assessment of current scholarship 
and its views about Greek settlement overseas and its earlier historiography.  The intention is 
to avoid using recent works selectively in order to create a „straw man‟, or rather „straw 
scholar‟ whose views of Greek settlement owes as much to a current mindset as it does to the 
past, and of whose views of earlier scholarship is simplistic and thus easier to disprove in the 
subsequent discussion.  It is hoped that were one to amalgamate different views outlined 
above into one hypothetical scholar representing current thought, that that scholar would be 
justly representative.  It is argued that the position of the „current scholar‟ is as follows:   
The terminology used for colonisation has led to misconceptions, and the double 
layered distortions of Classical and modern writers colouring the past with their own much 
more „colonial‟ presents have fused with the suspect terminology to provide further 
misconception.  In addition, the privileging of such evidence such as the Classical and literary 
has led to the use of other types of evidence – namely archaeological – being misdirected 
towards confirming distorting ideas.  All the above misconceptions have become mutually 
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supporting, leading to a view of Greek settlement overseas which a) puts too much emphasis 
on state involvement, not enough on individual enterprise, and b) accepts uncritically later 
foundation traditions and so posits a close and dependent relationship between „colony‟ and 
„mother city‟ (while colonial ideas have left a residue of notions of  „colonial inferiority‟) and 
c) sees relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples as mirroring later colonial (Classical 
Greek and modern European) experiences in which Greeks are superior agents of cultural 
change whereas indigenous peoples are unsophisticated and passive recipients.  Rather, we 
should be thinking in terms of cultural interaction as being a two-way thing, and we should 
not automatically think that Greeks were always ascendant – even militarily – and that there 
were unequal power relations.  There is debate as to whether we should be thinking of Greek 
settlement overseas as part of a wider phenomenon of „colonialism‟ at all – as that assumes 
unequal power relations whereas „culture contact‟ was probably a more widespread 
experience.  In terms of earlier scholarship it is steeped in colonial ideas from the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, identifying with Greek colonists, viewing indigenous peoples as 
inferior to the former and passive recipients of their culture when not being subjugated, all 
reinforced by racial ideas.  In a further hierarchy, Greek colonies are regarded as culturally 
dependent on mother cities in the same way as the British settler colonies were to their 
mother country.   
What of the weaknesses of this view?  Whereas new approaches have undoubtedly 
been of great value in offering an entirely different way of seeing Greek settlement overseas, 
it is in some respects too sharp a swing in a different direction.  While still taking into 
account the impact of Greek settlers, there has been a shift against seeing Greek involvement 
as a violent affair in which unequal power relations can arise.  Phrases such as „culture 
contact‟ or „Middle Ground‟ imply more peaceful encounters, and while that is a welcome 
change from one sided accounts of Greek arrival, conquest, ascendancy, and there is ample 
awareness of how our own contemporary ideas influence the way we think about this aspect 
of the past, this awareness is not always reflected in the interpretations themselves.   We have 
gone from looking for unequal relations to looking for peaceful interactions and cultural 
contact, and seem to privilege such interpretation over other, harsher, possibilities.  Terms 
such as the „Middle Ground‟ are a further indication of this – the term itself, suggesting 
mediation, accommodation, and compromise, is laden with connotations.  These are very 
important issues, as they concern the way we approach the subject – it is therefore crucial that 
we are as open minded as possible about what we might find.  Instead of adopting and 
applying new theoretical approaches, we should be storing them as a new set of ideas to 
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complement those already in existence, all of which offer different possibilities, different 
ways of seeing the past. 
The aim of this thesis is not, however, to comment on the historical reality of Greek 
settlement overseas.  The focus will be on the extent to which contemporary experiences and 
ideas influenced the way scholars writing in a British cultural and intellectual context wrote 
about „Greek colonisation‟.  The method will be first to contextualise the scholarship by 
explaining the relevant political, imperial, colonial and intellectual climate of a given period   
with specific reference to the importance of antiquity in shaping the relevant debates.  Then 
there will follow an examination of the way in which the authors in question deal with what 
is a very specific aspect of Greek history, interrogating their works for evidence of distortions 
motivated or caused by an imperial or colonial mindset, and doing so against the framework 
set by the criticisms of recent scholarship: colonisation as an act of state, colonial 
dependence, and civilising natives.  Of course, in order to be able to do so it is critical to be 
able to gauge to what extent they deviate from the evidence at their disposal.  It follows, quite 
naturally, therefore, that we must first establish the nature of that evidence – which authors 
discuss colonisation, in what sorts of contexts did they write, what information do they 
provide, and how does that predominantly literary ancient evidence relate to our three key 
themes?  The next chapter will discuss the ancient literary evidence, addressing its context, 
the information it provides, and the impression it gives of the nature of Greek settlement 
overseas in relation to its causes and the three associated themes of state action, colonial 
dependence, and native interactions. 
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Chapter 3: Ancient sources and ancient perceptions of Greek settlement overseas 
 
 The main responses to the study of „Greek colonisation‟ have been discussed in the 
previous chapter.  We have seen how they can be characterised as critiquing earlier 
scholarship for applying distorting imperial perspectives and colonial analogy to create a 
structure of thought in which Greek settlement overseas is misnamed and misrepresented as 
colonising and colonial and thus misleading in three main ways:  „colonies‟ are state 
foundations, „colonies‟ are seen as in varying states of dependence to a „mother city‟, and 
relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples are cast in colonial terms, as those between 
conquerors and vanquished, innovators and imitators, superiors and inferiors.  The aim of this 
chapter is to aid the main purpose of the thesis, which is to examine in more detail, with 
reference to a broader range of scholars and a broader chronological perspective, the saliency 
of such criticisms to British scholarly perspectives of Greek settlement overseas.   It will do 
so by providing the ancient basis (what the ancient literary evidence says in relation to our 
three interpretive themes) by which we can judge the accounts of modern scholars.  The 
rationale behind this is that in order to determine to what extent contemporary colonial 
experiences lead scholars to distort antiquity, we need to first determine to what extent they 
depart from what the evidence at their disposal can reasonably be interpreted to say.  For that 
reason, we evidently must have an understanding of the nature of that evidence.   
 As a further element of complication, to some, the very idea of „Greek colonization‟ is 
meaningful only in terms of literary tradition, and that to pursue „this construct‟ is „as 
complete a subordination of archaeology to the slavery of text-based history as one could 
imagine‟.1  Furthermore, it has been said that the privileging of the literary evidence 
reinforces
2
 the distorting lens of European colonialism and imperialism‟3 and associated 
assumptions regarding „the ascendancy of a higher over a lower civilisation‟.4  In this view, 
the traditional idea of a „Greek colonisation‟, expressed with greatly varying imperialistic 
virulence from Grote to Freeman through to Dunbabin,
5
 is in fact to a degree rooted in fifth 
and fourth century literary sources.  The sources are themselves held to be guilty of 
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„inappropriate retrojections of classical models into the archaic period‟.  Thus not only have 
modern historians imposed their present onto the Archaic past; so did Classical historians.  
Our much maligned traditional view is „a product of the interplay between ancient and 
modern ideologies of colonization‟.6  This raises another issue – even if our modern authors 
are faithful to the literary evidence at their disposal, this does not necessarily diminish the 
„colonial‟ nature of their accounts because they derive their evidence from ancient authors 
writing in ancient (mainly) fifth century contexts which were themselves „colonial‟.7 As such 
it is necessary to consider the value of our ancient sources for the study of, if not Archaic 
Greek colonisation, then what Boardman cannily titled The Greeks Overseas.
8
  The chapter 
will, therefore, be divided into three parts.  It will begin by discussing the sources available 
for the study of Greek settlement overseas with a view to commenting on their utility as 
sources for the Archaic period.  This will be followed by an examination of the causes or 
reasons given by ancient sources for Greek settlement overseas in its various guises, as the 
reasons for colonisation – which involves the attribution of motives – can be of direct 
relevance to the thinking behind modern reconstructions of ancient colonisation and attempts 
on our part to discern the presence or absence of modern impositions in such accounts.  
Consider, for instance, how motives such as overpopulation, emigration and colonisation on 
the part of „undesirables‟, the desire for land or trade could find resonance equally in modern 
and ancient accounts of settlement overseas.  Disentangling ancient evidence from modern 
experience can be fraught with difficulty, and hence it is important to be clear as to what 
image of motives our ancient sources give.  The third and final part will look to establish 
what our ancient sources tell us about the nature of settlement overseas in relation to our three 
interpretive themes. 
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The Sources for Greek colonisation 
  
Homer and colonisation  
 
Homer may appear an unconventional source for Greek settlement overseas, but if 
arguments against using fifth and fourth century accounts as sources for Archaic history rest 
on the idea that such authorities tell us more about their own times than that they purport to 
describe, then by same reasoning might not an eighth-century source, even if, or indeed 
especially if it were concerned with an earlier period, be able to tell us something of the 
nature of eighth-century Greek society?
9
  The dating of the Homeric epics remains, of course, 
somewhat contentious, and it is noteworthy that colonisation has played a part in such 
debates.  Finley, for instance, contested the idea that the world of Odysseus was that of the 
eighth or seventh century because, among other things, there was „no colonization‟.10  Others 
have used the presence of colonisation in Homer as evidence for its eighth-century 
provenance,
11
 and so there is clearly some confusion – and it most likely rests with the 
assumption that something called colonisation happened in the eighth century, and that there 
is a lack of consistency in terms of understandings of what colonisation is.  There have been 
attempts to address this muddle.  Wilson, critical of the desire in scholarship to trace ancient 
evidence for a traditional model of colonisation back to the start of the archaic period, 
examined the validity of using Homer as evidence for colonisation.
12
  Focusing on three key 
passages which have drawn the attention of other scholars, he argued that they were variously 
reflections of Dark Age migrations to Ionia, examples of pre-colonisation, or wandering 
myths relating to the Dark Age.  As such none of these passages were „reflective of colonial 
ideologies‟.13  The problem with his approach, however, is that he examined the passages for 
evidence of „colonial ideology‟ relating to the „traditional model‟ of colonisation largely 
derived from the interplay between modern and later, fifth century, Greek ideas of 
colonisation.  One simply is not going to find colonisation in an eighth-century source, but in 
looking for it we are „testing‟ Homer for the wrong thing and in doing so neglect to consider 
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to what extent Homer‟s depiction of settlement overseas could reflect an early Archaic reality 
quite different to the „colonial‟ model of later invention, and more like the image put forward 
in more recent reappraisals.  In this way Wilson‟s analysis is confined by the very distorting 
ideas his study looks to unseat.  Looking for colonisation is not the best way forward – we 
should be looking at Homer, as an eighth-century source, depicts Greek settlement overseas.   
Let us consider the passages Wilson examines.  Greco argued that parts of the 
following passage (Odyssey 6.2-10) give us „the clearest and most ancient description of a 
Greek colonial foundation‟14: 
 
...αὐηὰξ Ἀζήλε βῆ ῥ᾽ ἐο Φαηήθσλ ἀλδξ῵λ δῆκόλ ηε πόιηλ ηε, νἳ πξὶλ κέλ πνη᾽ 
ἔλαηνλ ἐλ εὐξπρόξῳ Ὑπεξείῃ, ἀγρνῦ Κπθιώπσλ ἀλδξ῵λ ὑπεξελνξεόλησλ, νἵ 
ζθεαο ζηλέζθνλην, βίεθη δὲ θέξηεξνη ἦζαλ. ἔλζελ ἀλαζηήζαο ἄγε Ναπζίζννο 
ζενεηδήο, εἷζελ δὲ Σρεξίῃ, ἑθὰο ἀλδξ῵λ ἀιθεζηάσλ, ἀκθὶ δὲ ηεῖρνο ἔιαζζε πόιεη, 
θαὶ ἐδείκαην νἴθνπο, θαὶ λενὺο πνίεζε ζε῵λ, θαὶ ἐδάζζαη᾽ ἀξνύξαο. 
 
...but Athene went to the land and the city of the Phaeacian men, who formerly 
lived in spacious Hypereia, near the stronger and overweening Cyclopes who 
would plunder them.  Thereupon Nausithous the godlike leader raised them and 
placed them in Scheria – far from the toils of man – drew a wall around the city, 
and built houses, and made temples of the gods, and divided the lands.
15
 
 
Dougherty thought it a colonial history of the Phaeacians,
16
 whereas Wilson agreed with 
Demand that it was more a case of „urban relocation‟.   Unlike Demand, whose explanation 
had as its basis mid seventh century expulsions from Ionia, Wilson thought it to refer to Dark 
Age migrations to Ionia.  For Wilson, then, it was more likely to refer to past migrations than 
a contemporary „colonization movement‟.17  Considering that the passage sounds very much 
like the act of setting up a new polis (which scholars argue may or may not have been 
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established by the eighth century) it is somewhat strange to suggest that it more readily 
resembles an even earlier period: surely the act of delineating a city by its walls, of building 
temples, but most especially dividing the land must relate to the process of establishing a 
polis-style community?
18
  Furthermore, it seems that the rationale behind dismissing this as 
an example of colonisation is that it was a case of forced migration.  Yet surely asking 
whether or not this looks like colonisation – understood as a state decision to further its 
interests, or as the decision of a late archaic community to be rid of part of its population (e.g. 
Herodotus, Thera, and Cyrene) – is the wrong question entirely.  It forces us to look at the 
eighth century through a later prism, and obscures the questions we should be asking – such 
as how does Homer depict Greek settlement overseas, and to what extent can this contribute 
to a still fairly general understanding of the eighth-century environment.  In other words, the 
fact that this passage may not be about colonisation does not mean it is not about the eighth 
century and the sort of settlement overseas which existed in the early Archaic period. 
 This problem is also evident with the next passage (Odyssey 9.116-41), usually seen, 
according to Wilson, as a „colonial fantasy island‟.19  It details a fertile island with a fine 
harbour which a seagoing people would have populated.  Wilson disagrees with Dougherty 
that this represented the opportunities of a new (colonial) world, agreeing instead with 
Malkin that it has more likely parallels in a „pre-colonial‟ world, or a world of exploration as 
opposed to colonisation.
20
  As such, Homer is not a source for the late eighth century.  Again 
this argument is based on a false premise – the question asked of the evidence is whether it 
portrays a „colonial‟ situation comparable to that presented by late archaic or classical 
sources.  It is clearly „pre-colonial‟ because it is a source much earlier than late archaic and 
classical ventures which can more accurately be characterised as „colonial‟ – but it does not, 
therefore, necessarily depict a situation predating Greek settlement overseas in the eighth 
century, a process which recent reinterpretations (e.g. Osborne) suggest to have been fluid, 
piecemeal, and the result of such private initiatives in any case.  The fact that Odysseus does 
not settle on this island, and that it depicts virgin land unlikely to exist in the eighth century 
when the west was probably well known, do not mean that this therefore depicts a ninth or 
early eighth-century situation.    Instead, it is quite possible that this is precisely how so-
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called colonisation, or rather settlement overseas, was conceived of by eighth-century Greeks.  
The important thing is the concept in Odysseus‟ mind that this is a place worth settling and 
that a seagoing people (i.e. the Greeks) would have done so, thus indicating the existence of 
the idea of overseas settlement.  Consider how this could relate to the first passage which 
details how such a settlement might be organised.  Furthermore, the supposedly uninhabited 
nature of the island fits in well with the idea that this is above all a glimpse of the promise of 
settlement overseas and not necessarily its reality.  This is a point to bear in mind – Homer is 
not deliberately depicting eighth-century realities.  Rather, we are asking whether we can 
identify certain mentalities or concepts consistent with the eighth-century world put forward 
by recent reimaginings of Greek settlement overseas.   
 The final passage Wilson considers is from the Iliad and concerns Tlepolemos, who 
having killed his father‟s much loved uncle, decided to build ships, gather a large band of 
followers, and „set off in exile over the seas‟.  Eventually, and after much hardship, they 
came to Rhodes and settled there in three tribes, becoming miraculously wealthy by the will 
of Zeus.  Tlepolemos set off to Troy with nine ships from Rhodes (Iliad 2.650-675). This 
resembles what we are told of a man named Meges, who had quarrelled with his father and 
then moved to Doulichion, leading forty ships from that place – clearly implying that he took 
with him his followers and did not simply settle Doulichion alone (Iliad 2.625-30).
21
  
Dougherty referred to the parallels between these tales and later foundation myths relating to 
archaic settlement overseas.  Compare these foundation stories to that of Syracuse whose 
founder, Archias, had according to Diodorus Siculus been responsible for the death of a boy 
in his native Corinth (Diodorus, 8.10).  Given the choice between wealth and health by 
Apollo, he chose wealth, and went on to found a proverbially wealthy city (Strabo, 6.2.4).   
For Dougherty the murder which caused a „colonising‟ expedition was symbolic of the 
violence inherent in the act of colonisation itself; Wilson objects that the Homeric example is 
not the same as it does not include reference to pollution and the consultation of the Delphic 
oracle, and thus does not fit into the general schema for foundation myths Dougherty drew.  
Instead passages such as these are more in keeping with other tales of wandering heroes 
present in the Homeric epics, and more likely to be based on „earlier periods of population 
movements‟22   
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It is of course possible that the accounts of settlement overseas in Homer relate to an 
earlier period rather than the poet‟s own day (which is another way of saying the time in 
which the epics were crystallised).  Yet it is going too far to suggest that this basis in earlier 
events is „more likely‟.  On the contrary, as far as this uncertain issue is concerned there is no 
more evidence, and the arguments are no stronger, for Homer‟s accounts relating to a more 
distant past than they are for a time nearer crystallisation.  Homer (understood as an eighth-
century source), and much later fifth century sources (or sources later still but derived from 
the latter), both contain accounts of inglorious motivations for settlement overseas.  That they 
do so, but do so differently, may be because they are in fact talking about different times, 
different places, and different things altogether.  Yet the differences evident in these accounts 
may be alternatively interpreted as adding to their plausibility: such disparate sources would 
not provide the very same account, and surely the pollution and Delphic consultations Wilson 
sees as an indication of later agendas makes perfect sense in this context – that is, without 
such later additions then would not the fifth century (and later) accounts concerning 
disreputable founders be very similar to our Homeric stories?  We may be dealing with 
similar accounts dressed up differently.  The substance remains.   
Although there may be something in this apparent convergence between tales set in 
the early Archaic period on the part of later authorities, and the evidence in Homer, these 
traditions are on the whole of dubious reality in a specific sense.  Even near contemporary 
sources of the Archaic period, preferring personalisation, are unlikely to have explained 
overseas settlement in political and economic terms.  Perhaps the best we can hope for is that 
in spite of the centuries of manipulation some indication survives of the sorts of reasons why 
people left their homes for foreign lands.  Thus attempting to pin Homer down as „pre-
colonial‟, or anything so specific, notwithstanding the problems inherent with that example 
may be missing the point.  The dating of Homer remains a contentious issue, and thus it is 
simply not possible to say with certainty that the epics are exactly contemporary with 
settlement overseas in the west.
23
  Wilson, for instance, „broadly‟ accepts Raaflaub‟s dating 
of Homer;  although he was writing in the late eighth century, Raaflaub believes Homer was 
deliberately setting his poem in the near past, thus to 800 BC.
24
  This sort of argument is 
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perhaps too chronologically specific for comfort: do we really know enough of eighth-
century Greece to make such distinctions, and narrow them down to decades?  There have 
been arguments against Homer as reflecting any historical society, and certainly not a 
specifically eighth-century one.
25
  This is too pessimistic.  More likely is that the Homeric 
epics reflect the time of their crystallisation, whenever exactly that was,
26
 and that what 
attempts there were to thrust the story into the past came in the form of both archaic 
technology and exaggeration.  For instance the use of bronze instead of iron, and the vast 
catalogue of ships, the latter juxtaposed with an unstable aristocratically-led society that 
makes sense in an eighth-century context.  Such deliberate differences would be far easier to 
conceive of than creating a society different in nature.   Exaggeration is a predictable method 
of dramatisation: had Meges sailed from Doulichion with four rather than forty ships he 
would make a much more credible early Archaic noble setting out to raid distant shores in 
some joint venture.  The main thing I hope to have demonstrated is that we simply cannot 
dismiss Homer as a source for the general conditions of the eighth century, in other words the 
conditions in which century settlement overseas took place, simply because there are no 
traces of colonisation in the text. Colonisation is something later, and eighth-century 
settlement overseas need not have looked anything like it.  
Homeric evidence can be used to add some flesh to the bones of the other limited and 
very imperfect literary evidence, and also the archaeology.  The uncertainty regarding its 
actual crystallisation does not render it useless since we can still use it as a general indication 
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of the kind of society from which the Greeks who settled in the West came.  Being epic 
poetry, with its purpose being to entertain rather than carefully record historical reality, we 
should not in any case really expect Homer to be an accurate reflection of his own day in a 
specific sense.  Even Herodotus thought Homer narrated things he knew were not true, 
because certain versions of events were more appealing than others.
27
  We need to be wary of 
several levels of distortion when analysing the literary sources – there exists not only the 
problem of anachronism caused by distance in time to the events described, but also the 
deliberate 'distortions‟ of contemporary accounts.  If we remain aware of such difficulties, 
however, there is no reason why we cannot use Homer to inform our understanding of an 
early Archaic world and the overseas settlement of that era. 
If we cannot use Homer in a specific sense, it is nonetheless of value as far as the 
study of Greek involvement overseas is concerned in conveying general impressions of the 
Mediterranean.  Homer shows it a harsh and violent environment, due not only to nature, with 
its tempestuous seas manipulated by wrathful gods, but also the societies inhabiting its shores 
and islands like frogs about a pond (Plato, Phaedo 109b).
28
  We see this in Odysseus‟ 
piratical raiding; on his voyage home he and his followers like pirates raid the lands of the 
Cicones, killing the men and dividing among themselves the women (Odyssey 9.40-45).  The 
Cyclops in fact asks Odysseus whether he and his men sail as traders or as pirates roaming 
the seas bringing misfortune to others (Odyssey 9.250-60), and when Odysseus comes to 
inventing for himself a past he speaks of himself as once in command of swift ships sailing 
against foreign shores wining great riches (Odyssey 14.230-35).  Egyptians similarly fell 
victims to this pirate of his invented past, yet Odysseus was to wander further still, falling 
into the company of a cunning Phoenician, accompanying him to Phoenicia and then setting 
sail to Libya, where the Phoenician secretly hoped to sell him into slavery.  Stormy seas 
intervened to prevent this fate (Odyssey 14.260-305). 
It seems its very mobility, and the fact that men were ready to cast themselves out 
onto its dangerous expanses, is part of what made the Mediterranean such an unstable world.  
We see further echoes of this mobility in the Phaeacians, whose men are as able in 
seamanship as their women are deft in weaving (Odyssey 7.109-10), the Phoenicians who 
conspired to steal away the infant Eumaeus, and the Phoenician woman who was a slave in 
                                                 
27
 T.J. Luce, The Greek Historians (1997), 39.  In fact, Herodotus mentions that Homer could have invented a 
particular name (2.20), and that Homer may have been familiar with a story about Paris and Helen in Egypt, 
only choosing not to use it because it was not suitable for epic poetry (2.116). 
28
 L. Casson, „Mediterranean Communications‟, in D. M. Lewis (ed.) et al, The Cambridge Ancient History, 
Vol. 5., The Fifth Century B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Second Edition 1992), 512. 
38 
 
his father‟s household in the first place (Odyssey 15.415-85).  The societies of Homer‟s 
Mediterranean may have been frogs around a pond, but they were frogs who roamed it 
consistently in spite of its many perils, seeking to capitalise on its many opportunities.  
  
Hesiod  
  
Another very early source at our disposal is Hesiod.  West thought him to have 
composed in the last third of the eighth century,
29
 others that he did so in the early seventh 
century.
30
  Murray believed he composed around 700 and that he was either a contemporary 
or within a generation of Homer.
31
  Hesiod‟s Works and Days is a potentially highly valuable 
companion to Homer – if, of course, we are willing to accept that Homer composed his work 
in the eighth century, and that it was then soon committed into writing and thus crystallised.  
The Works and Days is very much a mundane work compared with Homer‟s epics, and 
reflects the more mundane existence of a man lower down the social scale than Homer‟s 
heroes, and perhaps also Homer‟s audience who would have sought to associate themselves 
with the former.  Therefore Hesiod may be used to shed light on those areas cast into the 
shadows by what Raaflaub perceived to be Homer‟s pandering to an aristocratic audience,32 
to whom the poet presented a world of the past which reflected the world of the present as 
they wished it to be.  Hesiod‟s use is not confined to merely complementing Homer, as he is a 
useful source in his own right to those concerned with mobility in the eighth-century 
Mediterranean.  To give one example, Hesiod‟s father was an unsuccessful sea-trader who 
had emigrated from Cyme in Asia Minor to become a farmer at Ascra, in Boeotia (Hesiod, 
Works and Days 630-641).
33
  A further point is that as Hesiod is very much a mundane 
account, and that it contains mention of travel  by sea, then it is possible to draw the 
conclusion that sea travel was a commonplace thing around 700. 
It has been argued that Homer can in some way be used as a source for the general 
environment in which Archaic settlement overseas occurred.  Hesiod can be used rather more 
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specifically, as he provides a specific example (see above) of an Archaic Greek leaving his 
home.  
 
Archilochos  
 
 Datable by a total solar eclipse in 648 BC, Archilochos was born on Paros in the 
seventh century and he and his family took part in the settlement of Thasos.
34
  Archilochos 
contrasts with Homer and Hesiod in that he does speak of overseas settlement directly – 
which is to be explained by the fact that he seems to have actively taken part in such a 
venture, making him a unique source.  Several of the remaining fragments of his work relate 
to the emigration from Paros to Thasos,
35
 some of which make Archilochos quite revealing a 
source for Archaic involvement and settlement across the seas  – and not just in the east.  For 
instance we learn of his disappointment on seeing Thasos‟ bleakness for the first time 
(Archilochos 21), indicating that an overseas venture did not always live up to expectations.  
More interestingly perhaps is that he describes how Thasos, where the misery of all Greece 
converged (Arch. 102), was not as desirable a place as the area surrounding Siris (Arch. 22); 
which of course may well refer to southern Italy, or as Campbell more specifically states, the 
gulf of Taranto.  This would serve as striking testament to a mid seventh century Greek being 
aware of the attractions of that region, perhaps illustrating how widely circulated tales of 
opportunity could be in the Archaic Greek world.  Archilochos also provides insight into the 
conflict which could occur between newcomers and natives in his references to warfare with 
the Thracian tribes (Arch. 5), and in his contempt for the „Thracian dogs‟ (Arch. 93).36  Yet 
here some have urged caution, suggesting that the Greek does not justify the term „dogs‟, 
which is too enthusiastic and too modern sounding a translation influenced by our modern 
assumptions about what a seventh century act of colonisation would have been like.
37
  
Archilochos does speak of settling overseas and of conflict with the indigenous peoples, yet 
there is nothing to suggest that this venture was a strategic act of a centralised state, and thus 
an act of colonisation.  In this way our three earliest sources, and the only Archaic ones 
available to us, are quite consistent.    
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All other sources are later, the main ones available to us being Herodotus, 
Thucydides, Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Strabo.  The first two are 
fifth century accounts, the final three dating to the early Roman Empire.  Yet this is not all, 
for these sources used others now lost to us in the original, but quoted and referred to by 
those we have.  Fundamentally, our more genuinely „Archaic‟ sources, Homer and Hesiod, 
do not speak of Archaic settlement in the West directly.  We may suppose the reason for this 
is because later sources imagined earlier settlement of the west to have been something it was 
not.  Hindsight may have led them to imagine that what were in fact gradual processes, 
perhaps to the Archaic eye even imperceptible ones, were instead single events or 
foundations, thus giving us inaccurate and highly reductive accounts.  Even so we cannot 
however dismiss these accounts without careful consideration. 
 
Herodotus of Halicarnassos 
 
The father of history was not simply concerned with recording great deeds; he had as 
his primary concern explaining why Greeks and Persians came to blows.  According to 
Rhodes, this desire to „establish and explain what has happened in the past‟ is what makes 
him a historian.
38
  Herodotus appears to have known the work of Hecataeus of Miletus.  
Although according to some the latter was not strictly speaking a historian, he is believed to 
have given an account of his role in the Ionian revolt of 499 BC.
39
  It is surely not 
inconceivable that Herodotus learnt of the flight of the Phocaeans in the face of Cyrus, 
believed to have occurred in the mid sixth century, from Hecataeus (Herodotus, 1.163-169).  
Thus Herodotus, due to his access to earlier authorities, could inform us of events reching as 
far back as the mid sixth century and into the Archaic period.  According to Luce, Herodotus 
himself saw a distinction between history and myth – there are things he believed he „knew‟, 
such as Croesus being the first man he knew of who wronged the Greeks (Hdt.1.5-6), 
implying of course that there were other stories of earlier men who did so, only that 
Herodotus thought they could not be properly substantiated.
40
  Rhodes says his line between 
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„prehistory and history‟ was drawn around the mid sixth century – „as far back as the oldest 
men whom he met could have remembered,‟41 citing Thomas‟ assertion that leading Greek 
families had detailed traditions „only for the last three or four generations.‟42  It is simply 
worth bearing in mind that there must surely be a difference between the accuracy of fifth 
century accounts speaking of sixth century events, and those speaking of the early eighth 
century.  Further to this, and a point to remember, having spent his final years in Thurii, 
Herodotus cannot have been oblivious to the foundation traditions of the Greek West.  
Whether or not he completed his history in Thurii is unknown.  If not, it is open to question 
whether he would have revised his work, incorporating the additional knowledge living in 
this new home may have brought.   
If, as has been argued, Herodotus represents mid sixth century events accurately, or at 
least as Greeks of that era would have seen them, then perhaps we can locate the first genuine 
act of colonisation at this point.  Although Herodotus says it was founded by the Phocaeans 
on the advice of an oracle twenty years prior to the Persian attack, Alalia may in fact have 
been a real „colony‟ (Hdt. 1.163-169).  The ties between the two cities, Phocaea and Alalia, 
were certainly strong enough for the Phocaeans to flee to their foundation of twenty years 
previously, and that these ties were those of a dependent „colony‟ and mother-city is a distinct 
possibility: one may question whether any city, fellow countrymen or not, would have 
voluntarily accepted such an influx of refugees.   As for the oracle, it may have a wider 
significance.  On its own, perhaps it was a very real commonplace and a similar practice to 
reading the omens before a battle.  Wherever we encounter oracles as causes of settlement 
overseas, however, maybe the case in question should be read as one of state organised 
colonisation.  This is because oracles seem such a topos that they are scarcely credible as 
causes, yet their consistent presence indicates that somewhere lies a grain of truth, and it is 
possible that this is to be found in an oracle‟s possible role as providing religious ratification 
for a state‟s colonisation.  Were this the case, it would simply be a matter of confusing either 
a legitimating act, or less cynically a religious precaution prior to embarking on a potentially 
perilous colonising venture, for the motives behind that act.  These motives could well be 
strategic and thus the sort of thing Herodotus, who liked to personalise stories and perhaps 
did not understand or think in terms of high politics, would not have spoken of.  Yet not all 
fifth century sources had the same agenda or approach. High politics and grand strategy are in 
fact the sorts of reasons Thucydides posits in his work.  Although again highly personalised, 
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his work uses speeches not simply to tell a tale but to convey arguments of quite some 
intellectual sophistication.  In terms of strategic thinking, this can be seen in his contention 
that Spartan fear of growing Athenian power was the cause of the Peloponnesian war (Thuc. 
1.88).  It may be worth noting that Thucydides, who appears a different kind of writer, 
writing arguably dryer history, has no place for oracles, or indeed causation, in his brief 
interlude on the colonisation of Sicily in book six.  To return to Herodotus as a source, there 
need not be a contradiction in saying that Herodotus reliably informs us about events in the 
mid-sixth and also the fifth centuries but that his presentation of the reasons for colonisation 
in these years is misleading.  His failings are not those of inappropriate retrojection, but 
rather of failing to recognise the present.  Therefore if we carefully interpret what he says, for 
instance by suggesting that we should see oracles as betraying acts of calculated colonisation, 
his utility is not seriously hindered. 
If we accept that Homer, Hesiod and Archilochos provide us with evidence of rather 
more loosely organised overseas involvement down to the mid seventh century, and that real 
colonisation is in fact detectable in Herodotus‟ depiction of the mid sixth century foundation 
of Alalia, this would leaves us with a hundred years, from around 650 to 550 BC, in which 
Greek activities overseas could have changed from more loosely organised processes into 
colonisation.  We should bear in mind, however, that this depends on an interpretation of 
Herodotus that is by no means conclusive.  We can only be certain of genuine colonisation 
from the fifth century onwards. 
 
Thucydides and his sources 
 
Thucydides has been considered a more scientific, more objective a historian in the 
truer sense of the word than Herodotus.
43
  Perhaps it may be more accurate to say that 
Thucydides is a more sophisticated writer.  Nevertheless this tendency of past scholarship 
may lead to our overlooking the fact that they are both fifth century sources, and may indeed 
have been writing at much the same time.  As it happens, this furthers emphasises that our 
sources are overwhelmingly fifth century or later.
44
  Thucydides‟ account of Sicilian 
colonisation is different to that of Herodotus, but covers some of the same ground.  It is a 
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brief and largely systematic account of the origins of the various cities, providing a backdrop 
for the Athenian invasion (Thucydides 6.1-6).  He has much of value to say about the 
question of ties of ethnicity (see 6.17, and 6.76), and there is a further passage useful for the 
study of colonisation (7.77) where Nicias encourages the demoralised Athenians by claiming 
that they, with such a force of hoplites among them, are sufficient a force to constitute a 
powerful city should they choose to settle down.  It has been argued that Thucydides presents 
the Sicilian expedition itself as a vast colonising expedition
45
 and in this way Thucydides 
may be considered the source in which colonisation proper is presented in its clearest form.  
As we have already seen in the above discussion of Herodotus, this is due in no small part to 
the way Thucydides thought – in terms of states, their fears, and their strategies for 
dominance and survival.  This may seem strikingly modern, yet one may well ask whether it 
is us who have been so influenced by Thucydides that our thinking is strikingly Classical and 
Athenian. 
What Thucydides actually wrote about the settlement of Sicily in the eighth century, 
that is book six, is worthy of closer examination, as the picture he paints is not quite so 
clearly one of „colonies‟ founded as an act of state and the subjugation of natives.  First of all, 
in writing about the first eighth-century settlements, he notes the origins of settlers, but 
appears to present their founders, rather than the mother cities, as responsible for the 
enterprise – or alternatively he does not explicitly state that the settlement was the result of a 
decision on the part of the mother city: 
 
Ἑιιήλσλ δὲ πξ῵ηνη Χαιθηδῆο ἐμ Εὐβνίαο πιεύζαληεο κεηὰ Θνπθιένπο νἰθηζηνῦ 
Νάμνλ ᾤθηζαλ... 
 
The first of the Greeks were the Chalcidians who sailed from Euboea with the 
founder Theocles and settled Naxos... (Thuc. 6.3.1-3). 
 
Σπξαθνύζαο δὲ ηνῦ ἐρνκέλνπ ἔηνπο Ἀξρίαο η῵λ Ἡξαθιεηδ῵λ ἐθ Κνξίλζνπ ᾤθηζε. 
 
The following year Syracuse was settled by Archias of the Heraclids of Corinth 
(Thuc. 6.3.1-3). 
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θαηὰ δὲ ηὸλ αὐηὸλ ρξόλνλ θαὶ Λάκηο ἐθ Μεγάξσλ ἀπνηθίαλ ἄγσλ ἐο Σηθειίαλ 
ἀθίθεην, θαὶ ὑπὲξ Παληαθύνπ ηε πνηακνῦ Τξώηηιόλ ηη ὄλνκα ρσξίνλ νἰθίζαο... 
 
About the same time Lamis led a settlement from Megara and arrived in Sicily, 
and settled a place called Trotilus beyond the river Pantacyas. (Thuc. 6.4.1-3) 
 
In these three cases, the place of origin (Euboea, Corinth, Megara) is named, but the focus 
appears to be on the founder (νἰθηζηήο).  The settlement is described as having been settled 
(νἰθίδσ) by a certain individual leader.  Settlers leave with a founder (νἰθηζηήο), a settlement 
is settled (νἰθίδσ) by a founder, or a founder leads (ἄγσ) a settlement (ἀπνηθία).  Thucydides‟ 
account clearly concentrates on the oikist as the driving force behind these early settlements 
overseas.  There is no mention of the mother city as an active agent in these events. 
What is interesting is that Thucydides does ascribe to the mother city a deciding role 
when it comes to secondary settlements – that is, settlements founded by Sicilian Greek 
communities themselves, of course, once new settlements overseas (ἀπνηθία): 
 
θαὶ Κακάξηλα ηὸ πξ῵ηνλ ὑπὸ Σπξαθνζίσλ ᾠθίζζε, ἔηεζηλ ἐγγύηαηα πέληε θαὶ 
ηξηάθνληα θαὶ ἑθαηὸλ κεηὰ Σπξαθνπζ῵λ θηίζηλ: νἰθηζηαὶ δὲ ἐγέλνλην αὐηῆο 
Δάζθσλ θαὶ Μελέθσινο. 
 
Camarina was first settled (ᾠθίζζε, νἰθίδσ) by Syracuse, around one hundred and 
thirty five years after the creation/settling  (θηίζηλ, θηίζηο) of Syracuse.  Daxon 
and Menecolus became its founders (always νἰθηζηαὶ, νἰθηζηήο) (Thuc.6.5.3). 
 
Ἄθξαη δὲ θαὶ Καζκέλαη ὑπὸ Σπξαθνζίσλ ᾠθίζζεζαλ 
 
Akrai and Casemenae were settled (ᾠθίζζεζαλ, νἰθίδσ) by Syracuse (Thuc.6.5.2) 
θαὶ ἔηε νἰθήζαληεο πέληε θαὶ ηεζζαξάθνληα θαὶ δηαθόζηα ὑπὸ Γέισλνο ηπξάλλνπ 
Σπξαθνζίσλ ἀλέζηεζαλ ἐθ ηῆο πόιεσο θαὶ ρώξαο. πξὶλ δὲ ἀλαζηῆλαη, ἔηεζηλ 
ὕζηεξνλ ἑθαηὸλ ἢ αὐηνὺο νἰθίζαη, Πάκηιινλ πέκςαληεο Σειηλνῦληα θηίδνπζη, θαὶ 
ἐθ Μεγάξσλ ηῆο κεηξνπόιεσο νὔζεο αὐηνῖο ἐπειζὼλ μπγθαηῴθηζελ. 
45 
 
They were settled there for two hundred and forty five years until Gelon the 
tyrant of Syracuse raised them up (ἀλέζηεζαλ) from the city (i.e. drove them out) 
and the land.  Before they were made to emigrate, a hundred years after they 
settled, they sent Pamillus and founded (θηίδνπζη/θηίδσ) Selinous, and he had 
come from the metropolis Megara to join in settling (ζπγθαηνηθίδσ) [Selinous].  
(Thuc. 6.4.1-3) 
 
In each of these passages, there is reference to a Sicilian Greek city as responsible for the 
settling of another Sicilian settlement.  Camarina, Akrai, and Casmenae were settled 
(ᾠθίζζε/ᾠθίζζεζαλ, νἰθίδσ) by Syracuse (ὑπὸ Σπξαθνζίσλ).  Megara Hyblaia sent 
(πέκςαληεο, πέκπσ) Pamillus and founded (θηίδνπζη/θηίδσ) Selinous – Pamillius having 
come from the metropolis Megara.  The exception from this tendency is the settlement of 
Himera, „ἀπὸ Ζάγθιεο ᾠθίζζε ὑπὸ Εὐθιείδνπ θαὶ Σίκνπ θαὶ Σάθσλνο‟ (settled from Zancle 
by Euclides, Simus, and Sacon, Thuc. 6.5.1).  In the latter the responsibility for the settlement 
is ambiguous – it was settled from Zancle under the three named founders – but in the other 
two examples it is quite clear that the settlements were established by the polity in question.  
In the case of Megara Hyblaia and Selinous, there is mention of the founder as having come 
from the metropolis for the purpose joining in the settlement („μπγθαηῴθηζελ,ζπγθαηνηθίδσ‟).  
The important thing to note here is that Thucydides, on closer inspection, does not appear to 
present early eighth-century settlements in Sicily,
46
 such as Naxos, Syracuse, Megara, as 
having been sent out by their mother cities – the emphasis is on the founder, and his place of 
origin as a secondary concern.  The case of Lamis, who led an „apoikia‟ from Megara 
(„Λάκηο ἐθ Μεγάξσλ ἀπνηθίαλ ἄγσλ‟, Thuc. 6.4.1-3) need not have statist connotations 
provided we translate „apoikia‟ as a „settlement, and not as a „colony‟. The emphasis on the 
founder in the settlement of the first site, and subsequently on the community in any 
secondary settlement, is also in evidence with Thucydides‟ account of the foundation of Gela, 
usually dated to the early seventh century: 
 
Γέιαλ δὲ Ἀληίθεκνο ἐθ Ῥόδνπ θαὶ Ἔληηκνο ἐθ Κξήηεο ἐπνίθνπο ἀγαγόληεο θνηλῇ 
ἔθηηζαλ, ἔηεη πέκπηῳ θαὶ ηεζζαξαθνζηῶ κεηὰ Σπξαθνπζ῵λ νἴθηζηλ…ἔηεζη δὲ 
ἐγγύηαηα ὀθηὼ θαὶ ἑθαηὸλ κεηὰ ηὴλ ζθεηέξαλ νἴθηζηλ Γειῶνη Ἀθξάγαληα 
ᾤθηζαλ…νἰθηζηὰο δὲ πνηήζαληεο Ἀξηζηόλνπλ θαὶ Ππζηίινλ… 
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Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Entimus from Crete led settlers (ἐπνίθνπο, 
ἔπνηθνο) and settled (ἔθηηζαλ, θηίδσ) Gela jointly, forty five years after Syracuse 
was settled… One hundred and eight years after their settlement/peopling 
(νἴθηζηλ,νἴθηζηο) the Gelans settled (ᾤθηζαλ, νἰθίδσ) Acragas… they made 
(πνηήζαληεο, πνηέσ) Aristonous and Pystilus founders… (Thuc. 6.4.3-4). 
 
Again the emphasis is on the founders and their origins with the first settlement, and on the 
community in any subsequent settlement undertaken from that first settlement.   Note that 
with the secondary settlements (e.g. Camarina, Selinous, Acragas) there is a tendency for 
certain individuals to be made, or become, the founders – in other words it might be possible 
to infer that Thucydides‟ intention was to present these as appointed by the community, or 
that the decision to settle a site was taken, and that a founder was found to carry it out.  
Earlier settlements and earlier founders, or perhaps more specifically initial settlements and 
initial founders, are not presented in this way.  In the accounts relating to Theocles, Archias, 
Lamis, Antiphemus and Entimus, the settlement is presented as having originated from, or 
entwined with the figure of the founder from the beginning.  It may be significant that 
Thucydides presents the information in this way, and it is possible that this emphasis on 
individuals in initial settlements overseas (e.g. Naxos c.734, Syracuse c.733, Megara Hyblaia 
c.728, Gela c.688), and then on communities with regards to secondary settlements (e.g. 
Camarina c.598, Selinous c.628, Acragas c. 580) is a reflection of what the sources he used 
said.  These may have been silent on the issue of the role of the mother city in the foundation 
of the first settlements, or alternatively depicted a situation far removed from that of state 
instigated foundations with which Thucydides was familiar.  The exception to this pattern is 
Theocles and the Chalcidians – here Theocles leads them to Naxos, which they settle, but 
then on to settle Leontinoi and later Catane – „although the Catanians themselves made 
Euarchus their founder‟ (Thuc. 6.3.1-3).  The picture Thucydides presents here is of three 
settlements established in quick succession by Theocles, but one of them deciding to endorse 
a certain Eurarchus as its „founder‟ – whether this is a symbolic title, or in this context simply 
means „leader‟, is unclear.  The fact that they are presented as having been settled so rapidly  
and under the guidance of one leader, this may explain why these secondary foundations are 
not said to have been founded by a particular community.  The one thing which is consistent 
with the origins ascribed to secondary foundations is the nomination of a founder – but this 
again is different as the founder is nominated by the new settlement itself, and not by the 
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originating community.  Overall, it may be possible to argue, tentatively, that these 
differences in the way in which Thucydides depicts initial and secondary settlements may 
reflect actual differences identified by his sources (which will be discussed below), but 
perhaps not fully or consciously understood by Thucydides himself. 
 Thucydides provides information about the relations between Greeks and indigenous 
peoples.  This portrayal is varied, and what violence it contains is consistent with a view of 
early history in which expulsions, migrations and wandering, and further expulsions and 
displacements of peoples figure prominently.  The violent expulsion of native peoples is 
attested in the foundation of Syracuse – Archias drove out the Sikels from the island 
(„Σηθεινὺο ἐμειάζαο πξ῵ηνλ ἐθ ηῆο λήζνπ‟, Thuc. 6.3.1-3).  Similarly, Theocles and the 
Chalcidians drove out the Sicels in battle, settling Leontinoi  („Λενληίλνπο ηε πνιέκῳ ηνὺο 
Σηθεινὺο ἐμειάζαληεο νἰθίδνπζη...‟ Thuc. 6.3.1-3).  This is not the complete picture, however, 
as Thucydides also presents an example of cooperation between Greeks and natives:  
 
νἱ δ᾽ ἄιινη ἐθ ηῆο Θάςνπ ἀλαζηάληεο Ὕβισλνο βαζηιέσο Σηθεινῦ πξνδόληνο 
ηὴλ ρώξαλ θαὶ θαζεγεζακέλνπ Μεγαξέαο ᾤθηζαλ ηνὺο Ὑβιαίνπο θιεζέληαο. 
 
The others were made to raise themselves up (i.e. driven) from Thapsos and 
Hyblon king of the Sicels gave/surrendered the Megarans land and guided them, 
and they settled a place called Hyblaia (Thuc. 6.4.1-3). 
 
The Chalcidians who eventually settled Megara Hyblaia did so having been driven out of 
Leontinoi by their fellow Chalcidian Greeks, and again from Thapsos after Lamis‟ death.  An 
indigenous king either gave them land, or surrendered it to them.  Positive relations may be 
inferred by the naming of the settlement after the king.  What this demonstrates is that 
Thucydides presents us with an account of Greek involvement in Sicily which is not 
exclusively characterised by Greeks expelling and subjugating native peoples.  On the 
contrary, Greeks are equally prone to driving out other Greeks as they are indigenous 
peoples.  This in turn fits into the general flavour of the account which appears to give the 
impression that Greek involvement in Sicily was merely the latest of a series of migrations 
and displacements stretching back further than the Trojan War.   
 
Ἰιίνπ δὲ ἁιηζθνκέλνπ η῵λ Τξώσλ ηηλὲο δηαθπγόληεο Ἀραηνὺο πινίνηο 
ἀθηθλνῦληαη πξὸο ηὴλ Σηθειίαλ, θαὶ ὅκνξνη ηνῖο Σηθαλνῖο νἰθήζαληεο μύκπαληεο 
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κὲλ Ἔιπκνη ἐθιήζεζαλ, πόιεηο δ᾽ αὐη῵λ Ἔξπμ ηε θαὶ Ἔγεζηα. πξνζμπλῴθεζαλ 
δὲ αὐηνῖο θαὶ Φσθέσλ ηηλὲο η῵λ ἀπὸ Τξνίαο ηόηε ρεηκ῵λη ἐο Ληβύελ πξ῵ηνλ, 
ἔπεηηα ἐο Σηθειίαλ ἀπ᾽ αὐηῆο θαηελερζέληεο. 
 
After the capture of Troy, some fled from the Achaeans, and coming in ships to 
Sicily, settled (νἰθήζαληεο, νἰθέσ) near the Sicanians, and were all called 
Elymians, their cities Eryx and Segesta.  Some Phocians also came to settle with 
them (πξνζμπλῴθεζαλ, πξνζζπλνηθέσ), brought by the storm from Troy first into 
Libya and then into Sicily itself (Thuc. 6.2.3-4).   
 
The native Sicanians, although claiming to be autochthonous, had themselves migrated to 
Sicily having been driven from their homes in Iberia by the Ligurians („ὑπὸ Ληγύσλ 
ἀλαζηάληεο‟, Thuc. 6.2).  They were joined afterwards by Trojans – the most famous forced 
migrants in history – and it seems by wandering Greeks.  The Sicels came from Italy, fleeing 
from the Opicians, and drove (ἀλέζηεηιαλ, ἀλαζηέιισ) the Sicans to the south and the west, 
and to Thucydides‟ day held the centre and north of Sicily (Thuc. 6.2.5).  Then came the 
Phoenicians, and although they were not migrants in the same sense, settling occupying 
instead headlands, they still played a part in this story of displacements by abandoning 
settlements in the face of the Greeks, concentrating instead on their western holdings.  This is 
where the Greeks enter Thucydides‟ history of Sicily – and it is evidently as the latest in a 
long line of migrants in a Mediterranean world characterised by displacement, migration, 
settlement, and the displacement of others in turn.  This is the context in which Thucydides‟ 
depiction of indigenous peoples being driven out by Greeks must be placed.  This is not, 
therefore, the imposition of a „quasi-colonial‟ fifth century perspective onto the past, but it 
may nonetheless owe something to more recent Greek experience.  The history of the Greeks 
in the west, as presented in book six seems as replete with expulsions as the earlier, pre-
Greek, history. 
 Thucydides describes with some frequency instances of Sicilian Greek settlers being 
displaced by other Greek settlements, most notably, but not exclusively, those Greek 
settlements ruled by tyrants.  First we have the example of Megara Hyblaia: 
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θαὶ ἔηε νἰθήζαληεο πέληε θαὶ ηεζζαξάθνληα θαὶ δηαθόζηα ὑπὸ Γέισλνο ηπξάλλνπ 
Σπξαθνζίσλ ἀλέζηεζαλ ἐθ ηῆο πόιεσο θαὶ ρώξαο.  
 
They [the settlers of Megara Hyblaia] were settled there for two hundred and 
forty five years until Gelon the tyrant of Syracuse raised them up (ἀλέζηεζαλ) 
from the city (i.e. drove them out) and the land.  (Thuc. 6.4.1-3) 
 
In this instance it is the tyrant of Syracuse who „raises them up‟ (ἀλέζηεζαλ, ἀλίζηεκη).  This 
experience is by no means regarded as unique, as the Camarinians suffer a similar fate having 
revolted against Syracuse: 
 
ἀλαζηάησλ δὲ Κακαξηλαίσλ γελνκέλσλ πνιέκῳ ὑπὸ Σπξαθνζίσλ δη᾽ ἀπόζηαζηλ, 
ρξόλῳ Ἱππνθξάηεο ὕζηεξνλ Γέιαο ηύξαλλνο, ιύηξα ἀλδξ῵λ Σπξαθνζίσλ 
αἰρκαιώησλ ιαβὼλ ηὴλ γῆλ ηὴλ Κακαξηλαίσλ, αὐηὸο νἰθηζηὴο γελόκελνο 
θαηῴθηζε Κακάξηλαλ. θαὶ αὖζηο ὑπὸ Γέισλνο ἀλάζηαηνο γελνκέλε ηὸ ηξίηνλ 
θαηῳθίζζε ὑπὸ Γειῴσλ. 
 
The Camarinians were made to rise up/emigrate by the Syracusans (ἀλαζηάησλ 
δὲ Κακαξηλαίσλ γελνκέλσλ) because they had revolted.  Later Hippocrates, tyrant 
of Gela, received the land of the Camarinians as ransom for Syracusan prisoners 
of war, and he himself became founder, settling/establishing Camarina (θαηῴθηζε 
,θαηνηθίδσ).  Again they were made to rise (ἀλάζηαηνο γελνκέλε) up by Gelon 
and it was settled/established (θαηῴθηζε, θαηνηθίδσ) for a third time by Gelon. 
(Thuc.6.5.3). 
 
Here, of course, not only do we have the expulsion of the Camarinians by Syracuse, but also 
the further intervention of a tyrant who resettles the place.  These are then in turn „made to 
rise‟ – the same terminology is used (ἀλάζηαηνο γελνκέλε) – by Gelon who settles the place 
for a third time.  The overall impression is one of habitual displacement and settlement.  This 
is further reinforced by the example of Zancle: 
 
ὕζηεξνλ δ᾽ αὐηνὶ κὲλ ὑπὸ Σακίσλ θαὶ ἄιισλ Ἰώλσλ ἐθπίπηνπζηλ, νἳ Μήδνπο 
θεύγνληεο πξνζέβαινλ Σηθειίᾳ, ηνὺο δὲ Σακίνπο Ἀλαμίιαο Ῥεγίλσλ ηύξαλλνο νὐ 
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πνιιῶ ὕζηεξνλ ἐθβαιὼλ θαὶ ηὴλ πόιηλ αὐηὸο μπκκείθησλ ἀλζξώπσλ νἰθίζαο 
Μεζζήλελ ἀπὸ ηῆο ἑαπηνῦ ηὸ ἀξραῖνλ παηξίδνο ἀλησλόκαζελ. 
 
These [the Cumaean and Chalcidian settlers of Zancle] were themselves indeed 
driven out (ἐθπίπηνπζηλ, ἐθπίπησ) by the Samians and other Ionians, who fleeing 
the Persians put in to Sicily.  Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium threw out 
(ἐθβαιώλ, ἐθβάιισ) these Samians, settled (νἰθίζαο, νἰθίδσ) the city with a 
mixture of men, and named it instead Messene after his original fatherland (Thuc. 
6.4.5-6). 
 
We have here the combination of a forced displacement and subsequent migration resulting 
in another displacement.  These Ionians are again displaced, this time by a tyrant, and their 
recently acquired lands repopulated.  The crucial point to note is that the theme of expulsion, 
migration, and displacement constitutes an underlying consistency between the way 
Thucydides saw the events of the Classical period, the Archaic period, and the period 
preceding the eighth-century Greek settlement.  The later displacements caused by tyrants, 
states, and migrants in the classical period, the displacement of Greek settlements by other 
Greeks and  the expulsions of native peoples by Greeks in the archaic period, and the tales 
surrounding Sican, Sicel, Trojan, and Phoenician presences in the pre-Greek period, all 
contribute to a general impression of instability and successive population movements.  It 
would seem that the only settlements which do not explicitly fit into this wider pattern are the 
eighth-century Greek settlements themselves, for which motivations are not referred to, and 
the focus rests on the founder.  
Such is the information Thucydides provides, and the place of eighth-century 
settlement within a wider perspective.  Now it is necessary to turn to his sources.  It is likely 
that Thucydides used some earlier source for his work – how much earlier is open to debate.  
Dover dismisses the possibility that he could have used Hippys of Rhegion or Hellankios.  
More likely is Antiochos of Syracuse.
47
 Greco thinks him a late sixth century or early fifth 
century author.
48
  This would make Antiochos a contemporary of Hecataeus of Miletus, 
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regarded as Herodotus‟ great predecessor.49  Dionysius of Halicarnassos was familiar with 
Antiochos‟ work, in fact directly quoting Antiochos (Dion. Hal 1.12.3).  Clearly well-read, 
Dionysius remarkably refers to Antiochos alongside Hellanikos, Philistus and Thucydides 
(Dion. Hal. 1.22.3-5).  Dover sees the fact that Thucydides‟ account shows great familiarity 
with events associated with Syracuse – not least the fact that the majority of the foundation 
dates are „expressed with reference to Syracuse – as support for the idea that Antiochos (of 
Syracuse) was his source.
50
  This view is echoed by Van Compernolle.  He also suggests that 
arguments against Thucydides‟ use of Antiochos, whom we know as the author of a Sicilian 
history from other authors such as Strabo, rest on our accepting some other unknown 
source.
51
  Most scholars, in any case, appear to accept that Thucydides at the very least must 
have known Antiochos‟ work.52  As Van Compernolle says, since Antiochos‟ work does not 
survive, it is impossible to demonstrate in a direct manner how Thucydides used it, yet that 
Antiochos was his source is the only satisfactory hypothesis.
53
  It should be added that when 
Strabo cites Antiochos, he does so in reference to the Phocaeans (Str. 6.1.1), early Italy 
(6.1.4), Zancle and the Siceli (6.1.6), Croton (6.1.12), Metapontion (6.1.15), and Taras 
(6.3.2).  May we then presume that he was somewhat of an authority for the Greek 
colonisation of Italy and Sicily and the preceding indigenous presence?  If so, then who better 
for Thucydides to use as a source for a brief excursus on Sicily than Antiochos – the local 
authority on the matter?  If we accept this hypothesis, and accept that Antiochos was a 
contemporary of Hecataeus, this further suggests the firmly fifth century or at the latest late 
sixth century nature of our sources.   
   
Xenophon and Plato 
 
 Xenophon and Plato are two somewhat unexpected sources.  They are almost exactly 
contemporary fifth or fourth century sources and both students of Socrates.  It is interesting 
that we should come across in works not ostensibly about this issue such sources for 
colonisation.  Xenophon is mainly of use due to a passage in the Anabasis (5.6.15-37): seeing 
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so many hoplites and other types of troops around him, Xenophon recalls how it seemed to 
him that it would be a good idea to found a new city, gaining for Greece more territory and 
power.  This seems in some ways to echo Nicias‟ speech mentioned above (Thuc. 7.77).  
Both passages are informative with regards to what would constitute both a city, and a 
‘colony’ – an army large enough to be able to defend itself, also implying that a Polis was in 
fact its people.  Plato, in his Laws, has a fascinating dialogue about the foundation of a new 
‘colony’, in which the characters speak of things such as natural resources, the origins of the 
colonists, and what type of government there should be (Plato, Laws, 4.704-16). 
 
Diodorus, Dionysius, Strabo, and their sources 
 
Although writing in the later stages of the Republic, Diodorus, Dionysius and Strabo 
are believed to have used if not necessarily fifth century sources, then certainly ones 
themselves using sources of that era.  It is this use of earlier sources such as Ephoros which 
according to some makes Diodorus, an otherwise much criticised author, a good source for 
the late fifth and early fourth centuries.
54
  It would appear that Diodorus‟ relatively poor 
reputation is the result of his moralising tendencies,
55
 and the belief that he copied his sources 
unquestioningly.  More recent approaches have sought to rehabilitate Diodorus as a author in 
his own right, and more than a copyist unable to offer his own interpretations.
56
  According to 
Pearson Diodorus used Timaios for his account of Sicily and Southern Italy, „constantly‟ 
paraphrasing or summarizing his text.  Likewise, for the fifth and early fourth centuries he 
made use of Ephoros,
57
 who Clarke regards as his main source.
58
   
It should be noted that not only does Diodorus mention Timaios and Ephoros, but at 
one point he compares them as sources.  He considered Timaios as precise and 
knowledgeable but prone to lengthy and excessive censures.  Ephoros, on the other hand, he 
praised for not only the style of his composition but also the arrangement of his work which 
dealt with events falling under a single topic.  It is this method, Diodorus tells us, that he 
embraces, and so his fifth book about islands begins with an account of Sicily, since it is the 
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largest (Diod. 5.1-2).  In other parts of his work he is again seen to compare one historian 
with another, indicating clearly which version of events he prefers.  For instance, Philistus 
thought the Sicani had moved to Sicily from Iberia, but that Timaios, exposing the ignorance 
of the former, correctly identifies the Sicani as indigenous (Diod. 5.6).
59
  He refers to several 
historians during the course of his work.  The following give examples, but by no means an 
exhaustive catalogue of his references to other works.  Thucydides is spoken of (12.37), as is 
Herodotus (9.20, 10.24, 11.37), and Antiochos (12.71).  Ephoros does indeed seem to be one 
of his chief sources (see 13.41) as is Timaios – in fact their accounts are compared in 13.54, 
13.60, and 13.80 for the numbers they give to various armies.  Timaios, who lived from the 
mid fourth century and well into the third, was forced by Agathocles to leave Sicily for 
Athens where during his 50 year stay he wrote his history.
60
 He is referred to by Diodorus in 
his own right on several other occasions (13.85, 90, 108, and 109) as well as alongside a 
certain Polycetios (13.83), and in one place both Dionysius, Dio, and Diodorus himself 
(10.29).  What should be clear is that Diodorus had many sources at his disposal.
61
  It is quite 
puzzling that he should be considered by some as more than an unthinking copyist, when in 
fact he cites and compares different accounts, on occasion expressing a preference.
62
  It 
would be sensible, therefore, having seen the frequency with which he cites Timaios and 
Ephoros, to assume that these two constituted his main sources for Sicilian and Italian 
history. 
We see a similar situation with Dionysius, who writing in Rome during the age of 
Augustus,
63
 used Antiochos, Philistus (late fifth and early fourth centuries), and Timaios.
64
  
The sections of his work which are especially of use are his first and seventh books.  The 
former deals with the very early history of Italy and Sicily and the latter with later, more 
historical events such as the history of the city of Kyme (in Latin Cumae).  The context in 
which Dionysius was writing was not radically different to Strabo‟s.  Strabo, originally from 
Amasia in Pontus, came to Augustan Rome at a time when it was a major intellectual centre, 
and „a meeting point for scholars from the entire Greek world.‟65  Clarke explains that Strabo 
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was concerned with „periods of geographical transformation‟, and that for him the importance 
of the battle of Actium was its „significance for the changing face of the world‟.66  As we 
shall see, in Strabo‟s notion of geography, it is not the physical environment itself which is 
the main concern, but those who peopled it and gave a place its identity and significance.
67
  
In this way, his value for the study of settlement overseas, and how different places became 
occupied and defined by different peoples over the ages, should not be very surprising.   
As for Strabo‟s sources, he clearly used Antiochos of Syracuse in one way or another 
for his accounts of Sicily and the Greek West.  Dueck sees this choice as a reflection of 
Strabo‟s preference for native sources.68  Pearson, due to Antiochos‟ supposed status as a 
little-known early historian, believes Strabo used him indirectly, drawing quotations from 
Timaios (fourth and third century).  On what grounds he judges Antiochos a little-known 
historian is however unclear,
69
 but as we have seen in the above discussion of Thucydides, 
Strabo, one way or another, learned much from Antiochos.  It should also be pointed out that 
in 6.1.4, Strabo says that Antiochos was speaking in but a simple and antiquated way on a 
certain matter, not making a distinction between the Lucanians and the Brettians – before 
going one better himself by explaining the differences.  This may imply that he was using 
Antiochos directly.   Whatever the case and however he gained his information, Strabo seems 
not to have been shy about acknowledging his debt to other, earlier, sources – „debts to the 
tradition were embraced rather than feared as a sign of lack of originality.‟70  In that case we 
may question whether ancient authors embellished their accounts with references to authors 
they had not in reality read, or had not read in much depth – rather like the modern students 
seeking to make their work look more impressive for their own particular audience.  Strabo 
also refers to the fourth century historian Ephoros, whose account, according to Diodorus, 
came to an end around 340 BC.
71
  As a matter of fact he refers to Ephoros, a writer influential 
on his work,
72
 on several occasions.  Pearson considers Ephoros a historian as important as 
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Timaios in providing us with information about the Greek West,
73
 suggesting that the latter 
adopted much of what Ephoros wrote with little change.  He also suggests that ancient writers 
expected their readers to be as familiar with Ephoros as they were with Thucydides.
74
  
Polybius certainly was (Polybius, 4.20).   Strabo, however, should be judged as having used 
Ephoros directly; he does after all refer to him consistently throughout books six and seven.
75
  
Furthermore, the lexicographer Harpocration preserved a sentence of Ephoros‟ relating to the 
foundation of Aenos in Thrace,
76
 the content of which is closely mirrored by Strabo (Str. 
7.51). 
If this is true, then Strabo must through a combination, though not necessarily a 
synthesis of Timaios, Ephoros and Antiochos, have had access to fifth and fourth century 
accounts from which he derived his accounts of founders and their foundations.  He also cites 
Polybius,
77
 but those parts of Strabo‟s work likely to be relevant to the study of the West are 
more likely to be derived from Antiochos, Ephoros and Timaios.
78
  Very curiously, although 
aware of Herodotus (see Str.6.3.6), he does not appear to use him, or rather, cite him, for his 
accounts of migrations to and colonisation in the West.  This is very clear in the case of the 
Phocaeans‟ expulsion and their subsequent migration and attempts at colonisation.  He also 
seems not to compare him to others as he does with Antiochos and Ephoros.  Yet this does 
not mean that he did not read and digest what Herodotus, and indeed Thucydides (Str. 7.7.7) 
had to say about the West.  In the case of Thucydides, why would Strabo mention him if he 
had Thucydides‟ own source – Antiochos?  This may lend support to arguments such as 
Pearson‟s: our authors may not see fit to mention their intermediary sources, instead 
mentioning only the most ancient and by extension, perhaps, the most prestigious.  To look at 
it another way, however indirectly he may or may not have accessed them, Strabo seems to 
have had at his disposal quite an array of sources.  He must have known Herodotus‟ work, 
and through him, it is possible, some of what was recorded by Hecataeus of Miletus.  Either 
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indirectly through Timaios, or directly, he benefited from Ephoros and Antiochos.  To add to 
these accounts he had Thucydides.   
This is further evidence for the very strongly fifth and fourth century nature of his, 
and therefore our sources.  The latter are thus most likely to be well informed about fifth and 
fourth century events, although through the use of Herodotus and Antiochos of Syracuse, the 
two earliest sources we know to have been used, we can assume them to be reasonably well 
informed as far back as the mid sixth century.  The familiarity with earlier sources 
demonstrated by our Augustan sources indicates to me that their usefulness is not severely 
compromised by their late composition.  If they distort the „colonising‟ process, the distortion 
they apply is that of the fifth and fourth centuries.  This maybe a bad thing as far as Archaic 
history is concerned, but if follows that accounts supposedly pertaining to the Archaic period, 
precisely because tainted by a Classical „ideology‟ of colonisation, must thus be valuable as 
sources for a fifth and fourth century „imperialism‟.  If, as Wilson argues, classical models of 
colonisation have much in common with „both the Roman colonial experience and the 
modern imperialist experience‟79, then surely this should encourage us to explore the 
parallels, and consider the „distorting lens‟ of European imperialism as potentially 
illuminating.  We should not fall into the trap of the early archaeologist in seeing that which 
is oldest as the most valuable, disregarding the later levels found nearer the surface. 
 
Other sources 
 
 Migrations, overseas settlements and colonisation are such common themes in ancient 
works, in one way or another, that there may well be a great many references of use and 
importance in other, quite unexpected sources.  We have already seen this in the cases of 
Plato and Xenophon.  Further examples are Athenaeus, who in his Deipnosophistae (12.521-
527) discusses the themes of luxury and its paths to arrogance and effeminacy.  He has 
several references to famous Sicilian and Italian-Greek cities like Croton, Sybaris, and Taras.  
This is not all for he also has place for other cities which became proverbially wealthy, like 
Miletus, but also Massilia and Siris.  To give another example, Cassius Dio relates how after 
Caesar had taken Massilia, Pompey gave Phocaea, its founding city, its freedom – in order to 
„offset this misfortune‟ (41.25.3).  This is as clear an indication as any of the extent to which 
foundation stories and ancient ties of kinship were something akin to common knowledge in 
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late Republican Rome.  Strabo and Dionysius serve as evidence that this interest persisted 
into the Augustan age, and authors such as Athenaeus and Cassius Dio that it continued into 
the third century AD. 
80
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Reasons for settling overseas 
 
We now know something of our sources, their context, and indeed the sources which 
they themselves use.  What will follow is for the most part a literary picture, deliberately so, 
and excluding other sources such as the archaeology.  The reason for this is that the purpose 
of this chapter is to identify the themes emerging from the evidence at the disposal of earlier 
scholarship.  The focus here will be firstly on personal motivations as revealed by what the 
literary sources tell us about the oikist, and then secondly on the broader themes relating to 
the reasons for colonisation which emerge from the literary evidence.   
 
Personal motivations: the oikist 
 
A recurring theme is that of the oikist.  Among his various manifestations are figures 
such as Philoctetes, the Pylians, and Nestor; heroic characters and wandering individuals with 
their followers in tow.  Philoctetes (Str. 6.1.3) seems to have personal reasons for leaving one 
place to found another, and were it not for the Trojan War as a background, he could be an 
Archaic oikist.  Ogden sees it as significant that Philoctetes, having been lamed by being 
bitten by a snake then abandoned by Odysseus, was imperfect (Sophocles, Philoctetes, 5-
11).
81
  Imperfection is a recurring theme within that of the oikist, and it encompasses both 
Heroic and Archaic figures.  Kroton had as its oikist a hunchback called Myscellus from 
Rhype, Syracuse a Corinthian named Archias.  The reasons why they left their homes is not 
stated in Strabo‟s account, which tells us more about their colonising activity and visits to 
Delphi.  We must look to Diodorus for the reasons why, and as we do so, the theme of the 
imperfect oikist becomes evident: not only was he a hunchback, but Myscellus set out from 
Rhype to Delphi in order to ask Apollo about the begetting of children, implying that he 
could not achieve this at home.  Whether this was because of his unsightly deformity, or 
because of sterility, it is not said.  He received the oracular response that if he founded 
Kroton, untouched by plough, he would be granted his wish (Diod. 7.17).  We may presume 
that the following story related by Diodorus was meant to explain Archias‟ departure from 
Corinth: seized with love for a youth, Archias conspired to take him with the aid of his 
associates, only for the boy to die in the ensuing brawl as his family tried to defend him 
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(Diod. 8.10).  Myscellus is deformed, and perhaps sterile.  Archias is practically a murderer.  
Both have reason to be shunned by their communities.   
This leaves us with curious heroes indeed, for it is generally accepted that Greek 
settlements did celebrate their oikist, and it is fascinating that they are such imperfect figures.  
In some cases, this imperfection extends to the initial colonists more generally, as we can see 
in the well known case of the Spartan Partheniai who founded Taras, and the less well known 
example of the Messenian refugees who having violated Spartan maidens, fled punishment to 
establish Rhegion (Str. 6.1.6).  Whether the citizens of colonies attributed such unsavoury 
origins always accepted them is open to question, but we should not dismiss the possibility 
that they did.  Erichthonius was a positive figure in Athenian mythology – in spite of his 
being an imperfect figure, a teras baby with snaky lower limbs.
82
  It is probably telling in this 
regard that according to Herodotus, it is  the Cyrenaeans themselves who tell the tale of the 
imperfect Battos going to Delphi about his (defective) speech and told to found a city in 
Libya (Herodotus 4.154-56).  The Theran version is more about the drought in Thera than 
Battos‟ own motives (Hdt. 4.150-51).83 
Osborne wrote of „some common expectation of a better life elsewhere, some 
common threat to be escaped, or common goal to be acquired‟.84  The imperfection of the 
oikists we have come across – the hunchback who goes to Delphi about his deformity and is 
told to found a city (Diod. 7.17), and the man with a lisp who receives much the same 
response – may well have something to do with this promise of a new and better life.  Odgen 
points out that settlers like Battus and Myskellus may have gone to Dephi in the hope of 
having a deformity or disability cured, but ended up being given a apoikia.
85
  In some cases 
this appears like divinely ordained compensation.  Ogden considers „divine compensation for 
disability with an exceptional gift‟ a common motif.86  These are highly personalised 
accounts, and the personalisation implicit in the imperfect oikist makes the Archaic and 
Heroic oikists in effect very similar figures.  Of course, they need not be entirely implausible.  
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If we believe, as Snodgrass does, that early settlements would have been led by aristocrats, 
then perhaps the personalisation inherent in these stories is not entirely unfounded.
87
   
Another clear theme which seems to pervade accounts of various oikists is the manner 
in which their stories are in some way connected.  Their paths cross and interlock.  Not only 
was Archias at Delphi at the same time as Myskellus but when he embarked on his journey to 
Syracuse he did so with Cheriscrates of the Heracleidae and part of an expedition that was to 
help settle what became Corcyra, then called Scheria.  Thus Archias accompanies yet another 
expedition setting out at the same time as his.  Where Myscellus fits into this story is unclear 
– we are told that they were both at Delphi together and that Archias became his associate, 
suggesting that they sailed as far as Kroton together.  However, to return to Scheria, 
Chersicrates drove out the native inhabitants and colonised it with new settlers.  Archias on 
the other hand proceeded to land at a place called Zephyrium (Locri).  There he found some 
Dorians who had parted from the founders of Megara Hyblaia, and were on their way back 
home from Sicily.  Making common cause with them, Archias took these men with him to 
found Syracuse (Strabo. 6.2.4), where he first drove out the native Sicels from the island, by 
which Thucydides must mean Ortygia (Thuc. 6.3).  The link with Megara Hyblaia provides a 
connection, albeit indirect, to yet another oikist, Theocles the Athenian.  According to Strabo 
the founders of Megara Hyblaia itself set off to Sicily with Theocles and his band of Euboean 
Chalcidians.  On arrival the Euboeans founded Naxos and the Dorians, mostly from Megara, 
founded Megara Hyblaia (Str. 6.2.2).   
These are only a few examples.  The early days of Greek settlements overseas, and 
their oikists, were clearly connected via the web of the ancient traditions, or foundation 
stories.  This intertwining of origins can suggest two things.  It may be a reflection of real 
cooperation, association, and path crossing between different oikists and groups of settlers in 
the small world of eighth-century Archaic Greece.  Alternatively, the oikists may have 
formed a necessary part of a narrative structure lending simplicity and coherence to the 
origins of Greek presence in the West.  In other words, to make sense of it all, that is the 
complicated and rather distant nature of their origins, Western Greeks created a series of 
interlocking stories centred on various oikists.  One might be tempted to say that these early 
Archaic oikists were similar to the Heroic founders who roamed the West in still more 
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ancient times, but they may have performed quite different functions.  Heroic founders added 
precedent and prestige to various sites which would later become sites of Greek settlement, 
such as in the case with Metapontion and its initial foundation by the Pylian companions of 
Nestor (Str. 6.1.15).  Archaic oikists on the other hand could have served as direct and 
personalised points of origin for a community.   
As for the thorny issue of reality, it is very much open to interpretation.  As has been 
postulated above, earlier Archaic oikists may have been created as part of explanatory 
traditions.  The often very similar stories, exhibiting the same sort of themes, such as Ogden‟s 
loimos schema, suggest, as Ogden himself put it, that only very limited „factual‟ assertions 
can be made about the rulers represented in such narratives.
88
  The crucial word here is 
„limited‟.  We may dismiss the substance of what is said about the oikist as invention, but this 
does need not mean that also entirely dismiss the reality of the individual; or that the initial 
settlers of Syracuse were led by a man called Archias from Corinth.  That Greeks quite 
clearly perceived certain settlements to have certain mother cities in Greece suggests that at 
least one part of the colonisation narrative bears some resemblance to reality – the origins of 
the groups of settlers involved.  The early Archaic oikist may be called into question.  He 
may be regarded as no more than a personalisation of the group, or groups involved. It is 
however harder to explain away the detail our sources provide us of the places of origin of 
Western Greeks.  Writing in the fifth century, Thucydides could refer to the ethnic 
differences of various Greek colonies, and as in the case of Leontinoi and Chalcis identify 
both apoikia and mother city (Thuc. 6.76).   
To conclude, the truth or reality of individual Archaic oikists can in many cases be 
called into question, but if we meld all we are told of these various individuals, and turn them 
into one man, we are left with a very richly coloured picture.  Because his society shunned 
him for his crimes, bastard birth, and physical imperfections, even the latter in a harsh age 
reflections of evil, our man was driven to find a new and better life.  Had these not driven 
him away, he may have in any case some day have been forced to flee from rapacious 
conquerors overrunning his native land.  On the other hand, this new future in a new land 
across the seas offered opportunities.  In a new environment there would be the opportunities 
presented by shedding one‟s previous identity, dubious past, and the disadvantages they 
brought.  In some places he could hope for wealth beyond conception, in others healthy lands 
in which to rear a healthy family.  In short, perhaps this invented man, an amalgamation of all 
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the oikists we have read, oikists who are by themselves of too dubious reality to be helpful in 
any specific sense with reference to any specific settlement, can provide us with an echo of 
the kind of world it was, and the reasons why people left their homes in Greece to venture to 
the West.  
 
Reasons for settling overseas: broader themes 
 
The reasons for overseas settlement, other than the personal motivations of oikists, 
deserve closer attention, as it is important to establish what the ancient literary evidence 
reasonably allows in terms of the reasons for colonisation before we can determine any 
distortions in modern scholarship.  Even in recent works some strikingly modern reasons 
have been given for ancient colonisation.  Scholarship has in the past regarded the need for 
raw materials, overpopulation and the consequent land hunger, as primary reasons for 
colonisation.
89
  Even in recent work one encounters the most sweeping statements to this 
effect.  Take, for example, Niemeyer‟s remarks that „Phoenician expansion was not a 
movement to lessen the pressure of overpopulation, as was so often the case with Greek 
colonisation.  And insofar as that was so, Phoenician expansion followed a non-Greek 
model.‟90  One assumption leads to another, in this case a whole article on the uniqueness of 
Phoenician colonisation, using Greek colonisation, or rather a set of assumptions concerning 
its nature, as the point of comparison.  The difficulty with this needs no pointing out.   
The foundation of Cyrene may be the example which gave this school of thought its 
grounding in ancient evidence.  Told they must found a city in Libya, they fail to do so.  
Consequently they suffer drought, and end up sending away two penteconters‟ worth of men 
drawn by lot under the leadership of Battos (Hdt. 4.150-53).  Yet the account Herodotus gives 
us is anything but clear that it was a case of land hunger leading to Therans leaving to found 
Cyrene.
 91
  Drought making existing land infertile does not point to a lack of land, and such a 
random happening as drought hardly needs overpopulation to make it disastrous.  Thus the 
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assumption that land hunger was a key reason is supported more by the location of Greek 
settlements, with good arable land within their territories, than by the evidence actually 
provided by the literary sources.  These should not of course be treated as gospel, but 
regardless of whether or not those who set out from Greece did so for want of land, it is 
hardly logical to think that they would not in any case have sought a site that was 
agriculturally rich.  Food is, after all, an essential resource for any settlement, and the mere 
presence of land capable of providing it proves nothing in terms of the reasons for settling 
overseas.  Rather it is perhaps one of the requirements of a site.  This is not to entirely 
dismiss the notion of land as a factor.  Some fifth century Athenian colonies, or cleruchies, 
appear to have been founded to aid the grain supply to Athens.
92
  These, however, are more 
well documented examples, and do not necessarily stem from land „hunger‟ per se.  Desiring 
more land is not necessarily the same needing it.  Moreover, it is questionable whether land 
hunger could have been a reason in the eighth century since there is no clear evidence for 
overpopulation in those areas of mainland Greece most commonly associated with colonising 
activity.
93
  Such archaeological evidence was, of course, not available to nineteenth century 
scholars.   
We can look into further possibilities.  Perhaps the definition of land needs revision.  
Perhaps it was not land in itself that was in short supply, but rather land close enough to be 
part of a settlement‟s territory and thus eligible to be defended by the community as a 
whole.
94
  If arguments for land shortage leading to overseas settlement are largely based on 
modern assumptions, does the same apply for trade?  Certainly the search for raw materials 
cannot be discounted as a reason for overseas settlement in the early Archaic period.  
Phoenician settlements in Spain and Sardinia, and the Greek settlement at Phithekoussai, 
have been convincingly linked to the trade in metals.
95
  The literary sources are, on the 
whole, not very vocal on the matter of trade as a reason for overseas settlement.  Perhaps 
there is a good reason for our sources‟ silence on the matter of people settling abroad as an 
extension of their trading activities – it simply isn‟t very glorious.  In fact, it seems a 
positively disreputable thing to engage in.  When a young Phaeacian sought to taunt 
Odysseus into taking part in an athletics competition, his tactic was to suggest our (dubious) 
hero had no talent for sports: 
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More likely, I think, you are one who plies here and there in some big ship, a 
master of trading sailors; anxious over the cargo out, watchful over the cargo 
home and his greedy gains; nothing about you speaks the athlete (Odyssey 8.155-
65). 
 
This is enough of an affront to anger Odysseus into taking part.  By excelling with the discus 
he demonstrates his prowess, and by extension how unlike a trader he really is.  This 
seemingly intense contempt for the trader makes it quite unsurprising that there is no mention 
of any settlement coming into existence through trading initiatives or the initial settlement 
being encouraged and organised by a trader: far better to have as one‟s oikist a murderer than 
a trader.  This passage should also serve as a sufficient counter to Finley‟s idea that the 
Homeric epics could not reflect the eighth century because there were no Greek traders.
96
  
The above passage clearly demonstrates an awareness of traders and trading as an activity.  It 
may also show that a Greek could be a trader, and even if the only traders we encounter are 
Phoenician (seee Odyssey 14.260-305), should we expect epic poetry about Greeks of a 
distant golden age to show them as traders, of all things?  This may be a good example of 
Homer suppressing an element of present reality (Greeks trading) in an attempt to set his 
story in an idealised past.  Trade and traders are not the only things Homer may have 
suppressed.  As part of an argument for an embryonic Polis in the (eighth-century) Iliad, 
Raaflaub claims the poet downplayed the role of commoners in order to pander to aristocratic 
ideology.
97
 
With reference to the Archaic foundation traditions resembling those two found in the 
Iliad, and mentioned above, perhaps a similar logic applies.  Are we really to believe that 
some quarrel, illegitimacy, or some other similarly personalised cause was behind the 
foundation of all these settlements attributed such a beginning?  Maybe murderers, bastards, 
and the deformed fitted in with the wider scheme of Greek mythology with its host of very 
imperfect heroes.  These are certainly very common: Apollonius of Rhodes, writing in the 
third century BC,
98
 has Heracles admonish the Argonauts for considering staying with the 
women of Lemnos, asking whether they had been exiled for murdering their relatives 
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(Apollonius, Argonautica 1.865-75).  Jason himself „enters deeply worrying moral territory‟ 
in his part in murdering Medea‟s brother.99  A rather late source fully aware of and influenced 
by the Homeric epics, if not also later motifs relating to the reasons for voyages and 
settlement overseas, these aspects may be more a reflection of these influences than Archaic 
events.
100
  Therefore, if we accept that these are unlikely stories, could it follow that the 
illegitimate Spartiates, led by Phalanthos, were no more than an invented tradition, invented 
to mask a shameful aspect of the Spartan past before the days when it became such an 
example for fascist ideologues – could it be that Taras was initially a small settlement, or 
community of Spartan traders which grew only gradually into a large and powerful city?  Its 
location, as the „only fine port on Italy‟s southeast coast‟, might support the idea that it was 
initially a trading settlement.
101
  This might explain Taras‟ much emphasised (and perhaps 
compensatory) militarism, reflected in its foundation oracle which depicted the men of Taras 
as divinely willed to kill and conquer the natives (Str. 6.3.2) – a militarism more palatable to 
the later, more severe, Sparta?
102
  It is possible that when Strabo describes how even as early 
as the Trojan War Greeks deprived the indigenous peoples of Italy of so much territory that 
the area became known as Megalē Hellas (Str. 6.1.2), he was not simply reflecting a Greek 
tendency to see their past as a series of violent episodes and migrations.  Rather, in the 
conspicuous absence of other less glorious reasons for the diffusion of Greeks and Greekness, 
such as trade, he was also, or instead, depicting the past as his earlier Greek sources desired it 
to be.  To put it crudely; murder and brutal conquest was more honourable than trade; a tale 
of war more attractive to an audience than that of a trading venture.  Failing that, perhaps the 
way in which trade may have been partly responsible for the reaching out of Greeks to the 
wider world was far too prosaic a process, even if recognised, to be given any mention by 
ancient writers.  
Therefore trade may have been an important factor, but our sources are unfortunately 
largely silent on the matter, and as far as the literary sources are concerned we are obliged to 
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read between the lines.  But what reasons do the literary sources themselves give for Greek 
involvement overseas, and its culmination in settlement?  The reasons behind several Archaic 
settlements are hard to define beyond the personal reasons of their oikists, but there are 
exceptions.  As Graham pointed out, if the Archaic oikist ever set out to establish settlements 
which would further his home city‟s „imperial or commercial policies‟, our sources, however, 
are silent on the matter.
103
  At no point do the stories surrounding Myscellus and Archias 
suggest that there would be close and friendly relations between their new settlements and old 
homes, let alone that the former served to augment the power of the latter.  Having said this, 
Thucydides has the Corinthians say, with reference to the Archaic foundation of Corcyra, that 
they did not found colonies to be insulted by them, but to retain their leadership and be 
treated with proper respect (note that there is no mention of a „statist‟ dimension to the 
colonisation of Syracuse in book six).  The Corinthians claimed that their other colonies were 
pleased with them, whereas Corcyra had been acting improperly towards her mother city 
(Thuc. 1.38).  As we have already seen, the literary tradition, as found in Strabo (6.2.4), 
depicts Corcyra as contemporary with Syracuse,
104
 with Cheriscrates of the Heracleidae 
setting out from Corinth at the same time, and indeed with, Archias.   
How can we explain this apparently imperial purpose of such an early apoikia 
(founded around 733)?  Thucydides presents the Athenians as colonisers of Ionia (Thuc. 
1.12), a myth allowing Athens to make much of her supposed position as mother city of the 
Ionians, thus legitimising her rule over a mainly Ionian empire.
105
  This is not to say that ties 
between Corinth and Corcyra were purely or even largely invented, for Corinthian and 
Corcyraean arbitration saved Syracuse when the latter was under pressure from Gelon (Hdt. 
7.154), indicating that all three cities felt such ties were important.  What I would say is that 
Corinth sought to present the relationship differently, to lend it a character of political 
subordination that it did not originally have.
106
 
This fifth century tradition, leads us to other, often later settlements, of which we have 
some further information, and in these cases it is possible to identify several different sets of 
reasons for Greeks establishing new settlements overseas.  First, and perhaps most peculiar, is 
that some settlements are presented as having been founded on the invitation of an already 
existing settlement in the West.  Metapontion was founded on the invitation of Sybaris, the 
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latter fearing that Taras might seize the land (Str.6.1.15).  Zancle sent for Chalcidians to settle 
Rhegion, (Str. 6.1.6), and then again invited Samians fleeing from the Persians to settle Kale-
Acte (Hdt. 6.22-24) – with unforeseen consequences, as we shall see.  
The Messeians and Samians, who were fleeing their homes in the face of another 
people, bring us swiftly to the second reason given for new settlements:  forced expulsion 
leading a people to flee and find a new home.  This is a reason which persists from the 
Archaic through to the Classical period.  Ionians came to Siris escaping Lydian domination 
(Str. 6.1.14), and Phocaeans fleeing Cyrus founded Elea (Str.6.1.1).  Messenian refugees, as 
we have already seen, took part in the foundation of Rhegion (Str. 6.1.6), and Zancle looks to 
have been refounded by Messenians from the Peloponnese (Str. 6.2.3), where one assumes 
conditions were not favourable due to the Spartans.  The Messenians resurface when refugees 
from the Messenian revolt are given Naupactos by the Athenians.  The latter having taken it 
from the Ozolian Locrians (Pausanias, 4.24.7; Thuc.1.103).  To return to Zancle and the 
fleeing Samians, having been invited to settle Kale-Acte, the Samians, at the suggestion of 
Anaxilas of Rhegion, decided to take Zancle instead, in a sordid tale of betrayal (Hdt. 6.22-
24).  According to Pausanias, however, due to their own experiences the Messenians refused 
to comply with Anaxilas‟ command to enslave the Zancleans (Paus. 4.23.9).107  
The third reason is the will of a tyrant.  Sicilian tyrants were involved in transplanting 
people from one place to another in accordance with their strategic or imperial designs.  We 
have already encountered the example of Katane, its inhabitants, along with those of Naxos 
forced to resettle in Leontinoi (Diod. 11.49), and men loyal to Hieron settled there in their 
place.  Theron, who ruled Himera, having killed so many of his own people, brought in new 
settlers.  The two tyrants behaved quite similarly, expelling or killing their opponents, 
whether external or internal, and bringing in new people whose loyalty they may have hoped 
to possess (Diodorus, 11.48-49). As for the reasons for these resettlements, there is clearly the 
motive of gaining loyal subjects and killing, isolating, or keeping one‟s enemies in one place– 
as at Leontinoi.  In fact Leontinoi, which saw the concentration of Hieron‟s enemies after 
their forced expulsion, looks like an instance of the forced concentration or internment of 
enemies in a particular place for strategic reasons – some sort of ancient concentration camp 
perhaps.
108
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A fourth reason for colonisation is similar to the third – that it was part of an imperial 
plan.  This is well illustrated by the nature of the oikist.  In fifth century Athenian colonies 
such as Brea, Thurii, and Amphipolis, as in those of tyrants, the role of the oikist was „clearly 
dictated by the policy of the metropolis‟.  At these three sites, the oikists Democlides, 
Lampon and Hagnon seem to be no more than state officials on a temporary assignment, with 
limitations to their authority, and whose task it was to oversee the establishment of these 
manifestations of Athenian imperial policy.
109
  Nothing demonstrates this temporary nature 
better than the example of Hagnon, Brasidas and Amphipolis.  Having come under Spartan 
control, the people of Amphipolis posthumously made the Spartan general Brasidas their 
oikist, sacrificing to him „as to a hero‟, and demolishing the buildings of Hagnon and 
everything that would remind them he had once been their founder. Eager for the Spartan 
alliance, and at war with Athens, they were unable to honour Hagnon as before (Thuc. 5.11).  
By the Classical period, the title of oikist was something that could be conferred upon an 
individual regardless of whether or not he was in fact the founder.
110
  Graham stated that the 
role of the oikist diminished as new foundations increasingly became imperialistic tools of 
the founder state.  Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it changed.  The „all 
responsible, even monarchical‟ nature of the oikist in earlier foundations may be later 
invention in itself, or alternatively a side effect of the high degree of personalisation we have 
seen to accompany early Archaic foundations.
111
  Seen in this way, it is possible that main 
change lay in the status of the the oikist.  While not necessarily monarchical in the eighth 
century, it would be sensible to assume him to be at the head of the new aristocracy of an 
independent settlement.  As the leader of an expedition sent out by a Greek state for imperial 
purposes, the fifth century oikist would have been at the head of a settlement answerable to 
the mother city.   
Therefore our literary sources show four main reasons for the founding of settlements 
in the later Archaic and Classical periods.  The first is settlement by invitation.  Such 
invitations were often accepted by those fleeing conquest.  The second reason is precisely 
that – people moving in large numbers having been forced to flee by an enemy, sometimes 
inflicting on others what they themselves suffered.  The third and fourth reasons are 
ostensibly born less out of desperation as out of imperial calculation.  The latter should be the 
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only sort of act of settlement afforded the term colonisation.  This, of course, assumes that we 
wish to continue with an understanding of modern colonisation which is common in recent 
studies of Greek settlement overseas, but, as we shall see, would have been less familiar to 
eighteenth, nineteenth or twentieth century Britons. 
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The Ancient Literary Evidence and the Interpretative Themes 
 
State or Individual, Event or Process? 
 
Perhaps the most striking thing about the literary evidence is that their portrayal of the 
events leading up to the foundation of a settlement overseas focuses overwhelmingly on 
individuals.  Our eighth-century sources (assuming that Homer can be used as such), Homer 
and Hesiod, both posit individual reasons for settling overseas.   Hesiod‟s father, as we have 
seen, was an unsuccessful sea-trader who had emigrated from Cyme in Asia Minor to become 
a farmer at Ascra, in Boeotia (Hesiod, Works and Days 630-641).  Homer‟s Tlepolemos 
(Iliad 2.650-675), and Meges (Iliad 2.625-30) both lead their followers to settle overseas 
because of a family quarrel of some description.  In the case of an entire community being 
forced to migrate, it is Nausithous who makes the Phaeacians uproot and find a better home 
(Odyssey 6.2-10).   In the case of Homer this tendency to depict individuals as the primary 
decision makers in terms of settling overseas could, of course, be ascribed to a natural 
tendency to personalise in epic poetry, but it is not inconsistent with the aristocratic focus of 
the epics taken as a whole.     
Although the nature of the tales does differ, there is a degree of correlation between 
the tales transmitted by Homer and the foundation traditions surrounding Archaic founders 
provided by our fifth century sources (sometimes via later authorities) in that they all 
emphasise the role of the individual. Thucydides emphasises individual founders in his 
account of the settlement of Sicily in book six: on the motivations of mother cities he is 
silent.  This must be set alongside his willingness to ascribe to communities as a whole the 
decision to undertake a secondary foundation, and the decision to provide such secondary 
foundations with a founder from the city‟s own place of origin.  By Thucydides‟ day, this was 
thought to be „in accordance with the old custom‟ (Thuc. 1.24.2),112 part of the respect his 
fifth century contemporaries thought a apoikia owed its city of origin.   He clearly presents 
Corcyra – an early settlement according to Strabo founded at the same time as Syracuse (Str. 
6.2.4) – as an apoikia of Corinth, bound by custom to treat the latter with respect.  Syracuse, 
no doubt, was thought to be under similar obligations, yet the silence over the role played by 
Corinth in its foundation is striking.  Is it possible that in his account of the earliest founders, 
and using an authority such as Antiochus of Syracuse who himself may well have been aware 
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of much earlier traditions, Thucydides provides us with a refracted glimpse of Archaic 
reality?   
Our much later sources, Strabo and Diodorus – heavily reliant on earlier, fifth and 
fourth century works such as those of Antiochos, Ephoros, and Timaeus – also emphasise the 
individual in their accounts of settlements overseas.  Founders of the Homeric era such as 
Philoctetes (Str. 6.1.3), as well as those of the Archaic period such as Archias and Myscellus 
(Diod. 7.17, 8.10), are all depicted as the determining factor in the establishment of a 
settlement overseas.  In other words, the motivations are theirs (albeit in consultation with an 
oracle), not those of a „mother city‟.  As has been discussed, there may well be an element of 
personalisation in such accounts – it is simply easier to explain what may have been a prosaic 
process in terms of an individual and his motivations.  On the other hand, and as has also 
been mentioned previously, if indeed earlier settlements overseas would in any case have 
been led by aristocrats or men of sufficient authority and means, then these stories may not be 
as implausible as they may at first seem.
113
   
The most „statist‟ of our accounts is that of Herodotus and the Theran foundation of 
Cyrene, but even here the Cyrenaean version of the foundation tradition relates a tale very 
much focused on the individual;  the imperfect founder Battos went to Delphi about a speech 
impediment and was told to settle in Libya (Hdt. 4.154-56).  It is the Theran version which 
provides us with impersonal, communal reasons for sending out a group to settle overseas 
(Hdt. 4.150-153), and it is this version, supported by reference to a later Theran inscription, 
which has come to dominate thinking about Greek settlement overseas whereas the other, 
more individualistic tales are liable to be dismissed as myth.  It is perhaps worth noting that 
the traditional dating of Cyrene (c.630) corresponds more readily to the period of secondary 
foundations in Sicily, starting with Selinous (c.628).   
In conclusion, the literary evidence, be it apparently contemporary (e.g. Homer), fifth 
century (e.g. Thucydides), or still later but using earlier sources (e.g. Strabo), paints a portrait 
of earlier settlement overseas which centres on individual motivations.  It is only in relation 
to later, seventh century settlements that sources such as Thucydides and Herodotus suggest 
that settlements were founded for communal, or statist, reasons.  As such, one would expect 
earlier scholarship perhaps more credulous of literary evidence to see eighth-century 
settlements as the result of private enterprise, but secondary foundations in Sicily, settlements 
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from the later seventh century onwards, and on certain readings of Thucydides‟ Corinthian 
foundations specifically, as the products of state decisions.   
 
Colonial Dependence 
 
 There is nothing in Homer to suggest any form of dependence to their original 
communities on the part of settlers.  Indeed their motivations are such – either expulsion 
(meaning there was no „mother-city‟) or private quarrel – that any relations, let alone ones 
based on dependence, were unlikely.  The idea that a apoikia would revere its community of 
origin is probably based to a large extent on understandings of Thucydides and Herodotus.  
That Megara Hyblaia sent to Megara in order to provide Selinous with a founder (and indeed 
Corcyra to Corinth for Epidamnus, Thuc. 6.4.1-3, 1.24.2) has been seen as evidence for close 
relations between overseas settlement and community of origin from the beginning.
114
  The 
quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra in the fifth century, and the competing claims of 
rightful reverence denied to the mother city (Thuc. 1.25), or illegitimate interference in the 
affairs of the apoikia (Thuc. 1.34) have also served to create a very definite idea of what 
relations between overseas settlement and originating community were or should have been 
like not only in the fifth century, but also earlier.   
Herodotus‟ account of the relationship between Thera and Cyrene differ from both 
Theran and Cyrenaean perspectives – the former stressing the communal nature of the 
decision to send settlers to Cyrene, the latter the importance of the founder.  As Osborne has 
said, these differing accounts reflect the respective agendas of Therans and Cyrenaenans 
some 150 years after the foundation: the Therans were keen to stress that they had no choice 
but to send out a apoikia and that they had done everything necessary for its success, whereas 
the Cyrenaeans had been successful, and hence wished to „assert their independence, not their 
dependence‟, and the ruling Battiad dynasty of Cyrene had an agenda in stressing the 
personal role of Battos.
115
  Thus the varying emphasis on the communal and individual, state 
and private, ties into later agendas concerning the degree to which the apoikia should be 
considered bound to its metropolis.  In the event, Cyrene accepted a Theran version of events: 
in the fourth century the latter approached Cyrene asking for land and citizenship in 
accordance with an agreement sworn at the time the initial settlers set out for Cyrene.
116
  Of 
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course, more recent interpretations may stress how the „invention of tradition‟ is visible in 
such accounts and on both sides: there may be advantage to both apoikia and metropolis  in 
having such a relationship recognised and celebrated – regardless of whether the initial 
settlement overseas was conducted by an aristocrat and his followers for their own reasons, 
but that the memory of their origins was something later formalised for the purposes of later 
generations.  For scholars writing in an age more credulous of literary evidence, however, it 
is quite easy to see how the customary ties of respectful reverence revealed in the failure of 
Corinth and Corcyra to uphold them could be retrojected onto an earlier period in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary.   
 
Colonist and Native 
 
The literary evidence includes much mention of hostile relations between Greek 
settlers and indigenous peoples, mainly expressed in terms of the latter being driven from 
their lands by the Greeks.  This is not the entire picture, as there are examples of cooperation, 
perhaps most notably in the case of Megara Hyblaia as related by Thucydides.  Nonetheless it 
does seem that conflict is depicted as more common in his account: Archias drives out the 
Sicels from Ortygia  (Thuc. 6.3.1-3), Theocles and his Chalcidians drive out the Sicels in 
battle, settling Leontinoi  (Thuc. 6.3.1-3).   Strabo provides similar examples – Cheriscrates 
settled Scheria, or Corcyra, having first thrown out (ἐθβαιόληα, ἐθβάιισ) the native 
Liburnians (Str. 6.2.4); Phalanthus the founder of Taras consulted the Delphic oracle which 
told him he was to be given Satyrion so he could gain „the rich land of Taras and to become a 
bane to the Iapygians‟ (Str. 6.3.2).117  Although these examples might in themselves indicate 
some form of „colonial ideology‟ on the part of the fifth century Greeks who wrote them 
down (both Thucydides and Strabo used Antiochos of Syracuse), they must be set alongside a 
host of other instances in which Greeks displace one another.   
Add to this examples of indigenous peoples driving one another out of their lands – 
the Samnites, having thrown out the Chones and Oenotri, even send out their own apoikia  
(ἀπνηθηζάλησλ, ἀπνηθίδσ) – and what we have is very clearly a vision of Mediterranean life 
in which violent conflict, displacement, migration, and still more conflict and displacement is 
seen as a commonplace encompassing Greeks and barbarians alike.  Fifth and fourth century 
Greek authors, and of course much later authorities using earlier accounts, saw their past in 
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much the same way as Homer did his – as a series of violent displacements and migrations.  
Indeed, considering that they would have been familiar with the displacement of Greeks by 
barbarians in places such as Ionia, it would be very odd had our Greek authors not seen 
Greeks as displacing indigenous peoples in Sicily and Italy.  Thus if earlier scholars depict 
Greeks as conquering native peoples, this is not necessarily a „colonial‟ imposition on their 
part – and nor is it necessarily a sign of any interplay between modern colonial ideology and 
a corresponding fifth century and later Greek „colonial‟ mentality.  The perceived harsh 
realities of the Mediterranean world encompassed Greeks and indigenous peoples alike – 
indeed, the literary evidence shows that the Greeks often were the „indigenous peoples‟, 
displaced both by other Greeks and more powerful barbarian neighbours; this was one of the 
most frequently cited causes of settlement overseas from Homer to Herodotus.   
 
Conclusions 
 
 The overall impression to be derived from a consideration of the literary evidence is 
as follows.  Taken as a synthesis, the accounts of ancient authors appear to emphasise the role 
of individuals in the establishment of settlements overseas.  This could be a reflection of 
tendency to personalise events on the part of our sources or a glimpse Archaic reality, as 
early ventures overseas would most likely have been initiated and led by individuals of high 
status.  The relations between an overseas settlement and its community of origin are 
something earlier sources (e.g. Homer) are silent upon, but which later sources depict as in 
theory based on amity, reverence, and respect.  Relations between Greek settlers and 
indigenous peoples are by and large shown as characterised by conflict, the latter often forced 
from their lands by Greeks.  This, however, is no different to the relations between Greeks, 
and fits into a broader vision of a harsh and anarchic Mediterranean world evident with most 
of our sources, be they Homeric, fifth century, or later still.  This literary evidence constituted 
most of what was available to and used by British scholars until Dunbabin‟s pioneering use 
of archaeology in the 1930s and 1940s.  Now that it has been established what it tells us 
about Greek settlement overseas, and that we have some parameters for assessing the extent 
to which earlier scholars were faithful to the evidence, or alternatively imposed contemporary 
colonial ideas, it is now time to turn to the main focus of this thesis.  
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Section II: The British View 1780-1990 
 
Introduction 
 
How did differing political viewpoints and differing historical contexts influence the 
way British scholars wrote about Greek colonisation?  Recent scholarship has highlighted 
several important ways in which earlier scholarship is seen to have imposed contemporary 
ideas upon the ancient past.  Among the most important distortions brought to our attention 
are a tendency to see colonisation as a state driven process,
1
 a sense of colonial inferiority to 
the homeland,
2 
and the view that indigenous peoples were inferior to the colonising Greeks.
3 
 
These three strands together form the single idea that Greek colonisation was rather like 
British colonisation.  The intention is to assess the extent to which these claims can be held 
representative for British scholarship from the late eighteenth century through to those 
reappraisals of the late twentieth century responsible for the resurgence of interest in the 
study of Greek settlement overseas.   
It will not be disputed here that earlier work was dependent on literary evidence, with 
the attendant prejudices that brought.  As De Angelis said, scholars such as Mitford and 
Grote quite naturally based their histories on the literary evidence because that is what was 
available.
4
  In fact, prior to the advent of large scale archaeological and epigraphic material 
nearer the end of the nineteenth century it was quite feasible for a serious scholar to write a 
history of an entire period and master the relevant source material.
5
  The availability of such 
evidence, of course, is not evidence for its use.  The practice of studying ancient history 
through the ancient texts died hard, and the intrusion of material evidence into the field of 
classical studies caused unease amongst more traditional scholarship: it took the classical „out 
of a world of eternal value and located it firmly in time‟, bypassing „the aesthetic and moral 
communion with the permanent messages of the ancients‟ – as Arthur Evans quipped, 
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„Inscriptions, Explorations, Archaeology are incompatible with true Philology‟.6  This is not 
to say that there was not a dissenting, archaeological, side to this story as some of the first 
established classical archaeologists saw the discipline as highly specialised and more than a 
handmaid to ancient texts.  They sought to instead examine ancient evidence in its own right 
with text no more than supporting material.
7
  Such debates raise questions about the saliency 
of recent criticisms of archaeological methodology, yet that is a subject outside the scope of 
the present chapter and study as a whole.  Also omitted from this particular chapter will be 
discussion of terminology: the common practice seems to have simply called Greek 
settlements colonies; more pertinent is what characteristics various authors attribute to these 
„colonies‟. 
There is no perfect way of structuring a discussion of this nature.  Certain scholars 
will always cross the arbitrary chronological divisions we create, and in a work such as this – 
essentially a history of ideas – changes and continuities will exist side by side, sometimes 
defying attempts to locate a particular way of thinking in a particular chronological context.  
Nonetheless the approach will be to provide an assessment of British scholarship and its 
interpretations of Greek colonisation between 1780 and 1990 by dividing it into three periods 
corresponding to different phases in British imperial history.  The first will be the period 
between 1780 and 1870, which encompasses the loss of the American colonies and the 
emergence of an Empire founded on the twin pillars of white settlement colonies and a 
despotic Empire of rule in India.  The second will be the period between 1870 and 1914, the 
age of High Empire, and encompassing the New Imperialism of the 1870s and the 
intensification of colonial rivalries which contributed to the Great War.  Finally the third 
period will take us from this defining event, through the interwar period, the Second World 
War, and up to the long process of decolonisation which lasted well into the second half of 
the twentieth century.   This admittedly arbitrary division is based on broad changes in 
international politics and imperialism, but great care will be taken to place British scholarship 
into several different yet interrelated contexts.  These will include, of course, changing 
conceptions of empire and colonisation, but also other contexts without which our 
understanding of these would be limited: ideas about domestic politics, of race, and of other, 
non-European peoples. 
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The contextual discussions will precede those of approaches to Greek colonisation 
itself.  This context is critical in order to understand why the scholars in question wrote about 
Greek colonisation in the way they did.  More recent interpretations of earlier scholarship, 
although often correct in arguing that contemporary ideas caused late nineteenth and earlier 
twentieth century scholars to create a distorting picture of Greek settlement overseas, do not 
always correctly identify the specific ideas which were in fact at play.  For example, there is a 
tendency to evoke the influence of an „imperial‟ or „colonialist‟ mindset when in fact the 
scholars in question were motivated and influenced by other concerns and ideas entirely, or 
alternatively understood these terms to mean something very different to our current 
understandings.  Thus the underlying agendas at work, and concepts at play, can be quite 
subtle and require an appropriate understanding of the context in which the scholarly writing 
took place before they can be correctly identified.  Moreover, this enables us to gain a more 
accurate insight into the precise role played by the study and different understandings of 
antiquity in contributing to contemporary political debate in addition to the wider intellectual 
climate.  In other words, if we simply refer to earlier scholarship as having an „imperial‟ 
mindset, and leave it at that, we risk limiting ourselves to an incomplete and oversimplified 
understanding of the critical importance of antiquity in forming the British historical 
imagination.  In other words, the precise way in which looking to antiquity informed British 
conceptions about the present and the future.  
Yet it is not simply a matter of missing out on the importance of readings of antiquity 
to modern political, imperial, and colonial debates, but also of the importance of these 
contemporary debates in defining those very readings.  It was a reciprocal process, as 
Vlassopoulos writes: 
 
For the educated elite of the eighteenth century, ancient history provided a 
cognitive model within which they could make sense of contemporary events and 
personalities and even predict the course of future developments... But this was 
not a one-sided process.  Classical scholarship did not merely provide models and 
symbols for the construction of imperial discourses; it was also reciprocally 
shaped by the development of imperial strategies and debates...‟8 
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What was true in the eighteenth century continued to be the case throughout the nineteenth 
and into the twentieth, before scholarly work became less openly interactive with 
contemporary political concerns, and more avowedly „academic‟.  As a result, it is critical to 
deal at length and in some detail with the relevant contexts so as to be able to understand not 
only the significance of antiquity as a discipline, way of thinking, and set of references in 
Western culture, but also the reasons why we have the histories of antiquity that we have, and 
why we have the accounts of Greek colonisation that we have – indeed why we have 
accounts of Greek colonisation at all, why some subjects are studied at all, and why they fall 
in and out of favour. 
 It is clearly of value to scholars currently working on ancient Greece, and Greek 
settlement overseas, to be able to identify those aspects of our understanding of the subject 
which are in fact derived from and owe their importance to the contemporary preoccupations 
of earlier scholarship, rather than meriting it due to prominence in the ancient evidence.  This 
can lead to new possibilities, approaches, and perhaps more accurate understandings.  On the 
other hand, all study of antiquity, past or present, has to deal with the limitations of the 
ancient evidence, material and literary – both have a tendency to over or under represent 
certain groups, tendencies, and so on.  All scholarship of antiquity, past or present, is faced 
with the same imperative of advancing knowledge of the same thing by questioning earlier 
approaches.  George Grote‟s famous A History of Greece was born out of a desire to unseat 
the conservative visions of William Mitford, and in doing so did much to advance the study 
of Greek history.  His political radicalism was deeply imprinted on his work, but A History of 
Greece was admired for its scholarship, as well as its politics – the radical edge of which was 
ignored.
9
  Earlier scholarship was much less circumspect about its political and philosophical 
inspirations than is the case today, yet it is unclear that it was fundamentally different in this 
regard.  Antiquity was something one could use to prove a political point about, say, empire –
but it was also something one could learn from, and in doing so, by looking for answers to 
contemporary questions, earlier scholarship advanced our understanding of antiquity: 
„modern discourses on empire did not merely employ the classical past for modern uses, but 
also initiated new scholarly questions and generated innovative research on ancient history.‟10  
Much as recent scholarship on Greek settlement overseas has benefited from re-evaluating 
the subject from the perspective of a different, post-colonial, age, and is as a result better 
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placed to understand the complexities of the ancient past, the pressing imperatives of seeking 
answers for contemporary political, imperial, and colonial problems from the eighteenth 
century onwards inspired new and more varied interpretations of antiquity.   
 This following discussion, then, will attempt to understand why British scholarship 
from the eighteenth century through to the twentieth wrote about Greek colonisation in the 
way it did.  It will not, however, take the precedence of the present in forming interpretations 
of the ancient past for granted – a subsidiary question is to what extent were earlier 
understandings of Greek colonisation attributable to contemporary political, imperial, 
colonial, and other concerns, and to what extent were they attributable to relatively 
uncontroversial readings of the ancient evidence.  It can be unclear at first glance, whether or 
not a certain view owes anything to a definable contemporary concern; this is the importance 
of context.  Without context, we cannot be sure of identifying those interpretations which are 
related to contemporary political, imperial, or colonial influences; we cannot be sure whether 
a certain interpretation can or should be understood in such terms, or whether the scholar in 
question would have envisaged it in such a way; we cannot, even if we identify what appears 
to us as an interpretation derived from an „imperial‟, „colonial‟, or for instance „liberal‟ 
mindset, truly appreciate how that would have related to contemporary understandings of 
imperialism, colonisation, and liberalism which were often complex and contested.  In short, 
without context, we will not be able to understand why a scholar wrote as he did and what 
exactly he meant by it.     
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Chapter 4: The Rise of Britain 1780-1870 
 
A Political, Intellectual, and Colonial Context 
 
The Significance of Ancient History and the Constitutional Obsession 
 
If it is something of a truism to state that Classics were central to European culture by 
the eighteenth century, it is nonetheless one which deserves reiterating.  It is a point which 
needs to be seen alongside another: that history, and with it historical writing, as a field for 
critical thinking about human affairs providing „validation and justification‟, had become 
central to political thinking.  These two points in conjunction meant that ancient history had a 
special part to play.
1
 In an age of „unashamedly utilitarian‟ Neo-classicism,2 the ancient 
world „represented the fundamental historical reference points for much political debate‟.3  Its 
„supposed completeness and general applicability‟ meant that to study the ancient world had 
the very practical purpose of escaping from a timeless and almost inevitable cycle of „birth, 
growth, maturation, decline, and death‟ which applied to all civilisations.4  This cycle was put 
onto canvas, using the Classical model of course, by Thomas Cole in his sequence of 
paintings from the 1830s, titled The Course of Empire, and most famously into writing with 
Gibbon‟s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-1788).5 
In the 1780s political debate frequently meant constitutional debate.  This could be as 
broad as arguments for or against Republic, Constitutional and Absolute Monarchy, 
arguments which themselves at times had the appearance of mirroring the wars and quarrels 
of European states, thus giving domestic political debates a very international flavour.  
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Although scholars such as William Mitford (1744-1827) sought to distance modern Britain 
from ancient Greece,
6
 thereby indicating that the Classical model was not a simple matter of 
validation by association, it has been suggested that Ancient Greece and its multitude of city-
states of varying constitutions, sharing a „spirit of liberty‟ and standing in opposition to a 
despotic East, could form a point of comparison with Europe itself.
7
  This still allows, of 
course, room for some states to be more praiseworthy than others, all still standing superior to 
the East, accurately reflecting British perceptions of contemporary Europe.
8
   
The concept of liberty was crucial to the relationship between the ancient and modern 
worlds, regardless of whether one‟s perspective was that of an Enlightenment revolutionary 
or a conservative historian.  Rousseau unfavourably compared modern states with ancient 
republics on grounds of the greater liberty found in the latter.
9
  John Gillies (1746-1836) 
castigated those ancient states which failed to resemble the happy British medium of 
constitutional monarchy as it was the latter which proffered the greatest liberty.
10
  The long 
and the short of it is that ancient Greece was employed by those on all sides of constitutional 
debates.  Historians of Greece such as William Mitford and John Gillies wrote in highly 
charged historical contexts encompassing two great revolutionary wars – American and 
                                                 
6
 Peter Liddel, „European Colonialist Perspectives on Athenian Power: Before and After the Epigraphic 
Explosion‟, in J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas, and R. Parker (eds.) Interpreting the Athenian Empire (London: 
Duckworth, 2009), 15. 
7
 C. Akça Ataç, (2006), 649. 
8
 Indeed, in 1856 E.A. Freeman wrote that „what old Greece was to the rest of the contemporary world, Athens 
emphatically was to Greece itself‟.  Assuming Athens could represent England, the conclusions are obvious.  
E.A. Freeman, “Grote‟s History of Greece”, North British Review, 25 (1856), 142.  See also J.S. Mill‟s 
statement from his second review of Grote‟s history (1853): „whatever in Greece most merits the gratitude of 
posterity, Athens possessed in fullest measure.  If the Hellenic nation is in history the main source and most 
conspicuous representative of progress, Athens may claim the same honourable position in regard to Greece 
itself...‟ in M. Robson (ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XI, Essays on Philosophy and the 
Classics (London: University of Toronto Press: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 315. 
9
 Peter Liddel, Civic Obligations and Individual Liberty in Ancient Athens (Oxford University Press, 2007), 4-5.  
Liddel comments on how Rousseau thought the „liberty and equality of ancient republics was reliant on their 
remaining small in both size and population, and that the virtues of ancient institutions would not endure in a 
larger organization‟; Liddel (2007), 5.  These thoughts might prove even more prescient when considered 
explicitly in terms of the acquisition of empire; the fate of the Roman Republic came, in the modern era, to be 
an important example of the corrupting influence of empire on democratic institutions.  See, for example 
Tenney Frank‟s Roman Imperialism (1914), and A History of Rome (1947 edition).   
10
 John Gillies, The History of Ancient Greece , its Colonies and Conquests; from the Earliest Accounts till the 
Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East (1786), Vol. 1., iii-iv.  According to Clarke, William Mitford 
also expressed this admiration of the British constitution, praising „Homeric Phaeacia and fourth-century 
Macedon‟ for showing that mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy‟ present in the British system. 
Mitford also equates the Athenians to a „complex Nero‟ and Athens to a Turkish despotism, „several times‟ 
drawing parallels between „democratic Athens and revolutionary France‟.  See M.L. Clarke, Greek Studies in 
England 1700-1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), 108. 
82 
 
French – the first of which resulted in Britain‟s defeat at the hands of her American colonies, 
by then a republic, and her old enemy absolutist France.  This was a grating political and 
intellectual disaster.  For such scholars, the political agenda behind their historical writing 
was quite clear, as can be seen from Gillies‟ dedication of his work to King George III (1738-
1820) with the following words:  
 
The History of Greece exposes the dangerous turbulence of Democracy, and 
arraigns the despotism of Tyrants.  By describing the incurable evils inherent in 
every form of Republican policy, it envinces the inestimable benefits, resulting to 
Liberty itself, from the lawful dominion of hereditary Kings, and the steady 
operation of well-regulated Monarchy.
 11
   
 
Liberty was a common theme, embraced by all, the debate being more about its definition 
and which form of government was its foremost guarantor.  Those not in agreement with 
one‟s constitutional preferences were accused of tyranny or despotism – thus implicitly of 
association with what both modern European and ancient Greek freedom were defined in 
opposition to: the East.   
 John Gillies wrote of the government of ancient Asiatics in a manner both disparaging 
and laden with ideas with contemporary association: 
 
The government of the Egyptians as well as of the Asiatics, is uniformly 
represented in scripture as an absolute monarchy.  Herodotus and Diodorus 
mention some laws of the Egyptians which seem to circumscribe the power of 
their kings.  But these laws, if well examined, will confirm the observations in the 
text.  They were established, not in favour of the nation at large, but of the priests 
and soldiers.  The throne of Egypt was supported by the altar, and defended by 
the sword; and what despotism can be upheld but by the same means?
12
 
 
This image of „throne and altar‟ monarchies is no doubt derived from a mixture of ancient 
attitudes, and also more modern ones towards the contemporary Eastern powers such as the 
Ottoman Empire.  Yet it is also possible that it could have been a jibe against the French, the 
country which would become the European equivalent to the East in comparisons between 
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British liberty and the despotism of others.
13
  His very use of the word despotism to refer to 
absolutist states is telling of his political agenda as they would not have regarded themselves 
as such – eighteenth century French scholars such as Phillipe Macquer (1720-1770) would 
have seen legitimate absolute monarchy and despotism as two very different things.
14
  The 
appellation of „oriental despotism‟ was something no European ruler or regime coveted.  
Indeed, critics of King George III, the object of Gillies‟ admiration, portrayed him as „an 
oriental tyrant who just happened to rule in the west.‟15  Oriental despotism was therefore 
something of a current and commonly understood political motif to be used by different 
people for different reasons.  Gillies‟ distaste for oriental forms of government is evident, and 
is in fact entirely consistent with „Orientalist‟ thinking – understood, of course, in Said‟s 
terms as derogatory comparisons between East and West, and not as a genuine interest in 
Eastern civilisations. 
 
Empire, Colonisation, and Antiquity in the Eighteenth Century 
 
 The eighteenth century was a time in which constitutional debates were very closely 
related with international debates and thus the themes of empire and colonisation.  This was 
due in part to a new dimension to imperial and colonial issues from the later eighteenth 
century onwards.  The defeat of French and Spanish imperialisms in the Americas in 1763 – 
imperialisms primarily concerned with the domination of non-European peoples – led to the 
predominance of the First British Empire, based on colonies comprised of European settlers.  
Empire, for the British, could now mean an empire of colonies peopled by European settlers 
and based on naval power, commerce, and political representation, reinforcing rather than 
inimical to liberty. This new form of Empire is said to have pushed conventional debates 
about empire detrimental to liberty to the background,
16
 for the time being at least. For now, 
and until Britain‟s nascent Indian Empire became more important following the loss of the 
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American colonies, empire meant governing other Europeans.
17
  This new imperative of 
thinking about colonial relations between settler and metropolis, made all the more pressing 
by the conflict between Britain and her American colonists, inevitably led contemporary 
Britons to look to antiquity for guidance.  James Abercromby, a supporter of British 
government policy towards the American colonies, thought Britain‟s colonies to resemble 
those of Rome, more than Greece.
18
  William Barron, another supporter of British authority, 
wrote that although early Greek colonies were little more than a means of getting rid of 
surplus population, there was a marked change during the Classical period, when the realities 
of interstate politics led to Greek powers making demands of their originally independent 
colonies.
19
  Critics such as John Symonds and William Meredith argued respectively that 
Barron confused colonies with subject allies, and that the example of Carthage and the revolt 
of her mercenaries and colonies warned against overzealous taxation.
 20
   
 The need to think about empire as a maritime rather than territorial entity shifted the 
focus from Rome as a quarry for imperial lessons.  As Vlassopoulos has shown, Athens, and 
even Carthage could provide more illuminating parallels: Montagu could write in 1759 that it 
was Carthage which bore the „nearest resemblance to Britain both in the commerce, 
opulence, sovereignty of the sea and her method of carrying on her land wars by foreign 
mercenaries‟, and that the position of Carthage in relation to a rapacious Rome seemed 
„greatly analogous to that of Britain with respect to France...‟.21  Others have argued that an 
eighteenth century attachment to Sparta as opposed to a demagogic Athens has been 
exaggerated, and in spite of identifying with Sparta over domestic politics, Athenian 
thalassocracy appealed to conservative conceptions of British foreign policy favouring naval 
mastery and the Blue Water Doctrine.
 22
  This resonated with the relatively newfound 
conception of legitimate empire, which Miles Taylor describes as an Atlantic empire of 
„ships, colonies and commerce‟ in which British naval mastery went hand in hand with 
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overseas settlement by „freeborn Englishmen‟ and the advance of trade.23  This stood in 
marked contrast, of course, to Spartan (and Roman) campaigns of unsustainable territorial 
conquest which resembled contemporary French and Spanish imperialisms.
24
  If British 
scholars and intellectuals in this period increasingly turned to Athens for lessons in maritime 
empire, they did not do so uncritically; the entire point was that antiquity was to be 
interrogated for ways in which it could inform the present – the proficiency of ancient states 
was not to be assumed, their methods not to be emulated without thought.   According to 
Liddel, whereas Temple Stanyan (author of Grecian History, 1707/39) thought the Athenian 
confederacy a mark of greatness, he also thought her reduction of allies to vassal status was 
her ruin.
25
  Similarly, Montagu looked to Athens for lessons applicable to Britain precisely 
because he wanted the latter to avoid the fate of the former, brought down by „luxury, 
effeminacy and corruption‟.26  Mitford‟s views centred on the idea that Athens was a 
tyrannical force imposing democracy on other states, and thought Athens was a bad example 
for empire simply because it failed to create a „commonwealth of common interests.‟27  That 
William Young took a more positive view of Athens
28
 merely proves that different agendas 
and approaches could lead to different conclusions.  The utility of antiquity in thinking the 
present was that it was more than a mere source of references, but rather a field for debating 
the present with reference to evidence drawn from a past historical reality of states exhibiting 
problems similar though not necessarily the same as, those which confronted modern polities.  
Those problems were in the eighteenth century perceived to revolve around constitutional 
debates, and so it was competing constitutional agendas which drove the histories written: as 
we shall see, John Gillies saw the Greek colonies of Magna Graecia as superior to the 
mainland because of their more monarchical constitutions.
29
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 The focus on a maritime conception of empire did not mean that the problems of other 
types of empire, less conducive to liberty, disappeared from the eighteenth century 
imagination.  William Young, a Whig, colonial governor, and plantation owner against the 
abolition of slavery, commented on the dangers empire posed to democratic states: to such 
states conquest could be corrupting.
30
  In this Young prefigured what was to be a pervasive 
nineteenth century concern as the maritime and colonial conception of empire receded in the 
face of a growing British interest in India, and a form of empire based on ruling non-
European peoples.  The difficulties of empire for a free state were twofold.  Firstly there is 
the corrupting influence of ruling others despotically, especially if this involved ruling non-
European peoples thus compounding the corruption by introducing the additional dangers of 
intermixing with un-free, servile, political inferiors.  Secondly there are dangers inherent in 
using standing armies to hold empire overseas.  This model of thought, especially the 
suspicion of standing armies, was present in the eighteenth century in the thought of 
Montesquieu and Hume,
31
 but it was to be rearticulated in the nineteenth as despotic 
territorial empire became a prevalent aspect of European involvement overseas – Britain in 
India, France in North Africa.  The dangers inherent in using standing armies to hold empire 
overseas, and that there may be domestic consequences, were in fact very evocatively 
expressed by Richard Cobden in relation to France, but in a publication about British India:  
„In France the razzias of Algeria were repaid by her own troops, in the massacres of the 
Boulevards, and the savage combats in the streets of Paris.‟  The point was, according to 
Taylor, that „illiberal forces associated with the acquisition of empire could actually pitch the 
domestic polity into despotism‟.32  These concerns came to be a crucial part of British 
thinking about empire, and very importantly they were to crystallise a conceptual wall 
between on the one hand empire – as the despotic governance of non-Europeans, and on the 
other colonisation – as the replication of free European communities overseas.   
 
The debates elicited by the maritime empire of ships, colonies, and commerce, and the 
interrelated international conflicts of the late eighteenth century, were very much centred on 
constitutional issues.  In a way this was very Euro-centric in that it did not obviously concern 
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the other important development of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century: that is 
European involvement in the East.  The political debates within and between European states, 
and especially Britain, were during the early nineteenth century to exert a profound influence 
over the nature of European involvement in the East.  In turn, the East itself, and certain 
perceptions of it, were to shape the intellectual underpinnings of that political debate. 
 
The Debt to the East in Antiquity 
 
 By looking at the way in which British historians explained the rise of Greece in 
relation to its early interactions with the East we can, assuming the newfound centrality of 
Greece to eighteenth century political thought, shed light on the role played by the East in the 
construction of the European self-image.  The histories of William Mitford and John Gillies 
do not conform to the (in)famous argument of Black Athena, as neither hammered home the 
point of an irreconcilable contrast between East and Europe by a denial of Eastern 
influences.
33
  Rather they acknowledge them, and in doing so a Greek debt to the East to 
comes to represent a far more persuasive affirmation of European superiority than any 
outright denial could ever have done.    
For Mitford, Greece was the first European country to emerge from a savage state 
precisely because of its connections with the „civilised nations of the East,‟34 and similarly 
Gillies wrote of a Greek debt to the East in religion, agriculture, and arts.
35
  So transformative 
were Eastern influences that Greeks became superior to all around them  (including, we may 
infer, their benefactors) „in arts and arms‟ – yet also increasingly loath to see themselves as 
such passive recipients of gifts from superior civilisations to the East, claiming instead to 
have been taught by the gods.
36
  This could be read as indication of awareness (indeed 
indicating surprising self-awareness) that Europe‟s rise was a recent and still ongoing 
process, awareness that for all its political failings, the East had long been more sophisticated 
and indeed the centre world political power.  More certain is the implication that the Greeks, 
having been taught by the East, surpassed it.  This is significant, but what is the explanation?   
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Greek superiority lay in political freedom, and this political freedom was derived from 
the innate superiority of the Greek mind and its language: eastern tongues, Gillies wrote, „are 
generally extremely deficient in vowels‟, thus making them „extremely different from the 
vocal harmony of the Greek‟.  The latter „abounds‟ in vowels and diphthongs, and hence the 
Greeks possessed „organs of perception more acute, elegant, and discerning.  They felt such 
faint variations of liquid sounds, as escaped the dullness of Asiatic ears, and invented marks 
to express them...‟37  Therefore the intrinsic superiority of Greece was linked to language, 
itself, we may infer, behind a certain way of thinking and thus a propensity for political 
freedom.  Gillies knew the Phoenicians who had given the Greeks so many gifts, including 
the alphabet, had been assimilated and had learned Greek because the „inflexible rigour of 
despotism, which as in all ages prevailed in Egypt and the East, was unknown to the 
conquerors of Troy.‟38  But why acknowledge Eastern influences at all? 
By recognising their debt to the East – a Greek and thus by extension European debt – 
two things could be achieved.  Firstly it contributed to a framework of progress and cultural 
interaction in which civilised peoples impart to rude tribes, implicitly meaning that there is a 
ranking.  Secondly, it turned an argument against European superiority, i.e. that they had 
been civilised by the East, into an argument for it: Greeks had received the material elements 
of civilisation from East and had progressed whereas their benefactors had not; as Oriental 
despotisms, although they possessed a degree of civilisation as befits large centralised 
powers, they were by definition stagnant.
39
  The East had developed as far as it could, 
whereas the European tribes, once savage, could develop fully, and reach the apogee of 
civilisation.  All because they had an intrinsic aptitude, possibly linguistic in origin, for 
political freedom – and political freedom was a precondition for the highest attainments in 
art, architecture, literature, and science.   Much of this is in loosely in keeping with Martin 
Bernal‟s ideas,40 yet ironically enough, in overlooking that such authors acknowledged a 
material debt to the East, Bernal overlooked the way in which this material debt implied the 
absence of a political one.  Freedom being the defining contrast between East and West, this 
innate Western political aptitude in fact formed the bedrock of the kind of Orientalism we see 
with these scholars.  Their Orientalism was nevertheless more than simply defining the West 
in opposition to the East; instead the ancient East, placed into the context of its role in 
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initiating the rise of an ancient Greece which would in time surpass it, represented a means of 
explaining the still recent ascendancy of modern Europe.   
 
Britain and the East 
 
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can be identified as the period in 
which European states surpassed their Eastern equivalents, economically, technologically, 
and militarily.  As we have seen with our depictions of a stagnant Orient swiftly overtaken by 
an innately more progressive Greece in antiquity, the idea of such superiority was in place 
during the last two decades of the eighteenth century – but this in fact merely coincided with, 
rather than post dated, the actual surpassing of China and India in economic terms.  It was 
not as obvious to eighteenth century Europeans, as it would be for later generations, that their 
states were substantially more progressive than those of the East.
41
  This was reflected in the 
way in which certain eighteenth century Britons could address the issue of non-European 
peoples.   
Pitts has demonstrated how Adam Smith, in emphasising material and contingent 
factors in the development of human societies, avoided attributing European superiority to 
superior rationality and cognitive superiority – as in fact became more and more common 
during the nineteenth century.
42
  For instance, Smith argued that some societies progressed 
„more or less quickly as a result of many environmental and material factors beyond obvious 
qualities of climate‟ – Greeks developed republican government because of defensible and 
cultivable land – and his account therefore „suggests that those who assume a population 
must be inferior if it lives “primitively” on good soil have probably misjudged other less 
obvious factors.‟ Positive advances in European societies he explained with recourse to 
physical explanations and good fortune; in doing so he was able to „avoid the self-
congratulatory note common in discussions attributing such developments to Europeans‟ 
special understanding of the values of freedom or political equality‟.43  These two foundation 
myths – profligate natives and a European aptitude for political freedom – would come to 
form the bedrock of nineteenth century colonisation and liberalism respectively.  
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 Smith‟s warnings were not heeded, as Britons derived more and more confidence from 
their technological and economic superiority.  This was, however, superiority aided by the 
„exploitation of colonial resources‟, and brought into sharper relief by a stagnation of India 
which was itself the direct result of British rule.  Thus, as Pitts writes, when nineteenth 
century Britons contrasted a progressive Britain with a stagnant or indeed backward India, 
„they were observing, on both sides of the comparison, phenomena that had not existed 
before 1790 and that were partly the consequences of colonial rule.‟44  For relative economic 
backwardness and traditionalism to merit such censure of course presupposes that attitudes 
within contemporary Britain were hostile to such traits.  This is why attitudes to the east need 
to be seen in the further context of the political changes occurring within Britain itself during 
the early nineteenth century: in other words, the rise of liberalism. 
 
Liberalism and Greek History: 1830-1870 
 
The histories of Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875), published in eight volumes between 
1835 and 1844, and George Grote (1794-1871), published between 1847 and 1856 
represented a marked break from those of Mitford and Gillies in that they had an entirely 
different domestic political agenda which must be seen in the context of a still contentious yet 
growing liberalism.  The association between Greece and Britain functioned on a specific 
level in terms of a political comparison between Greece and reformist Britain, but this was 
also positioned in a broader historical sense on a developmental path which applied equally to 
both societies.  Thirlwall‟s account of the development of Ionian Greece, in particular that of 
Miletus in the seventh and sixth centuries BC, is a good illustration of this way of thinking: 
 
It seems probable that the fall of the ancient aristocracies which succeeded the 
heroic monarchy, and the emulation between a growing commonalty, and an 
oligarchy which grounded its political claims solely on superior wealth, were 
conditions, without which the Ionian genius would not have found room to 
expand itself so freely.
45
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This mirrors Thomas Babington Macaulay‟s speech in support of the Reform Bill, delivered 
before the House of Commons in 1831 in which he „situated the Reform Bill crisis of Britain 
in the 1830s within a broader sweep of British and human history‟:46 
 
All history is full of revolutions, produced by causes similar to those which are 
now operating in England.  A portion of the community which had been of no 
account expands and becomes strong.  It demands a place in the system, suited 
not to its former weakness, but to its present power.  If this is granted, all is well.  
If this is refused, then comes the struggle between the young energy of one class 
and the ancient privileges of another.... Such was the struggle between the 
Plebeians and the Patricians of Rome... Such finally is the struggle which the 
middle classes of England are waging against an aristocracy of mere locality.
47
 
 
Both Thirlwall and Macaulay thought in terms of changes in material circumstances creating 
the necessity of redistributing of political power.  The inclusion of the Roman example 
suggests that this was a explanation of civilisational development which could be applied to 
all societies past and present. The consequence of rejecting reform was revolution – 
unpredictable and undesirable.
48
  Both men belong to an élite liberal intellectual milieu 
fearful of the demands of such working class agitation as would culminate in Chartism,
49
 but 
in favour of the kind of gradual political reform enfranchising the propertied middle classes 
embodied by the 1832 Reform Act.  For Thirlwall, the material changes and thus political 
changes in Archaic Greece were connected with maritime commerce, itself „coupled with the 
cultivation of the nobler arts, and the opening of new intellectual fields, in a degree to which 
history affords no parallel before the beginning of the latest period of European 
civilisation.‟50  Thus Ionian Greece followed a very similar developmental path as modern 
Britain – leading in both cases to a desirable outcome in which political liberalisation 
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accompanied intellectual enlightenment.  British and Ionian „genius‟ were the products of the 
same process.  
 It was George Grote, however, who would do most to transform the role and 
understanding of Greek history and make it speak to a new reformist Britain – even if his 
audience absorbed a much more diluted message than the radical one he proposed.
51
  Far 
more the radical democrat than Thirlwall, Grote‟s history was a concerted assault on the 
hitherto dominant conservative interpretation of Greece, and especially of democratic Athens, 
which viewed the latter as a demagogic tyranny.  The precise nature of Grote‟s democratic 
vision has been outlined in Frank Turner‟s subtle and persuasive account.  While he defended 
Athens from „unjust and misconceived conservative attacks‟, it is little known that Grote „did 
not in fact champion Athenian democracy‟.  Instead, Turner argues, „the democracy that he 
championed had no precedent, past or present‟.  Grote‟s democracy was what Athens could 
have been, and what Britain „might still achieve‟, were it to rid itself of those „predemocratic 
bonds of religion and family sympathy‟ which could stir „primitive fanaticism‟ and 
undermine the „bonds of citizenship and the civic morality of a democratic commonwealth‟.52  
This was not, however, the radical message his audience took from A History of Greece 
either in terms of Athenian democracy or radical democracy – instead, satisfied with the 
„moderate liberalism‟ of the 1832 Reform Act, they „admired Athens for the resemblance 
Grote had convinced them the ancient city bore to their own national polity‟.  For Turner, „the 
great history that Grote had hoped might stir his countrymen to self-criticism and reform 
instead provided frequent occasion for political narcissism.‟  Regardless of intentions 
unfulfilled, Grote‟s history was nonetheless profoundly influential, in Britain and abroad. 53  
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A Liberal Conception of Civilisation 
 
The battle of Marathon, as an event in English history, is more important than the battle of 
Hastings – J.S. Mill54 
 
Grote was very much part of the campaign for the Reform Bill of 1832,
55
 and was 
elected to Parliament after its passage.  Grote was, in fact, an admirer of James Mill
56
 and a 
lifelong friend of his son John Stuart Mill who wrote two positive reviews of Grote‟s History 
of Greece in 1846 and 1853.
57
  They came to disagree on many issues,
58
 but Mill‟s writings 
are very instructive if we wish to understand the context in which Thirlwall and Grote wrote, 
and especially the connection between their political ideas, influenced by a new 
understanding of ancient Greece, and a broader vision concerning the nature of civilisation 
itself.
59
  Thirlwall‟s vision of the rise of Greece as resulting from a „growing commonalty‟ 
without which „the Ionian genius would not have found room to expand so freely‟ is mirrored 
in Mill‟s essay of 1836, titled „Civilisation‟.  For Mill, one of the chief consequences of the 
advance of civilisation was that power passed from individuals to masses.  Power was 
contingent on property and „powers and acquirements of the mind‟, and the rise of the middle 
classes in Britain, France, and Germany, but in Britain most of all, signalled a marked change 
in the diffusion of property and knowledge, and in the degree of what he termed „co-
operation‟ among individuals.  By this Mill meant individuals coming together, „sacrificing 
of some portion of individual will, for a common purpose‟,60 becoming more 
interdependent,
61
 and, we must assume, making decisions collectively.  This was particularly 
significant as „there is not a more accurate test of the progress of civilization than the 
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progress of the power of co-operation‟.62  Co-operation, of course, could be easily translated 
to democratic institutions, and by marrying the advance of civilisation, and even the very 
nature of advanced civilisation with freer, more representative, more co-operative forms of 
government, Mill was depicting opposition to such broadening of political power as by 
definition uncivilised – something which would have implications for his view of non-
European peoples, and no doubt provoked the ire of contemporary conservatives.  So as to 
prove the point, he urges the reader to „look even at war, the most serious business of a 
barbarous people; see what figure rude nations, or semi-civilized and enslaved nations, have 
made against civilized ones, from Marathon downwards.  Why?  Because discipline is more 
powerful than numbers, and discipline, that is, perfect co-operation, is an attribute of 
civilization.‟63  This is also illustrative of another point – Mill implies that Persians were 
„barbarians‟.  Gone is a subtler, multi-tier, classification of different stages of development 
visible in the eighteenth century with Scottish thinkers such as Smith; like his father, John 
Stuart Mill drew a „crude distinction‟ between „civilized and savage or barbarious peoples‟.64 
A further significance is that while Mill did not necessarily see the progress of 
civilisation as inevitable, nor believe that greater advancement in civilisation was an 
unproblematic thing,
65
 his ideas do indicate a belief that if civilisation progresses, then we 
have an idea as to what form it will take.  To turn this idea on its head, we know that 
civilisation is progressing when we see increasing democratisation with first property, then 
knowledge, becoming more and more widely spread until the power itself is redistributed to 
reflect this change – as happened in 1832.66  Mill certainly believed that the nineteenth 
century was a time of dramatic change – „a change has taken place in the human mind‟ he 
wrote in 1831, and he saw his contemporary world as an awakening in which men „conscious 
of their new position‟ „insisted upon being governed in a new way‟.  The nineteenth century 
would as a result „be known to posterity as the era of one of the greatest revolutions of which 
history has preserved the remembrance, in the human mind, and in the whole constitution of 
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human society.‟67  Thirlwall‟s rise of Ionian Greece, in the seventh and sixth centuries BC, 
are expressed as resulting from the very same changes as those Mill saw as advancing 
civilisation in Britain in the 1830s: Mill‟s „co-operation‟, Thirlwall‟s „growing commonality‟ 
and Grote‟s Athenian citizens fulfilling „civic obligations‟68  are in effect different ways of 
saying a similar thing.  Thus it seems that within this broadly liberal intellectual milieu there 
existed a fairly coherent view of what civilisational progress meant, how it happened, and 
agreement that Greek antiquity provided meaningful parallels.   
 
Categorisation, Euro-Centrism, and Progress: 
 
A certain image of the East was an important component of a new, more far-reaching, 
Euro-centric understanding of the world which developed in the early nineteenth.  Attitudes 
to the East need to be seen within the context of the political changes occurring within Britain 
itself at this time: namely, the rise of liberalism. It would matter little that Britain was 
responsible for any perceived stagnation or traditionalism in Indian society – what mattered 
now was the way the East represented the antithesis of the sort of society these early liberals 
wanted to create in Britain, and as such constituted the foreign equivalent of conservative 
elements within Britain: in resisting the course of civilisation and progress, both belonged in 
the past.  It is useful to place these ideas within the following context: 
 
It was in this period [late 18
th
 to early 19
th
 centuries] that Europeans first 
advanced the claim that their civilisation and culture were superior to all others – 
not theologically (that was old hat) but intellectually and materially.  Whether this 
claim was true need not detain us.  Much more important was the Europeans‟ 
willingness to act as if it were.  This was shown in their eagerness to collect and 
categorize the knowledge they gleaned from other parts of the world.  It was 
revealed in the confidence with which they fitted this knowledge into a structure 
of thought with themselves at the centre.  The intellectual annexation of non-
European Eurasia preceded the imposition of a physical dominance.  It was 
expressed in the ambition by the end of our period (earlier if we include the 
French invasion of Egypt) to „remake‟ parts of Afro-Asia as the „New World‟ had 
been „made‟.  And it ultimately rested on the extraordinary conviction that 
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Europe alone could progress through history, leaving the rest of the world in a 
„stationary state‟ awaiting Europe‟s Promethean touch.69 
 
We have already seen how Mill‟s idea of advancing civilisation was connected to the rise of 
the British and European middle classes and the associated democratisation of Western 
societies.  For Europeans more widely, the idea of advancing civilisation was related, 
informed, proven, by a similar rise in Europe‟s position in the world.  Indeed the rise of 
European nation states exhibiting diminishing aristocracies and increasingly enfranchised 
middle classes was a gratifying vision – despotism was on the retreat both at home and 
abroad as European nations roundly trounced and dictated to Oriental despotisms in India and 
North Africa.
70
  The above passage hits upon several very important concepts related to these 
changes: firstly the urge to categorise, secondly a Euro-centric structure of thought, and 
thirdly the idea that only Europe could progress in an otherwise stagnant world.   
The author, John Darwin, refers to the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries – 
the very period under discussion – and it is no accident that the concepts he identifies find 
direct reflection in the way ancient history was written in this same period.  Historical writing 
about Greece from the 1780s up to Thirlwall and Grote reflects a society attempting to make 
sense of its place in the world, and especially from Grote onwards, it is consistent with the 
categorisation, re-structuring of knowledge (in this case history) around Europe, and the 
emphasis on an intrinsic and exclusive European aptitude for progress, which are identified as 
characteristic of the age.  Furthermore, there is a distinct tendency to interpret wider events 
through the prism of domestic political concerns: thinkers such as J.S. Mill sought to 
understand the remarkable events of his time in a wider European and world context and 
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place them in an explanatory framework based on a historically informed concept of 
civilisation.  Historians such as Connop Thirlwall and George Grote sought to do the same 
thing, but this time with an unavoidably greater historical emphasis as they placed the 
developments of their own day in a historical framework which traced a corresponding rise of 
Europe, and one state in particular, in the ancient world.  The concept of civilisation which 
emerges with these writers is consistent with the trend identified by John Darwin – i.e. 
explaining the past, present and future events in a manner informed by the upward 
developmental trajectory of Europe.  However, it is crucial to understand that it is implicated 
on two other levels.  Not only do such histories explain the rise of Europe among lesser 
civilisations on a world level, but it also explains the rise of certain European states among 
lesser ones within Europe, and, most importantly, the rise of a certain political movement 
contrasting to a lesser one within the foremost European state.  This was a schema applicable 
in both ancient and modern worlds.     
Creating a structure of thought with Europe at its centre was a task well underway as 
early as Gillies: the framework whereby civilisation was passed from the East and improved 
by the once rude but intrinsically more capable Greek was a novel way of doing just this 
while at the same time alleging that only Europe could progress.  This continued with 
Thirlwall, who thought Phoenician interaction with the early Greeks to have constituted „the 
most powerful of all the external causes that promoted the progress of civilised life, and 
introduced new arts and knowledge in the islands and shores of the Aegean.‟71  In a 
somewhat colonial style, the Phoenicians impart to the natives, bringing the benefits of 
civilisation by unleashing the hitherto unrealised potential of the natural environment: they 
„not only introduced the products of their own arts, but stimulated the industry and invention 
of the natives, explored the mineral and vegetable riches of the soil, and increased them by 
new plants and methods of cultivation.‟72  The East is included in a framework where 
civilisation is passed from civilising powers to primitive tribes because it serves to strengthen 
a model in which the Greeks – or British – ultimately end up on top. 
Classification only emerges in a systematic sense with Grote, and when it does, it is 
done according to the civilisational barometer seen with Mill.  If Grote‟s classification is 
more sophisticated than the „barbarian‟-„civilised‟ dichotomy of the two Mills, this is less a 
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depiction of societies at different stages of development, and more a ranking of seemingly 
innate qualities and aptitudes.  Babylon, Assyria, and Egypt „attained a certain civilisation in 
mass, without the acquisition of any high mental qualities or the development of any 
individual genius.‟  With industriousness bought at the price of „prostrate obedience to 
despotic rule‟ or „imprisonment within the chain of a consecrated institution of caste‟, the 
massed subjects of great kings would toil „unaided either by theory or by artifice, in the 
accomplishment of gigantic results‟. These were devoid of „the higher sentiment of art‟, 
something which owed „its first marked development to Grecian susceptibility and genius‟.73  
Greek, or European genius stands in stark contrast to the stagnant, limited, civilisation of the 
East – classic Orientalism, and nothing particularly new.  More than Orientalism, it was part 
of a structure of thought which, as we have seen with Mill, held civilisational advance to be 
contingent upon democratisation – the very cause of Greek and Athenian genius.  As E.A. 
Freeman was later to put it in his review of Grote‟s history:  „... in truth, the pre-eminence of 
Athens in literature, philosophy, and art, was simply the natural result of her pre-eminence in 
freedom and good government.‟74  What was new, and is indeed absent with Mill‟s 
Civilization, was that Grote seems to have believed the distinctions between Greece and other 
civilisations to have had some form of racial basis.   
This is evident in his views of racial mixing under Alexander: „such compulsory mixing 
of the different races promises nothing favourable to the happiness of any of them...‟.75  
Furthermore, whereas Thirlwall wrote loosely about Egyptian „national character‟,76 Grote 
sought to classify along racial lines the civilisations of Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, Phoenicia 
and Carthage.
 77
   Though still Asiatic, „people of the Semitic race‟ (e.g. Phoenicia) excelled 
other types (Assyria and Egypt) because of their „degree of individual impulse and energy‟, 
„industrial aptitude and constancy of purpose‟, and „strenuous ferocity of character‟.78  
Civilisational attributes seem to have been seen as racial qualities, reflecting a growing trend 
to use race to explain behaviour and a developed hierarchy of civilisations:
79
 the Semitic 
people were as distinguished from the Egyptians, enslaved as they were by „childish caprices 
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and antipathies, and by endless frivolities of ceremonial detail‟, as from „the flexible, many-
sided, and self-organising Greek.‟80  The Greeks, having learned a little from Egypt, more 
from Phoenicia, are destined to occupy the highest tier of Grote‟s hierarchy of civilisation: 
 
not only capable of opening both for himself and for the human race the highest 
walks of intellect, and the full creative agency of art, but also gentler by far in his 
private sympathies and dealings than his contemporaries on the Euphrates, the 
Jordan, or the Nile – for we are not of course to compare him with the exigencies 
of Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
81
 
 
In an age where Europeans increasingly sought to explain the disparities in technology and 
power that existed between them and other peoples across the globe, and at the same time as 
Charles Darwin was developing his ideas following a voyage to the far flung corners of 
European settlement, Grote‟s attempts to classify are a reflection of a widespread trend.  In 
his classification according to what appear to be innate capacities, Grote is entirely consistent 
with a tendency from James Mill onwards to rely „on the capacity or incapacity of individuals 
to explain all social difference‟.82  Was this derived from racial theory? 
 
Race and Racial Anglo-Saxonism 
 
Was the conception of civilisation and its highest stage seen with Mill, Thirlwall, and 
Grote based exclusively upon a people‟s position on what was essentially a timeline – rather 
than a immutable hierarchy – of civilisations,83 or did other  nineteenth century ideas about 
race have an impact?  The „liberalisation‟ of Greek history and conceptions of civilisation is 
very important, yet omits some important detail.  There were new ways of explaining an 
European, or British aptitude for freedom, an important one being race.  Of course, ideas of 
racial hierarchy were nothing new: they clearly existed in John Gillies‟ day.  The 1780s and 
beyond were times of slavery – even if Britain at this time sought some self-congratulation 
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from its increasing opposition to it, thus reaffirming its „unique commitment to liberty‟ after 
the less than creditable War of Independence.  The prominent position of slavery in the 
United States offered some moral consolation, and while the association of anti-slavery with 
the French Republic, Jacobinism, and the rights of man once posed problems for more 
conservatively minded Britons, the reinstitution of slavery by the French Empire in 1802 
meant that opposition to slavery could now sit comfortably alongside existing international 
political enmities.
84
  In 1807 Britain abolished the slave trade, although not slavery itself, 
within its Empire.
85
  The act of 1833 which went that step further was supported by reformist 
liberal opinion, including George Grote.
86
  What is significant is that at a time when Britain 
was acting against slavery, racial ideas were becoming more important, not less. 
An important intellectual and cultural development in the early nineteenth century 
was a growing interest in the Anglo-Saxons as a race. This was most keenly felt in the 
reception of medieval history.  Inspired by such works as those of Walter Scott, „medievalists 
were tapping contemporary interests in the history of European peoples to make Britain‟s 
“superior” history of free institutions the inherent trait of a superior Saxon race‟.87  These 
ideas were connected to the rise of phrenology, or the study of skull shapes, concerned with 
proving such things as the existence of a distinctly Anglo-Saxon skull, and that skull-shape 
determined behaviour.  It could have a distinctly domestic application by indicating a 
person‟s honesty or diligence – and as such would become a part of the all-encompassing 
ideologies of racial determinism and racial degeneration within European nations and cities.
88
  
More importantly as far as we are concerned, what could be applied to an individual could be 
applied to nations.  Just as „Britain‟s free institutions followed from the splendid mentality of 
their Anglo-Saxon creators‟, the undeveloped nature of Indians, Africans, and American 
Indians could be explained by their brains – „Their temperaments were unsuited.  And these 
temperaments could be measured from skull shapes.‟ By connecting skull shape to „racial 
temperament‟ one could „rank‟ various peoples and even predict their actions.89  From the 
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1840s it had become an assumption among racial theorists that Caucasian European races 
were inherently more civilised.  Although drawing on eighteenth century ideas about „beauty, 
art, and human difference,‟ they drew different conclusions to their predecessors,90 
conclusions rooted to a greater extent in unalterable human racial difference.  The social 
Darwinism of the period after 1859 „merely intensified‟ this sort of racial thinking and „aided 
the categorization of ethnic differences‟ – easing more detailed classification which could 
apply as much to Celts, Jews, and the working classes as to „non-Caucasian ethnic groups‟.91  
Thus although this way of thinking may have become more and more prominent after 1870,
92
 
when it would become an important facet of thinking about the future role of the colonies of 
settlement, its roots lay in the earlier in the century.  It is nonetheless unclear how racial ideas 
– especially the more extreme biological explanations of phrenologists – impacted upon the 
thoughts of liberal scholars of Grote‟s generation.  J.S. Mill, for one, had no time for claims 
of biological differences and inequalities – his „commitment to an ameliorative colonial rule‟ 
in British India was „premised on assumptions of human equality and biological uniformity‟ 
– assumptions which were beginning to be challenged by the 1860s.93   
 
A Mid-Century Transformation 
 
According to Taylor there occurred a „hardening of racial attitudes in the mid-
Victorian period‟, and henceforth „radical and liberal opinion drew a much sharper distinction 
between a white liberal empire composed of self-governing settlement colonies and a non-
European territorial empire, precariously dependent on the rule of imperial authority‟.94  
During early nineteenth century leading „liberal‟95 intellectuals could be among the most 
forthright supporters of British imperial rule in India – on the understanding that it could be a 
vehicle for modernising the country and save it from its stagnation and backwardness by 
imposing what were seen as universal values.  Such intellectuals included James Mill, 
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Thomas Babington Macaulay, and John Stuart Mill – all men who would work for the East 
India Company.
96
   
The Indian Mutiny of 1857, along with the reception of evolutionary theory after 
1859, caused an important change in the way Britons thought about empire and the 
governance of non-European peoples.  Earlier in the century James Mill and Macaulay 
envisaged a despotic but benign Britain as transforming India to a position of adequate 
civilisation in a matter of decades.
97
  The Indian Mutiny severely dented the confidence that a 
British civilising mission could succeed – that non-Europeans could be civilised.  The advent 
of evolutionary theory, mixed with such new pessimisms, brought about new ideas relating to 
race: it was „treated as neither immutable not incidental, but as a longue durée historical 
phenomenon‟ – in other words, other races could progress, but it would be a far longer 
process than was thought to be the case earlier in the century.  Now, races differed „not in 
their essential humanity, but in the speed and success with which they had passed through a 
universal transformation from savagery to civilization‟.  Indeed, as far as other races were 
concerned, progress was so gradual that individuals would not be able to experience it.
98
    
Bernard Porter‟s argument that Victorians could be seen as more „culturalist‟ than 
„racist‟ – the former implying the „arrogant but fundamentally liberal and optimistic belief in 
the advancement of everyone‟ – that „all peoples (or nearly all) could, like Britain herself, 
“progress”‟, 99   may well have applied before the mid-century crises – but after the 1860s in a 
very technical fashion only.  Not only did the Mutiny and evolutionary theory change the way 
attitudes towards non-Europeans were formed, but they also contributed to a shift in British 
imperial policy.  At the very time some of the universalising and assimilationist efforts of 
liberal imperialism were bearing fruit in the form of an educated Anglophone Indian elite, the 
colonial rulers changed their minds about the best way to govern India.
100
  From now on there 
would be contempt for such „Babus‟ with mere „trappings of an English education‟, and a 
move towards emphasising and indeed even cultivating the Indian traditionalism with which 
the British were far more comfortable, as it would mean effectively indefinite colonial rule.
101
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This is the transformation in British imperial policy which Karuna Mantena characterised as a 
shift from a „universialist‟ to a „culturalist‟ approach.102   
 
Empire and Colonisation into the Nineteenth Century 
 
The loss of the American colonies in 1783 did not mean that Britain was a power in 
decline: this happened during a period of continuing expansion and exploration, and it was 
France, not Britain, which was ruined by its victorious participation in the American 
Revolutionary War.  Between 1794 and 1816 Britain‟s trade more than doubled as it sought 
new markets elsewhere
103
 and continued to explore and expand.  By 1770 James Cook had 
discovered the eastern coast of Australia and circumnavigated New Zealand, both of which 
were claimed for the British crown.  The penal colony of New South Wales was subsequently 
founded in 1788, and Britain still held her Canadian provinces which from 1763 formally 
included the French speaking territories taken from France after the fall of Quebec in 1759.  
These were divided into upper and lower Canada in 1791, mirroring English and French 
divisions.  Added to this were the lucrative plantation possessions of the Caribbean and 
quasi-private interests in India.   
One of the most noticeable things is that eighteenth century Britons perceived 
separate empires: on one hand that, as already encountered above, which encompassed „ships, 
colonies and commerce‟ where British naval mastery went hand in hand with overseas 
settlement by „freeborn Englishmen‟ and the advance of trade,104 and on the other hand, 
although admittedly more an early nineteenth century phenomenon, the parasitic empire of 
conquest in India and West Indies which was corrupting and pregnant with dangers for liberty 
at home.
105
  Implicit is the idea that colonisation is a far nobler thing than governing others – 
James Mill at one point argued for a British colonisation of India in order to reproduce a 
British system of „checks and balances‟: a far better alternative than colonial adventurism and 
arbitrary rule which aided unsavoury „vested interests‟ at home.106  An added dimension to 
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more liberal thinking about colonies, informed by the loss of those in America, was the belief 
they should become independent as soon as possible.
107
 
John Stuart Mill, although he worked for the East India Company for 35 years, was 
most enthusiastic about Greek colonisation and the lessons it could teach Britain in its 
relations with the settler colonies.
108
  His conception of the British Empire was of „different 
types of possessions‟ to be „governed in different ways depending on the stage of civilization 
they had reached and on the political arrangements they had inherited‟.109  Even though a 
timeline of advancement consistent with his idea of civilisation rather than a strict hierarchy, 
it was obvious which possessions were able to govern themselves (the white settler colonies) 
and which could not (India).  Mill believed in an enlightened despotism fundamentally 
separated from the home government of the colonising power: for the good of both Britain 
and India, Mill „insisted that the administration of India be vested in a disinterested elite and 
kept entirely separate from the government of Britain‟ lest settlers and officials in India take 
advantage „of liberal institutions and public opinion at home in order to pursue their 
acquisitive interests in India‟.110  In a view that is contradicted by Pitts, who more 
persuasively holds Mill to have been a more enthusiastic liberal imperialist,
111
 Taylor argued 
that neither Mill nor those with similar ideas were „supporting imperialism‟ – „rather they 
were offering imperfect solutions to the political problems posed by distant dominion over 
non-European peoples.‟112  Empire is regrettable yet irreversible (another power would 
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simply step in), flawed, prone to corruption, and best kept at arm‟s length.  Colonisation, and 
the resulting extension of free-institutions, is none of those things.  It also became more 
popular from 1850 onwards as individuals such as Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Gladstone 
saw and publicised the merits of colonisation – it would „reproduce the likeness of England... 
thereby contributing to the general happiness of mankind‟.  An important part of such pro-
colonisation sentiment was the belief that the colonies would one day, as did America, 
separate from the mother country.  Regardless, there was a „gradual acceptance that the settler 
communities could be a valuable adjunct to British wealth and power, and a “healthy” 
extension of British society.‟113 
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the Victorian middle classes „did not call the 
British Empire an empire, because they did not think of it as one‟.114  Instead, glossing over 
an India in any case considered an entirely separate aberration, they much preferred the 
settlement colonies;
115
 the colonies were entirely consistent with the peaceful spread of free 
British trade and free British institutions,
116
proffering the benefits of empire without the 
drawbacks.  With colonisation, one could simply replicate what one had at home, and 
regardless of whether one maintained political control one had prosperous, self-organising, 
allies, bound by ties of filial affection, and upon whom one could count upon in conflict with 
any third power.  Colonisation was a means of circumventing empire, transcending its 
transience
117
 as something doomed to fail because of the necessity of ruling over the 
uncooperative and the unchangeable: as we have already seen, „in some circles, the second 
half of the nineteenth century was marked by a growing lack of faith in the ability of non-
European nations to become moulded and perfected in a Western pattern‟.118  As we shall see 
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in due course, with the discussion of the political, intellectual, and colonial context to the age 
of High Empire (1870-1914), the importance of colonisation in circumventing empire was 
soon to apply in a more European context.  Not simply because European conquests were 
seen as transient and a tinderbox of ethnic conflict with lesser races, but also because Britons 
as well as Germans came to see settlement in their colonies – as opposed to in America – as a 
means of allowing for emigration whilst still contributing to the geopolitical and demographic 
strength of the home countries
119
: so that Englishmen and Germans could emigrate and 
remain English and German.  This is a fundamental difference in the natures and perceptions 
of empire and colonisation.  Colonisation was a far more liberal, democratic, racial, and 
middle class phenomenon.  Empire, on the other hand, was conservative, autocratic, and from 
the mid-century involved the acceptance of, and governance through, native institutions and 
customs.  It was also the preserve of a class-obsessed aristocracy.  There is, clearly, one 
aspect of colonisation which we have overlooked.  Critics of empire tended to focus on the 
negative impact upon the imperialist in having to rule others despotically, not on the other 
way around.  Colonisation, praised as eschewing such vices, also exhibits a similar bias, and 
we can identify it by what is omitted: mention of what happens to the natives where the 
Englishman chooses to settle and bring with him his free-institutions.  The silence on how to 
govern such peoples is chilling.   
Porter suggests that admiration for Britain‟s settlement colonies involved „closing 
one‟s eyes to some inconvenient facts‟, one of which was the „violence done to their 
aboriginal populations‟.  Readers of nineteenth century textbooks could even be „unaware 
that continents like north America and Australia had any original populations at all‟, he 
writes, citing one example in which the author referred to „rich land unused by man‟.120  
Needless to say, the reality was very different.  New South Wales would stop receiving penal 
settlers in 1840, and New Zealand, formerly part of the penal colony, was founded as a 
separate entity in the same year.  This was a period in which the granting of autonomy and a 
strengthening of the colonial state was seen across the colonies: in British North America in 
the 1840s, and Australia and New Zealand in the 1850s.  Henceforth, it was the colonial state 
– i.e. that directly responsible to and comprised of colonists (as opposed to officials in 
faraway London ) and acting in the interests of white settlers  – which decided how land was 
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bought and sold and at what price.
121
 In New Zealand, self-government, but not control over 
relations with the Maori, was granted in 1852;
122
 the British state had only grudgingly 
annexed in 1840,
123
 and it appears that the impetus behind colonial expansion came from 
settlers rather than the Colonial Office.   In response to „growing racial friction‟ by the late 
1850s, London did grant the settler government more of a responsibility in relations with the 
indigenous population.
124
  The Maori had resisted intensely in 1845-6,
125
 and the 
government‟s decision led to an escalation in settler activity and further conflict involving up 
to 10,000 imperial troops throughout the 1860s, most intense between 1863-4, and only 
subsiding in 1870. These wars are thought to have „marginalised‟ the Maori and cemented 
New Zealand‟s future as a „settler state‟.126 Indeed, from the 1840s onwards the white 
population increased dramatically, whereas that of the Maoris fell and the land itself changed 
in accordance with the needs of Western civilisation: „this demographic invasion had been 
accompanied by a drastic transformation of the pre-colonial environment into a land of 
European grasses, trees, flowers and animals.‟127  Thirlwall (1835-44) and Grote (1847-56) 
were writing their works at a time when colonists themselves were the driving force behind 
settlement and the dispossession of indigenous peoples.  In this British colonists were doing 
what the French had been doing in Algeria since the 1830s, one difference being that in the 
French experience empire and colonisation went hand in hand rather than being two 
conflicting visions.  Perhaps it is telling that liberal criticism of British misrule was more 
vocal in response to governor Eyre in Jamaica, whose brutality attracted the condemnation of 
such liberal intellectuals as Mill and Darwin – Jamaica, with its history as a slave-run 
plantation with white settlers, was probably never considered a true colony of settlement.  
Having seen a political, intellectual, and colonial context for British scholarship on Greece up 
to 1870, it is now time to consider what individual scholars made of Greek colonisation.   
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British Scholarship and Greek colonisation 1780-1870 
 
Colonisation as an Act of State 
 
William Mitford, writing in the 1780s, certainly did not depict Greek colonisation as a 
statist movement resembling European experiences more than Archaic reality.  He wrote that 
„few of the Grecian colonies were founded with any view to extend the dominion of the 
mother country,‟ and so clearly he did not see colonisation as strategic acts of states.  
Furthermore, it would confound those who criticise the supposed statist or imperialistic 
distortion of earlier scholarship, instead advocating a greater for private individuals, to learn 
that Mitford thought the leaders of early colonising expeditions were often „no more than 
pirates, not unlike the buccaneers of modern times.‟128  Of course, rather than proving that 
Mitford was innocent of anachronism, this could instead suggest that our understanding of 
how Britons in the eighteenth century and beyond saw colonisation is flawed. That Mitford 
wrote of early colonisation in a manner not entirely dissimilar to more recent interpretations 
may not be a result of scholarly detachment but rather of a historical context in which 
colonisation was neither an uncomplicatedly state or private affair.  Having said that, 
Mitford‟s account does not differ radically from the picture allowed by the literary evidence, 
which as we have seen could quite reasonably be interpreted as depicting a high degree of 
individual responsibility and at times piratical tendencies. 
It is more difficult to gauge how John Gillies saw this issue.  He clearly thought that 
the Mediterranean from the eleventh century onwards was a very unstable place where piracy 
was endemic and even a well regarded profession.
 129
   This piracy, in a world of „intestine 
sedition, foreign invasion, or the restless spirit of adventure and rapine‟, was responsible for 
the early Greek colonisation of Sicily, Sardinia and Cyprus.
130
  Therefore his views are 
consistent with Mitford‟s in that he saw colonisation as something which could arise out of 
piratical ventures, yet elsewhere, writing of later events around the time of the first 
Messenian War in the eighth century BC, he described how peace caused a rise in the 
population of the Peloponnese, which in turn meant that the Peloponnesians „continued to 
diffuse their numerous colonies over the islands of Sicily and Corcyra, as well as over the 
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southern division of Italy, afterwards known by the name of Magna Graecia.‟131  Population 
increase, therefore, is the explanation for Greek colonisation, although on the execution of 
colonising ventures he is silent.
132
 
Connop Thirlwall, writing half a century later, thought it important to discuss the 
Greek colonies in order to have an „adequate conception of the magnitude of the Grecian 
world‟, and he saw these „migrations‟ as undertaken with the „approbation and 
encouragement of the states from which they issued‟.  Thirlwall lends more explicit weight to 
the explanation for colonisation given by Gillies: colonisation occurred when it was in the 
interests of the mother country, for instance „as when the object was to relieve it of 
superfluous hands, or of discontented and turbulent spirits.‟  Thirlwall‟s view is quite statist 
in that he sees colonisation as organised by the state and in the state‟s interests, yet he did not 
think colonisation was undertaken for strategic reasons. As we have seen previously, he 
wrote that 'it was seldom that the parent state looked forward to any more remote advantage 
from the colony, or that the colony expected or desired any from the parent state.‟133  It is 
difficult to determine whether one scholar is more statist than another.  Perhaps the important 
thing is that broadly speaking, none seem to have thought colonisation to have been strategic 
in intent – any benefits for the state were of the immediate kind.  Furthermore, Thirlwall‟s 
interpretation is no more than an exaggeration of the importance of the Theran and Cyrenaean 
example provided by Herodotus.   
 
Colonial Dependence 
 
 The failure of eighteenth century works to conform to current ideas about earlier 
scholarship is striking, and this is evident in the lack of any coherent idea of colonial 
dependence.  For William Mitford, only Corinth in earlier times and Athens somewhat later 
had more long lasting ambitions regarding colonies.  Colonies were not culturally or in any 
other way dependent, subordinate, or inferior to the cities of mainland Greece: „the colonies 
advanced nearly equally in improvements of art, science, and civilisation, and sometimes 
went even before the mother country‟.134  John Gillies, although critical of insolent Corcyra‟s 
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betrayal of its mother-city Corinth – as befits a scholar writing shortly after the American 
Revolutionary War – was nevertheless for the most part an admirer of the Greek colonies, 
and often a damning critic of the cities of mainland Greece.
 135
 
The mainland Greeks experienced „fierce and frequent wars‟ which „exhausted their 
population‟ while „the exclusive spirit of republican jealousy, which sternly refused strangers 
any participation in their government, or any protection in their government, or any 
protection from their laws, naturally repressed their vigour, and stunted their growth.‟136  The 
colonies of Magna Graecia, on the other hand, excelled: 
 
The kings, or nobility of Magna Graecia, secure in their own pre-eminence, felt 
nothing of the republican jealousies which prevailed in the mother-country.  They 
received with pleasure new citizens, or rather subjects, from whatever quarter 
they might come.  The barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation 
to whom they were associated; their children received a Grecian education; and 
the states of Italy and Sicily thus increasing by degrees, could soon boast, the 
former of Crotona, Tarentum, Sybaris, Rhegium; the latter of Syracuse, 
Agrigentum, Messene, Himera, and several other cities, which rivalled or 
surpassed the wealth of Athens or Corinth, and the populousness of Thebes, 
Argos, or Sparta.
137
 
 
Ruled, we may presume, by constitutional monarchies, the colonies of Magna Graecia were 
more capable than republics of being inclusive towards non-Greek elements.  They could thus 
assimilate, adding to their strength and prosperity.   
This highlights two things.  Firstly Gillies‟ account of the colonies is heavily 
influenced by the constitutional theme which runs throughout his history.  Secondly it could 
be said that his work is consciously or unconsciously a reflection of contemporary 
developments in the nature of the British Empire.  In other words, not only a commentary on 
the merit of monarchy over republic, Gillies‟ work is also evidence of early imperial 
discourse in what became in 1801 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.  Within 
the British Isles alone there were several different ethnic groups to unite – and Gillies was 
himself a Scotsman.
 The loss of the American colonies, seen as truly „English‟, was mirrored 
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by stronger links with Scotland.  In this way the Second British Empire was indeed British.
138
  
The expression of this „officially constructed patriotism‟, or Britishness, „stressed attachment 
to the monarchy, the importance of empire, the value of naval achievement, and the 
desirability of strong, stable government by a virtuous, able and authentically British élite.‟139  
Perhaps Gillies himself should be seen as a manifestation of this „authentically British‟, that 
is not solely English, élite.  His work is a defence of the lynchpin of this new order which 
emerged from the American war – the British monarchy.  As we have seen Gillies‟ 
monarchical Greek states unite disparate peoples, and this can be seen to mirror that of Great 
Britain.  This aspect of eighteenth century self-image finds echoes in recent interpretations of 
British history.  According to Phillip Jenkins, writing of the early modern period,  „though 
individual kings might make disastrous and intolerant decisions, the institution of monarchy 
offered the potential to satisfy an astonishingly broad range of cultural aspirations, and 
permitted very diverse ethnic and linguistic groups to see a given dynasty as the epitome of 
their nation, no less than the national state.‟140  Gillies‟ history of Greece can be seen as a 
defence of this idea of monarchy as a way of „forging the nation‟ out of disparate groups, and 
stands at the inception of an idea which would see the British monarchy becoming the focal 
point of a new British patriotism.
141
  Perhaps Gillies, above all, should be seen as a scholar 
writing as an imperial nation was invented – and this had a direct bearing on the way he 
wrote about Greek colonisation. 
Moving from John Gillies in the late eighteenth century to Connop Thirlwall in the 
1830s, we still see little sign of a coherent idea of colonial dependence: „there was in most 
cases nothing to suggest the feeling of dependence on the one side, or a claim of authority on 
the other‟, wrote Thirlwall.  He did use a filial metaphor – sons left Greece with the blessings 
of their fathers – but even here he described how these sons were „completely emancipated‟ 
from their fathers‟ control.  This was a relationship based on affection rather than formal 
political control; the founder would be honoured after death, and „when the colony in its turn 
became a parent, it usually sought a leader from the original mother-country.‟142  This is 
essentially a relationship between equals.  If there is any suggestion of colonial dependence, 
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then it lies with the filial metaphor, and even that indicates a very short-lived stage of 
dependence as colonies could become more powerful than their mother cities.
143
 
The theme of colonial dependence, or perhaps more accurately of inferiority, does 
appear with Grote, an author who as we have seen was somewhat more in tune with latest 
intellectual developments than Thirlwall.  For Grote the Greek colonies were inferior because 
of two interrelated factors.  Firstly, the Greeks of Sicily are not to be considered as purely 
Greek but as modified by native language, customs, and character, and secondly their politics 
are not on a par with the mainland, or more specifically, Athens:  
 
we are not dealing with pure Hellenism; and that the native element, though not 
unfavourable to activity or increase of wealth, prevented the Grecian colonists 
from partaking fully in that improved organisation which we so distinctly trace in 
Athens from Solon downwards. 
 
Colonial Greece represented a political and cultural debasement of Hellenism, or for the 
Atheno-centric Grote, Athenian Hellenism.  Here we see that the political message which 
pervades Grote‟s history, as well as contemporary ideas about the nature of civilisation, 
impact the way he wrote about colonisation.  The way native influences are not seen to 
prevent the creation of wealth reflects contemporary ideas about the distinctions between 
material civilisation and civilisation proper. Genuine European civilisation in large part, of 
course, means political freedom – Grote‟s primary concern. 
 The consequences of Greek colonisation speak not only to nineteenth century 
concerns about the true nature of civilisation and arguments for political freedom, but also the 
implications of engaging in colonising activity where this means interaction with native 
peoples.  Grote tells us how the poetry of Greek Sicily was coarser because of the way native 
ideas had entered the Greek mind, and how „Doric‟ Greeks had in common with semi 
Hellenised Sikels of neighbouring villages their „coarser vein of humour‟.  Native influences 
combined with the lesser Dorian aptitude for political freedom to create a situation in which 
Greek-Sicilian despots ruled by using native peoples as cheap mercenary manpower thus 
making popular government „all but impossible‟.144  This may place Grote within an 
intellectual canon critical of the corrupting influences of empire on the political freedom of 
the imperial power, and serves as a reminder that colonial and imperial affairs were 
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connected to the more domestic political concerns which were at the heart of his history.  
This issue, of course, is connected to the wider question of native peoples and their influence, 
something to which we shall now turn. 
 
Civilising the Natives 
 
 According to John Gillies, wherever „the spirit of enterprise‟ induced the Greek 
colonists to settle, „they perceived, it is said, on the slightest comparison, the superiority of 
their own religion, language, institutions, and manners; and the dignity of their character and 
sentiments eminently distinguished them from the general mass of nations whose territories 
they invaded; and whom they justly denominated Barbarians.‟145  Even so, the nature of the 
western colonies, monarchical like contemporary Britain meant that „they received with 
pleasure new citizens, or rather subjects, from whatever quarter they might come‟ and 
„barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation to whom they were 
associated.‟146  In this case, Gillies‟ barbarians were, under a benign monarchy, eminently 
improvable. 
 Thirlwall‟s perspective differs in that whereas he too saw Greek settlers everywhere 
„establishing themselves as conquerors‟, assimilation under a just monarchy was replaced by 
a more violent view of colonisation.  Greeks settled on land already inhabited, and so 
dispossessed its inhabitants.  Those „suffered to remain‟ did so as slaves, or at best inferiors.  
Colonisation was more violent for Thirlwall than it was for Gillies, and Thirlwall‟s account 
differs again in that he saw the types of government established in the colonies as very 
different to Gillies‟ restrained monarchy:   
 
The very spirit in which they [the colonies] were founded, was highly 
unfavourable to the permanence of an aristocratical ascendancy, and the only 
thing restraining complete democracy was the property qualification required for 
political rights.
147
   
 
A generation can make all the difference: if for the eighteenth century Whig colonial Greece 
was an admirably restrained monarchy, for the nineteenth century liberal it was a suitably 
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„liberal‟ place.  Interestingly, in Thirlwall‟s colonial Greece political equality between fellow 
citizens stood in stark contrast to the relations between the Greek and the indigenous slave: 
the colonies were on the one hand more exploitative of indigenous peoples and on the other 
more liberal than monarchical. 
 Grote saw interactions between Greeks and natives very differently.  Gillies and 
Thirlwall demonstrate to us a shift in emphasis from a defence of constitutional monarchy to 
a circumspect promotion of liberalism in which the expansion of Greece finds equivalence in 
the expansion of liberal Britain overseas.  Grote‟s account is much more clearly a product of 
its time in that much more of the contemporary intellectual context can be seen at work in his 
history.  To begin with he echoes contemporary colonisation rather strongly.  Grote‟s Greeks, 
on their arrival in Sicily, expelled and subjugated natives:
148
 
 
These natives seem to have been of rude pastoral habits, dispersed either among 
petty hill-villages, or in caverns hewn out of the rock, like the primitive 
inhabitants of the Balearic islands and Sardinia; so that Sicily, like New Zealand 
in our century, was now for the first time approached by organised industry and 
tillage. 
 
Greek colonisation, like modern European colonisation, unleashed the dormant potential of 
the land wasted by its primitive inhabitants.  This idea has been identified in other examples 
of colonial era writing, and called the „myth of the Profligate Native‟, meaning that „whoever 
was on the spot was wasting its resources, and that therefore they might be legitimately be 
expelled, or submitted to European tutelage.‟149  Grote described how the Greek colonies 
brought urban life and became very prosperous, not comparable to the English colonies in 
America, but „nevertheless very great‟. 
Grote mentions New Zealand, and considering the timing of his history, written in the 
1840s and 1850s, it is likely that his image of the transformative nature of colonisation is 
drawn directly from contemporary British experiences there.  As has been stated previously, 
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in New Zealand at this time white settlers were gaining ground in the face of Maori 
resistance, and the land, for so long neglected by the Profligate Native, changed accordingly 
– into „a land of European grasses, trees, flowers and animals‟.150  In broader perspective, at 
this very time, in Algeria, French soldiers and settlers were engaged in a similar process: in 
1843 the notorious Lieutenant-Colonel de Montagnac wrote of killing all Arab men older 
than fifteen and deporting the remainder, „en un mot, anéantir tout ce qui ne rampera pas à 
nos pieds comme des chiens‟.151 French scholarship on North Africa would for a long time 
lament its economic and infrastructural decline following the collapse of Roman rule and the 
coming of Islam.
152
 
Grote was very much a man of his age, yet to describe this age as one in which 
Classical scholarship simply served as justification for colonisation and empire would be 
deeply misleading.  Grote saw Greeks and natives interacting, indeed he saw „a fusion of two 
races in the same community, though doubtless in relation of superior and subject, and not in 
that of equals.‟  He, rather like Gillies and later Thirlwall, imagined the Greeks, on their 
arrival in Sicily, expelling natives from the town and surrounding lands, but as they extended 
their territory, subjugating, and not expelling, the native tribes.
153
  These then fell under 
Greek influence, what he called „the ascendancy of a higher over a lower civilisation‟, of 
Greeks possessing „superior intellect, imagination, and organisation‟ over natives inferior in 
all these regards, who were eventually Hellenised.
154
 This belief in assimilation is not what it 
seems. 
It has already been discussed how Grote thought colonial Greece to have represented 
a debasement of a Hellenism which found its purest expression in Athens.  We have also seen 
that Grote believed that one of the causes of this debasement was the corrupting influence of 
native peoples.  Writing of the days after Alexander, he stated that the Greeks who had gone 
to the East were unlike those who had not: in „communicating their language to Orientals‟ 
they themselves became „substantially orientalised‟.  In their „feelings, sentiments, and habits 
of action‟ they „ceased to be hellenic‟.  Equally, the „hellenized Asiatic‟ was „not so much a 
Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior varnish, and superficial manifestations‟, 
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distinguished „fundamentally‟ from the real Greeks – and that is how he would have been 
seen by „Sophokles, by Thucydides, by Sokrates.‟155  In somewhat of a parody of more recent 
views which see cultural influences working both ways, Grote thought they did, and that this 
was a bad thing.  An European people endowed with political freedom, in attempting to 
assimilate native peoples or Eastern civilisations will achieve only superficial change and 
corrupt itself in the process.   
Grote‟s cautionary tale does not end there.  Not only was this assimilation incomplete 
and by the very act of contact detrimental to the Greeks, leaving them incapable of political 
freedom and thus true Hellenic civilisation, but they eventually sowed the seeds of their own 
destruction:  
 
It was the destiny of most of the Grecian colonial establishments [in Magna 
Graecia as a whole, one assumes] to perish by the growth and aggression of 
those inland powers upon whose coast they were planted; powers which 
gradually acquired, from the vicinity of the Greeks, a military and political 
organisation, and a power of concentrated action, such as they had not 
originally possessed.
156
 
 
This is in some ways reminiscent of recent appraisals of the British Empire which claim it 
gave those over whom it ruled the wherewithal to free themselves,
157
 yet this is no nostalgic 
comment about the Greek colonial achievement.  The underlying message is that contact with 
less civilised peoples brings about a change for the worse: the political liberalism of the 
civilised colonising power is subverted while surrounding natives, having corrupted it, learns 
from it the material elements of civilisation with which it can one day strike back against an 
impure, debilitated, compromised, and decaying colonial civilisation.  Grote evidently did 
believe that colonial situations bring about a „shift in the conventions of both colonizer and 
colonized‟158 
It is instructive to consider how approaches to these aspects changed over time and 
according to political perspective.  For Grote admiration of Athenian Hellenism and its 
political freedom went hand in hand with contempt for lesser peoples and their tendencies 
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towards servility and despotism. Assimilated, or Hellenised Sikels, were but minions of 
politically deviant Greeks.  There is a clear difference between the attitudes of Gillies and 
those of Grote.  Whereas Gillies saw a monarchical colonial Greece welcoming and 
assimilating all,
159
 Grote displays little but hostility towards a despotic colonial Greece, 
impure and corrupted by the Hellenised Sikels whose assimilation, we may presume, was 
superficial, adopting the trappings of civilisation – wealth and grandeur – but not its 
substance – political freedom.  Both scholars showed consistency in method, Gillies extolling 
restrained monarchy while Grote lamented the frustration of liberal Hellenism – and in this 
Grote predates the pessimism of the period after 1857.  Both wrote in defence of a version of 
political freedom defined in opposition to Eastern and other lesser peoples, be they 
civilisations or „rude‟ tribes.  The difference is that Grote‟s own position within his historical 
context equipped him with a concept of civilisation which was highly contingent upon 
democratic (as opposed to oligarchic) political freedom.  It is also possible that he allowed a 
more prominent place for racial ideas.  These two elements in conjunction may have resulted 
in a much more suspicious approach towards empire and its effects upon the imperial power.  
Note the use of the term „empire‟ here instead of colonisation.  The reason for this is that 
Grote‟s colonial Greece appears a curious mix of a colonial situation – i.e. corresponding to 
New Zealand or Australia with settlement colonies in apparently „virgin‟ lands, and an 
imperial one – i.e. corresponding to India with a large subject native population.  Grote was 
of a political background one would have expected to be favourable towards British 
colonisation and the spread of free English institutions, yet critical of the Indian empire.  
Why, therefore, the seemingly paradoxical mixture of these two models of overseas 
involvement in the Greek colonising experience?  The answer surely lies in the way the 
contemporary world interacted with the historical world of colonial Greece in Grote‟s mind.  
Most likely is that Grote did not impose either a white settlement or Indian „model‟ onto the 
ancient Italy and Sicily.  Rather, certain elements of the debate pertaining to both influenced 
what he wrote about a situation he saw as mirroring in some elements a colonial setting (see 
the reference to New Zealand), and in others an imperial one (for instance the corrupting 
influence of „native‟ troops in preventing democracy and sustaining despotism).  In general 
terms, however, we can conclude that there is a marked difference between the views of 
indigenous influences exhibited by Gillies and Grote.  Gillies and his easy assimilationism 
based on eighteenth century ideas about the unifying influences of constitutional monarchy 
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could easily accommodate the „imperial‟ situation Grote saw in Sicily.  Grote and his liberal 
ideas about empire and the corruption it could bring,
160
 could not, and the fact that the Greek 
settlements were commonly understood as colonies did not lead him to a simplistic tribute to 
the Greek colonial achievement. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It may be useful to think of the different ideas encountered in this discussion in terms 
of overarching frameworks of „civilisation‟, frameworks which are frequently but not always 
connected.  The two most prominent are as follows: the first framework is a longstanding 
belief, traceable from the earliest work in the 1780s through to those of the mid nineteenth 
century and beyond, that that western, especially British (or rather English) peoples are freer 
than those of the east – a belief consistently held regardless of the particular political 
tendencies of the individual authors.  Western monarchy, let alone parliamentary democracy, 
was different from eastern despotism.  This idea stands alongside its opposite – by 
implication Eastern civilisation, although capable of great wealth and power, lacks the 
freedom so crucial to innovation in thought, art and more besides.  It is stagnant and 
incapable of attaining the highest level of civilisation.  It is worth noting that it is not only 
those of the East who are incapable of political freedom – other savage peoples can be seen 
as equally incapable, depending on the author and contemporary historical context.  The 
second framework is that of the nature of cultural interactions.  This is a framework which in 
its simplest form changes little in scholarship about Greece from the late eighteenth to the 
mid nineteenth century – peoples are „rude‟ until they come into contact with and are taught 
by civilised ones, and having learnt from the latter, the recipients, if European, eventually 
surpass them.  In its more complex form, encompassing both peaceful interactions and 
colonial rule, the capacities of various peoples for such improvement were thought to vary 
greatly, and in later work the idea of consequences for both coloniser and colonised, civiliser 
and those who are civilised, becomes very important indeed. 
These frameworks are parallel, and interlock where appropriate.  For instance it seems 
that the Greeks, being of European origin, are more capable of learning from other (eastern) 
                                                 
160
 The nineteenth century critique of Indian-style empire long predates the basis of the recent idea of a „Middle 
Ground‟; that colonial relations bring about „a shift in the conventions of both colonizer and colonized.‟  The 
difference is of course that the nineteenth century view was that such changes were negative.  See Malkin 
(2004), 357. 
119 
 
civilisations than others, and it is this very European origin, and a predisposition towards 
freedom, which enables them to overtake eventually their eastern instructors.  Thus the 
framework of western freedom becomes interwoven with that of cultural interaction, and in 
doing so it brings to mind other ideas such as those of race; there is some notion that 
westerners are quicker to learn, in some sense innately freer, and this must in some way be 
related to some idea, however inexplicit, of language, of race, of ethnicity, of blood.  In 
looking at this third framework in particular, we can see there existed changes between 
Gillies and Grote as to the capacity for improvement attributed to native peoples.  John 
Gillies believed in the capacity of a civilised Western monarchy to civilise primitive peoples 
– those primitive Europeans of ancient Sicily, at least.  Grote, writing in the mid nineteenth 
century, while believing that material civilisation could be taught, thought this was merely 
superficial, and that an aptitude for political freedom could not so easily be passed from one 
people to another.  On the contrary, despotism and servility is more easily transmitted from 
the colonised to the coloniser by a process of intermingling, and, possibly, also, the coloniser 
corrupts itself by the very act of exercising arbitrary rule.  In this, and even if this work 
predated the pessimism of the 1860s, Grote represented the shape of things to come. 
In broader terms we can conclude that historical writing about Greece, while at the 
same time intended as commentary on contemporary British politics, was embedded in the 
wider European attempt to understand a world in which they were the rising power by 
placing themselves at its centre.  All histories of Greece begin with an account of the 
influences of Eastern civilisation upon still primitive Greeks whose aptitude for political 
freedom enables them to surpass all such contributors.  On a different level, the history of 
Greece was an expression of the need for scholars of different nationalities to explain their 
particular place in this rise with reference to an ancient world comprised of different states 
whose characteristics were seen to mirror those of modern equivalents.  Focusing closer still, 
authors who saw themselves as part of particular political affiliations sought to inform, 
understand, explain and further their agendas with reference to an ancient world which was 
also seen to offer points of comparison and inspiration to the political battles both between 
and within modern sates.  These three layers of interpretation were mutually dependent, and 
as we have seen with liberal thinkers, domestic politics was a crucial factor in the formation 
of the idea of civilisation itself.  There are consistencies, however, as authors from across the 
political spectrum would have appreciated the superiority of Europe in the world and of their 
own country in Europe.  Furthermore individuals from all backgrounds would have 
conceived the superiority of European civilisation to have been the result of its liberty.  The 
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differences lay in the particular interpretations of Western freedom.  A tendency to praise the 
monarchies of the ancient world in the eighteenth century – as these only could preserve the 
liberty of the propertied and noble in the face of dangerous mobs – gave way to a democratic 
understanding of freedom from the early nineteenth century onwards.  The latter, assuming 
the freedom of democratisation to be the root of civilisational advance and its indicators – art, 
literature, culture, and humanity – became, as we shall see, a dominant conception in British 
scholarship about Greece for over a hundred years.  The influence of this idea – or perhaps 
ideal – also extended beyond the frontiers of this most Liberal of scholarly disciplines and 
came to influence British conceptions of other civilisations – ancient and modern – more 
widely.    
Neither Greece nor the Classical world more generally were intended as models for 
uncomplicated parallels and emulation, however.  The study of Greek civilisation was 
thought to offer lessons about the present and the future, and very conscious of what befell all 
ancient powers, be they Athens or Rome, this was as much about avoiding the mistakes and 
fates of such cities as emulating their virtues.  Any notion of „Whig‟ progress proves to be 
pointedly inadequate as an explanation of the message they contain.  The idea that there is 
such a thing as progress is entirely different to believing it is inevitable.  Historical writing 
about Greece reflected both the hopes and the anxieties of contemporary Britain and Europe – 
if the rise of Greece amidst the stagnant civilisations of the East was noted, so was its fall and 
the degradation of that political and intellectual freedom which was the very source of its 
greatness.  These histories display an intellectual culture concerned with explaining and 
debating the present in light of the past, and we can appreciate how interconnected were their 
ideas about international and domestic politics, of political freedom, Eastern influences, 
colonisation, empire, and the nature, rise and fall of civilisation.  Perhaps the most influential 
history of all, George Grote‟s A History of Greece best of all illustrates this complexity.  An 
admiration for Athenian Hellenism goes hand in hand with fears of civilisational 
degeneration resulting from the double-edged sword of ruling lesser, unfree, peoples.
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Chapter 5: High Empire 1870-1914 
 
Introduction 
 
If in the eighteenth century Greek monarchies were valued whereas democracies and 
eastern despotisms were reviled, come the nineteenth classical Athens was adopted by liberal 
Britain, its genius contrasted with other, illiberal, Greek states, and the despotisms of the east.  
By the last third of the nineteenth century, political liberalism had become a prevalent part of 
the political culture as opposed to a contentious proposition supported by controversial 
readings of ancient history privileging the role of Athens.  Even conservative politics, 
including Disraeli‟s New Imperialism, were conducted within a broadly liberal political 
system of parliamentary democracy with a limited, but increasing, franchise.  In this context, 
it is perhaps not surprising that much scholarship on Greece continued to be written from a 
liberal perspective.  This perspective, however, was not necessarily the one envisioned by 
Grote.  Grote did not hold Athens as a model, whereas later liberals such as E.A. Freeman 
most certainly did.
1
  Equally, Grote was not as critical of radical democratic Athens as would 
be later scholars of a more conservative bent, such as G.B. Grundy and Evelyn Abbott.
2
  
Gladstone, that symbol of late Victorian British liberalism, in fact started out as a 
conservative, and his higher regard for a Homeric Greece, characterised by leaders ruling 
with the assent of the people, constituted a „critique of the presuppositions of radical 
Victorian political thought‟ such as that represented by Grote, whose Homeric kings, on the 
contrary, brooked no dissent – as illustrated by the example of Theristes, beaten for speaking 
out (Iliad 2.210-280).  Gladstone‟s liberalism was to be a much more conservative one than 
Grote‟s, and should be seen within the context of the increasingly complex British political 
landscape of the late nineteenth century in which Athens was neither an outright pariah nor 
an uncomplicated model.
3
   
Nevertheless, most of the scholars covered in the following discussion betray an 
explicitly liberal perspective towards Greece, the individuals concerned often implicated in 
Liberal politics – but it is important to bear in mind that such an affiliation was a broad one, 
encompassing such radical figures such as Freeman as well as far more gradually reformist 
ones like Gladstone.  As with this discussion as a whole, there will be an attempt to avoid 
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explaining work written in this period in purely constitutional terms, as has been the trend in 
many other approaches to scholarship on Greece.
4
  Grote‟s A History of Greece, published 
between 1847 and 1856 and read for many years thereafter, is a work which stood at the cusp 
of the late Victorian era, and can be seen as a portent of some of the key concerns which 
would come to define it, even if later audience developed their own, very different 
understandings.  These concerns encompassed a range of interconnected ideas which 
exceeded the conventional confines of purely domestic political debate while still relating to 
it, and included debate about empire and ideas about other races and civilisations.  The 
following discussion will continue in this vein, demonstrating how scholarship about Greece 
offers an insight into the connected nature of these debates, and in particular how perceptions 
of Greek colonisation offer an unique window to the way Britons saw the past, present, and 
future of empire, civilisation, progress and political freedom.    
 
A Political, Intellectual, and Colonial Context 1870-1914 
 
Traditionally the period 1815-1870 has been seen as one of „informal empire‟5 giving 
way to a tendency towards annexation from around 1870 as Britain faced competition from 
new powers; the growth of Britain‟s „formal empire‟ was a product of its „relative decline as 
a great power‟.6  More recent work suggests that far from being an aloof idyll preceding 
rivalry and decline, the mid Victorian period was one in which Britain had only just begun to 
penetrate new markets, and was yet to „lubricate‟ world trade with its financial and 
commercial services.
7
 This only began in force during the late Victorian period.  
Consequently, instead of being the „rearguard actions‟ of a declining power, British 
annexations from 1870 onwards should be seen as „overflows‟ of „expansionist tendencies‟.  
In this context, it is Britain‟s rivals who were reacting to the expansion of a „dynamic and 
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ambitious power‟8  That said, the reality of British power need not necessarily be reflected in 
public perceptions which may nonetheless have seen their contemporary world as one in 
which Britain‟s global supremacy, naval mastery, technological and industrial lead, were all 
being challenged – a perceived decline which implicated the ancient world, for so long a 
fruitful quarry for those concerned with the rise and fall of empires. 
 
Colonies of Settlement, Empire of Rule 
 
One of the most noticeable features of the British Empire in this period was the 
marked difference between more or less democratically governed colonies of white 
settlement in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,
9
 and the vast territories populated by other 
races subject to despotic rule, most notably in India.  This was a contradiction which drew 
attention at the time, and conflicting views about these two „types‟ of empire, each speaking 
to different ancient parallels, would come to define British imperial thinking in this era. 
Disraeli‟s „Imperialism‟ of the 1870s, conferring upon the Queen the title „Empress of 
India‟, was part of a wider European trend to link imperial expansion with a greater 
prominence for an imperial figurehead.
10
  For some, such as Disraeli‟s great rival Gladstone, 
this was the pursuit of imperial expansion for its own sake: a „creed of aggrandisement‟11 
which involved making acquisitions for no purpose but to increase the vastness of the 
empire.
12
  Thus Disraeli‟s „Imperialism‟ (variously described as the „New Imperialism‟), 
intimately linked with the Indian Empire and the new imperial monarchy, and inevitably 
speaking to the ancient precedent of Rome, was very much a Conservative conception of 
Britain and Empire.  In his famous Crystal Palace speech in 1872 Disraeli claimed the 
working classes were natural Conservative allies „proud of belonging to a great country and 
wish[ing] to maintain its greatness…‟13  Gladstone would later write that Disraeli was 
appealing „under the prostituted name of patriotism, to exaggerated fears, to imaginary 
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interests‟.14  Drawing parallels between Disraeli and triumphal Roman generals, Gladstone 
railed against territorial aggrandisement while commending the colonies, which were „a noble 
feature in the work and mission of this nation, as it was of old in the mission of Greece.‟15  
The „sentiment of empire‟, „innate in every Briton‟, was at times prone to excess: as 
happened in the case of the American colonies, „the grandest monument ever erected by a 
people of modern times, and second only to the Greek colonisation in the whole history of the 
world‟, but lost due to „obstinacy and pride.‟16   It is important to grasp, nonetheless, that 
even in promoting his Imperialism Disraeli had to show at least some sensitivity towards the 
liberal British scepticism, even fear, of empire: he stressed that the imperial title was to be 
used in India only – not in England.17  Equally, Liberals such as Gladstone could no more 
think of being rid of the Indian Empire in its entirety than could Disraeli of making Victoria 
an Imperial monarch over Britain itself.  Having conquered India, Britain was obliged to 
remain,
18
 and in this esteem for Greek and English colonisation as spreading free institutions, 
and toleration of Roman and British Imperialism as being somewhat regrettable yet 
nonetheless better than the barbarism they replaced, Gladstone was consistent with earlier 
liberal thought as expressed by Cobden and Mill.  Yet even these subtler distinctions – that is 
admitting there was more to it than a simple dichotomy of Conservatives privileging India 
and Rome, and Liberals the Dominions and Greek colonisation – do not do full justice to the 
complexity of imperial thought after 1870.   
 
How to Avoid the Fate of Empires 
 
The day of small nations has passed away; the day of Empires has come – Joseph 
Chamberlain
19
 
 
There were those who thought that the Empire was transient and that the best way to 
secure Britain‟s future as a great power was closer links with the colonies of white settlement 
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– the idea of Greater Britain.  For its advocates, ancient history, if anything, proved that 
empires were „self-dissolving‟,20 and that Britain should break away from ancient models, 
both Roman and Greek: „empires modelled on their templates were doomed to eventual 
failure, whether by internal decay or the peaceful independence of the colonies‟.  Instead, 
Britain should follow its own path, and look to the modern world for „intellectual, political 
and moral inspiration‟.21  The path was towards an Anglo-Saxon political community, the 
inspiration a belief in the progress of the Anglo-Saxon race, better inured in political freedom 
than any other, and destined to succeed where all mere empires had failed.   
Chamberlain‟s words are easily misunderstood, his use of the term „empires‟ 
misleading.  To understand it properly, his vision has to be seen in the context of the theories 
of Mahan and Mackinder.  Alfred Mahan, an American Naval Officer, had in 1890 published 
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, which emphasised the crucial role 
played by maritime power in determining world affairs.  This view evidently reassured a 
Britain faced with increasing competition from states such as Germany and America whose 
demographic strength was all the greater for being relatively homogenous and concentrated in 
comparison to her own far flung and ethnically heterogeneous empire.  Less assuring was 
British geographer Harold Mackinder‟s paper „The Geographical Pivot of History‟, delivered 
in 1904, and which claimed that the „Columbian epoch‟ of „overseas exploration and 
conquest by European powers‟, was coming to an end, to be replaced by a dominance of large 
territorial (and demographic) units capable of sustaining a corresponding industrial base.  The 
consequences for the United States, Russia, and potentially an expansionist Germany were 
clear, as were the consequences for Britain, as a relatively small European state whose power 
was dispersed across the globe.
22
  Thus the idea of Greater Britain was part of an attempt to 
evade this prophecy by creating an ethnically homogenous entity, variously envisaged as an  
oceanic state, federation, or looser community, rather than empire per se, which could 
compensate for Britain‟s own demographic, territorial, and industrial shortfall.  This was 
something which simply could not be done with the non Anglo-Saxon empire: ancient history 
showed what happened when one based one‟s power on tribute and troops from subject races 
while neglecting the true basis of one‟s power – invariably an ethnically homogenous and 
egalitarian citizen body.  Even in seeking to transcend ancient models, Britons inevitably 
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ended up thinking of alternatives informed by the ancient past:
23
 „Men make their own 
history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected 
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. 
The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.‟24 
Not all political Liberals were as enthusiastic about Greater Britain as they were 
disdainful of the despotic Indian Empire, and not all made a conscious effort to abandon the 
ancient world as a source of prescient lessons.  E.A. Freeman thought the Greek colonies 
demonstrated the folly of attempting to bind colonies to the metropolis.  Relations between 
Corinth and her independent colony of Syracuse formed „a touching and beautiful tale of 
abiding friendship between two independent commonwealths‟, those between Corinth and the 
dependent colony of Korcyra ended up with the colony winning its independence at the cost 
of „bitter and abiding hatred between colony and metropolis.‟25  The example of Corinth and 
Korcyra reflected Britain‟s mistake in America, that of Corinth and Syracuse the way things 
were and should remain between Britain and what became the Dominions.   
For that matter, not all those in favour of Greater Britain were equally against the 
Indian Empire and its Roman exemplar.  It must be remembered that for all its unsavoury 
political implications, which for liberal imperialists were in any case misunderstood and the 
price of spreading civilisation, the Indian Empire was, for the time being at least, a crucial 
part of Britain‟s great power status and military power.26  The Indian empire was in the long 
term transient, not useless.  James Bryce, a political Liberal and president of the Oxford 
branch of the Imperial Federation League (and so for the Anglo-Saxon political community) 
did not think British rule in India was a problem: it had always been ruled by despots, its 
diversity in race, religion and language made despotic governance necessary, and in any case 
its inhabitants cared little for self-rule.  In its necessarily despotic nature British rule 
resembled Roman rule in the provinces.  The point was that Britain, unlike Rome, was 
democratic at home.
27
  Before 1857, British liberal intellectuals had been very forthright in 
defending a civilising and progressive government in India which had as its aim the spread of 
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universal Western values.   After 1857, and into the 1860s, this „universalist‟ perspective had 
given way to a „culturalist‟ one foreseeing a far more gradual – that is, effectively static –
progression on the part of non-Europeans.
28
  Empire effectively meant the indefinite 
guardianship of subject peoples – more likely to end in overthrow than in the granting of 
democratic freedoms to fully prepared natives.  By the end of the nineteenth century a leading 
Liberal statesman saw no contradiction in support for both a Greater Britain and such an 
empire of rule.  Is Bryce representative?  A detailed examination of British imperial thought 
is outside the scope of this study, but other figures also indicate an increasing liberal 
acceptance of empire by the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.  One such 
example is Benjamin Jowett, liberal theologian and eminent scholar of Greek famous for his 
translation of Plato‟s dialogues who became highly influential in the admissions to the Indian 
Civil Service.  His students included three successive Indian Viceroys, and he insisted on 
over half the marks in the Indian Civil Service exams to be in Latin and Greek so as to attract 
Classics graduates.  This suggests that the notion that classical antiquity could provide 
relevant lessons for the present was still very much alive.
29
  Perhaps the point is that liberal 
statesmen, scholars, and thinkers, although they preferred the settlement colonies, were 
increasingly prepared to accept the facts of international politics.   
That the role envisaged for the colonies came to be more important than ever at a time 
when liberal opinion was increasingly reconciled to the Indian empire as a problematic, 
transient, but nonetheless morally justifiable geopolitical necessity, is perfectly logical.  We 
have already seen how the idea of Greater Britain was situated in the geopolitical foreboding 
of the time, influenced by such ideas as those of Mackinder.  Britain‟s dependence on India 
for its demographic and territorial clout could be seen as a major weakness.  According to 
conceptions of the rise and fall of empires informed by the study of the ancient world, ideas 
of race, and more recent events such as the Indian Mutiny, any empire, by virtue of being 
based on despotic rule over other peoples, especially very different ones incapable of political 
freedom, are doomed to fall, eventually.
30
  Closer integration with the colonies offered a 
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unique way not of avoiding these problems – for they were unavoidable – but of making them 
irrelevant by ensuring that Britain‟s future power would rest on far firmer, more permanent, 
foundations.  Comprised of self-governing Anglo-Saxon settlers, together, the colonies would 
not constitute an empire, but as John Seeley put it, a „vast English nation‟.31  Indeed, in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century colonisation could more than ever seen as a means 
of achieving the double purpose of making emigration contribute not detract from Britain 
demographically and thereby creating that Oceanic nation – a Britannic nation – which could 
compete with the great white territorial empires.
32
  The Weltpolitik of a geopolitically 
surrounded Germany meant that it too was eager for colonies, for very much the same reason 
– Germans could emigrate and remain German, contributing to a Greater Germany, rather 
than adding to the strength of the United States.
33
 
Such concerns were not limited to Britain, but also extended to the colonies 
themselves.  In his piece for the periodical Nineteenth Century titled „Greater or Lesser 
Britain‟, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Julius Vogel, wrote that a confederation would 
save Britain from the fate of Holland, instead enabling her to retain „in her own dominions 
her subjects and their wealth, and not to drive them abroad‟.  Under a confederation, „the 
enterprise of her people‟ would be „devoted to enlarging the power of their country, instead 
of their diminishing it by becoming subjects of other nations.‟34  In the late nineteenth century 
and into the twentieth the increasing popularity of a British imperial identity went hand in 
hand with growing national consciousness among the settler colonies.  This may seem 
contradictory, but the development of colonial „national identity‟ entailed rejecting 
„subservience‟ to the British government while at the same time „affirming equality‟ with 
Britain: a Britannic nationalism. This had several advantages, one of which was that it would 
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enable the colonies to expand whilst remaining under British protection, and the other being 
that affirming a „Britannic‟ identity could provide social cohesion in these growing states.35   
Colonisation, or emigration to the colonies, was itself seen as an answer to Britain‟s 
social problems.  Late Victorian fears about demographic growth
36
 and the pending 
enfranchisement of an urban underclass – frequently referred to in the language of hygiene 
and degeneracy – fed the fears of social conflict and even revolution.37  As we have seen, 
emigration, primarily destined for the United States, increased the strength of a rival while 
doing nothing to alleviate anxiety about Britain‟s position in the world.38  Emigration to the 
colonies, on the other hand, could at the same time increase Britain‟s military and economic 
strength and relieve it of social pressures.
39
  This solution could appeal to a broad range of 
opinion about the future of Britain‟s relations with the colonies – from those who favoured 
eventual separation to those who wanted a globe-spanning Anglo-Saxon federal state.  
Although there were concerns among colonial governments about uncontrolled 
immigration,
40
 both British commentators and the colonies themselves saw the potential 
promise of emigration:  a Britain devoid of social conflict and urban degeneration could be 
remade in the colonies,
41
 and emigration would form part of the growth necessary to form 
dynamic states out of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
42
  British perceptions of the 
colonies, and the colonies‟ own perceptions of their place in the British system, were 
generally positive.  There is little sense of any disquiet over the consequences of colonisation 
for indigenous peoples.
43
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The Scholars 
 
Before proceeding to discuss British scholarship on Greek colonisation (1870-1914) 
we will consider where the scholars in question should be positioned in terms of the political, 
intellectual, and colonial context outlined above.  These scholars include Evelyn Abbott 
(1843-1901), who published a History of Greece in 1888, J.B. Bury, (1861-1927) whose A 
History of Greece, first published in 1900, became a standard textbook of remarkable 
longevity, and also scholars who touch upon Greek colonisation from different directions: Sir 
Edward Bunbury (1811-1895) and his History of Ancient Geography, and E.A. Freeman 
(1823-1892) who wrote The History of Sicily. 
 
E.A. Freeman 
 
E.A. Freeman has been subject to some of the most vocal criticism of earlier 
scholarship.  Shepherd writes how Freeman made overt use of the „ideals of high empire and 
the notions of race, hierarchy and fidelity combined with modern analogy‟,44 thus distorting 
Greek colonisation.  The latter proposition is no doubt true, and Freeman‟s ideas of racial 
hierarchies are indeed evocative of the era of high empire, but Freeman was if anything part 
of an intellectual discourse critical of empire, and his ideas were anything but an 
endorsement of Britain‟s status as a great heterogeneous world empire in which whites ruled 
over lesser races.  Freeman was not a young man in the 1890s, and his ideas were grounded 
in an earlier tradition of liberal scholarship about civilisation, the east, and the place of 
ancient Greece as well as being strongly influenced by the international politics of the 1870s. 
Freeman shared with Grote the idea of an oppositional relationship between east and 
west, and that only the latter could progress and attain the highest levels of civilisation.  On 
the very first page of the preface to his history of Sicily Freeman quoted Grote‟s remarks that 
the conflict between the Phoenicians and Greeks on Sicily, like those between Saracens and 
Normans, would determine whether Sicily be part of Europe or Africa, which he himself 
repeated more forcefully as a conflict between Ayran and Semite prefiguring the Crusades.
45
  
In a review of Grote‟s History of Greece, Freeman praised his bringing to light the political 
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genius of the Greeks.
46
  Freeman‟s politics were of a similarly radical Liberal bent to Grote‟s 
and their work both informed and was informed by this political outlook.  Freeman, however, 
was most famous for his history of the Norman Conquests, and this interest in medieval 
history resulted in a firmer belief in the Anglo-Saxon race and its unique ability for political 
freedom derived from the „free forests of Germany‟.47  For Freeman medieval history was in 
no way isolated from that of the ancient world – he believed in the „Unity of History‟, and his 
scholarship had as a consistent focus the study of those „Aryan‟ political institutions best 
representing freedom. 
There were other differences.  As far as we can infer from his writings on Greek 
colonisation and Hellenistic imperialism, Grote‟s liberalism drove him to pessimism as far as 
assimilating lesser races was concerned.  Freeman, for all his strident remarks about the „foul 
and bloody rites‟ of the Phoenician gods in his history of Sicily,48 wrote that if the Hamilkar 
and Hannibal of the fifth century B.C. were „still essentially barbarians‟, those of the third 
century were „essentially Europeans‟ equal to the greatest names in Greek and Italian 
history.
49
  He was tempted to think that the Phoenicians, „political peers of the European 
nations‟, had „drunk in something of the spirit of the West, and had almost parted company 
with the barbaric kingdoms of Asia.‟50  Freeman‟s conception of race, for him a product of 
modern scientific and historical inquiry,
51
 was with the notable exception of black Africans  
linguistic rather than biological. In his preface to Freeman‟s The Historical Geography of 
Europe, J.B. Bury
52
 wrote that were Freeman alive to edit his work anew, he would probably 
have modified his language: although Aryanism was one of the pillars of Freeman‟s 
„construction of history‟, what he really meant by the term Aryan was „of Aryan speech – 
„speech was his criterion‟, and therefore the „inference from Aryan speech to Aryan stock is 
invalid.‟  After all, Bury thought it to be „certain that all the European peoples who spoke or 
speak tongues of this [Indo-European] family are not of common race, and many of them 
probably have very little „Aryan‟ blood.‟53  Freeman was influenced by the ideas of Max 
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Müller (1823-1900), and this emphasis on the philological as opposed to physiological basis 
of the Aryan race enabled him to „reconcile his Teutonism with his broader classicism and his 
concept of Christendom.‟54  Although in theory open to other races, none of this means he 
was generous towards the unassimilated.  The other great influence on his work was, as stated 
above, contemporary politics.  His views on this were inextricably linked to his views on 
history, especially a belief in Aryan Anglo-Saxon political freedom eclipsing that of Europe 
but defined in opposition to the east. 
In the 1870s the Ottoman Empire still ruled over Christian peoples in the Balkans, and 
Revolts against Ottoman rule in Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1875 resulted in brutal reprisals 
from the Ottomans, became known in Britain as the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876.
55
  Propping 
up the Ottoman Empire against Russia was a cornerstone of British imperial strategy, 
especially since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made the Eastern Mediterranean the 
best route to an India threatened by that same power.
56
  This was known as the Eastern 
Question, and at the very time it erupted into violence, Disraeli was busily increasing the 
symbolic importance of the Indian Empire, in 1876 proclaiming Queen Victoria Empress of 
India.  Gladstone was as critical of the Ottoman Empire and the Bulgarian atrocities as he 
was of Disraeli‟s New Imperialism, and in the same year he published the pamphlet The 
Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East,
57
 the start of a campaign which would see 
some of Britain‟s foremost intellectuals vent their fury at Disraeli‟s policy.58  Among this 
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élite spanning science, history, the law, and politics and including Charles Darwin, Lord 
Acton, James Bryce, and many more, was E.A. Freeman.
59
 
  Freeman had as a boy been sympathetic to Greek independence
60
, and the idea of 
European, Christian, peoples governed by an Asiatic, Islamic, empire was for him an 
anathema.
61
  In Freeman‟s world view, the East was essentially the same, and as such it had 
constituted an eternal opposite to the West. In the same way as one could glimpse incipient 
modern European civilisation in the beginnings of Greece, once could also see the ancient 
empire of Nebuchadnezzar „reproduced in every essential feature at the court of any modern 
oriental despot.‟62  That some of the earliest homes of Christianity and European civilisation 
were under the control of such an oriental despotism, and especially one which adhered to the 
faith that was „the most direct enemy and rival of Christianity‟, was simply intolerable.  More 
intolerable still was that Disraeli – who was in any case of suspect racial provenance – was 
allowing this outrage to go unchecked because of an inherently flawed imperial interest.  
Gladstone was an outspoken critic of Disraeli‟s imperial expansion, and Freeman belonged to 
a more extreme version of this Liberal vision of the Empire, caring very little for the larger 
part of it.  Garrisons and forts in the midst of barbarian peoples (such as in India) would not 
result in the permanent extension of Europe: the real instances of colonisation were those of 
Europeans in places such as Canada, Australia and most importantly, the United States, 
where the constitution of Greece was born again.
63
  Tellingly, the latter was, of course, not 
even part of the British Empire.  Indeed, he once referred to George Washington as the „true 
Expander of England‟.64  Unlike other liberal Anglo-Saxonists critical of the longevity and 
utility of empire on the Indian model, Freeman‟s understanding of Greek colonial history 
reflects an opposition to the idea of an Imperial Federation.  In 1885 he delivered two 
lectures, „Greater Greece and greater Britain‟ and „George Washington, the expander of 
England‟, criticising such plans.65  This could be read as a belief that attempting to formalise 
relations between Britain and her colonies with the intention of creating a state to transcend 
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doomed heterogeneous empires was a contradictory ambition – the lesson of history, 
especially Greek and American colonial history, was that regardless of ties of kith and kin, 
political control over colonies was contrary to the Greek and Anglo-Saxon spirit of liberty – 
and it could only end in enmity and secession on hostile terms.  We should not read this as a 
belief that racial ideas do not matter because empires are doomed whoever they govern – 
instead there is an implication that governing Anglo-Saxons (and Greeks) despotically is 
perhaps even more untenable because of their superior and intrinsic capacity for freedom and 
self-governance. 
It is clearly misleading to portray Freeman as an archetypal scholar of high empire 
unless we understand that this period was in fact defined by debate and disagreement about 
what form, if any, empire should take.  Freeman‟s ideals were of a racial Anglo-Saxonism 
inextricably linked with political freedom and independent colonies of settlement echoing 
those of ancient Greece
66
 – a world away from the Indian Empire of Imperial Viceroys and 
Delhi Durbars, but also strikingly different to other visions (i.e. colonial unity) from within 
his own intellectual and political milieu.  That milieu, as we have seen, was in any case 
capable of great diversity of opinion not only in terms of what to do with the colonies but also 
in terms of varying attitudes towards the Indian empire of rule.  It is ill advised, especially 
when writing about approaches to colonisation and empire, to assume there to have been a 
single coherent way of seeing those things in the age of High Empire.  It would be equally 
misleading to depict Freeman as an extreme figure marrying crude racial ideas with strange 
political ideas.  His racial ideas were more complex than they appear at first glance, and his 
mix of political liberalism and Anglo-Saxon racialism although perplexing to modern 
audiences were perfectly coherent and indeed widespread at the time. Recent notions of a 
political left and right, of liberal and conservative, and where racial ideas belong in such a 
framework, are evidently misleading in looking at this period.  In spite of Queen Victoria‟s 
opposition to the appointment of a man with republican sympathies,
67
 with Gladstone‟s help 
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he became the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford in 1884.
68
  This position, an 
association with Gladstone, and the fact that he was father in law to Sir Arthur Evans indicate 
that Freeman was not a marginal figure.  Rather than demonstrating the „ideals of high 
empire‟69 he should be positioned within a canon of liberal thought critical of empire, for 
Anglo-Saxon freedom, yet who did not allow his Teutonism to override his Classicism, or 
most importantly, his Hellenism.  Freeman‟s view of Greece and the basis of its genius was 
entirely consistent with liberal thought before and after: „in truth, the pre-eminence of Athens 
in literature, philosophy, and art, was simply the natural result of her pre-eminence in 
freedom and good government.‟70 
 
Bunbury and Abbott 
 
Freeman‟s work is striking for its very immediate connection to contemporary politics 
and its highly explicit overarching framework – conflict between the free Aryan, the servile 
easterner, and the Semite.  Freeman‟s ideas, although their expression in racial terms make 
them sound different, were in fact but a continuation of a wider liberal, British, trend to 
define civilisational progress in terms of the supremacy of the free liberal Englishman over 
reactionary tendencies at home, the free Anglo-Saxon over a varyingly despotic Europe, and 
a broadly speaking progressive Europe over a despotic and stagnant Asia.  This mirrored the 
supremacy of democracy in Athens, Athens in Greece, and Greece in the ancient world.  The 
works of Sir Edward Bunbury and Evelyn Abbott, two very different scholars, are on the 
other hand much more visibly a continuation of trends already apparent from the earliest 
liberal histories of Thirlwall and Grote.  Bunbury wrote at the same time of Greek colonies 
such as Cyrene and Hesperides as constituting an „oasis of civilisation in the midst of 
surrounding barbarism‟71 and the „influence of the Asiatic civilisation upon their then ruder 
[Greek] neighbours‟.72  The allusion to then ruder neighbours carries an implication with a 
long history: the Greeks were once barbarous, but were subsequently improved by the 
Phoenicians, and surpassed their oriental tutors.  Abbott, very much a conservative scholar, 
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and in this „typical of the growing conservatism of late-century university intellectuals‟,73 
similarly echoes earlier work in his depiction of once rude Greece, itself guilty of barbaric 
religious practices at this early age,
74
 expelling the Phoenicians and their „inhuman rites‟ yet 
receiving from them metalworking and letters.
75
  There is a pattern of stating some 
reservations regarding Phoenician civilisation while at the same time recognising their 
technological superiority to the Greeks – in aid of course of a wider schema in which Greeks 
overtake them.  In a manner not dissimilar to Grote, Abbott concludes that it is not known 
how the Greeks resisted „amalgamation‟ with the Phoenicians, who „in material civilisation 
were far their superiors‟, but that evidence suggests „before the dawn of Western history, the 
Phoenicians were expelled from the peninsula of Greece and the northern islands of the 
Aegean, by the nation to whom we owe the gift of Hellenic civilisation, poetry and 
thought.‟76  In resisting „amalgamation‟ the Greeks spared themselves from corrupting 
influences which would have stunted the development of their civilisation. The overall thrust 
of their histories is the same privileging of Greece in the ancient world in a way that reflected 
Europe in the modern.  This is the case for both liberal and conservative scholars.   
 
J.B. Bury 
 
The republics of Greece had performed an imperishable work; they had shown 
mankind many things, and, above all, the most precious thing in the world, 
fearless freedom of thought – J.B. Bury77 
 
By the very end of the nineteenth century we can see that the place given to Greece in 
history is even more unambiguously central than it was with Grote, Freeman, Bunbury and 
Abbott.  J. B. Bury‟s A History of Greece, first published in 1900, became a very widely used 
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single volume Greek history for students, scholars, and a wider educated audience.  Bury was 
an eminent Classical and Byzantine scholar, and had as his (only) student the equally eminent 
Crusade and Byzantine historian Steven Runciman.  His view of history did not however rely 
on students for their survival and transmission, as a second edition of his history of Greece 
was published in 1913, a third in 1951, and a fourth with the aid of Russell Meiggs in 1975. 
Subsequent reprints included further revisions, and modifications of Bury‟s views about 
eastern influences – reflecting both advances in scholarship and the sensibilities of that era.  
Bury wrote at the high point of British liberalism, and although he was a much less publicly 
involved than such scholars as Grote, Freeman, and Bunbury, he nevertheless made notable 
intellectual contributions which spoke to this liberal era. 
A History of Freedom of Thought (1914) stands out, a work as forthright in its defence 
of freedom of expression as it is critical of religion, tyranny, and intolerance.  Chapters went 
under such telling titles as „Reason Free (Greece and Rome)‟ and „Reason in Prison (The 
Middle Ages)‟,78 at once an indication of Bury‟s interest in ideas of progress, and of the 
esteem in which he held the Athenian Hellenism. His description of the „debt which 
civilization owes to the Greeks‟ lends further meaning to his ideas about eastern influences 
expressed in A History of Greece.
79
  In that work, he wrote that in giving the Greeks the 
alphabet the Phoenicians „rendered to Hellas and thereby to Europe‟ one „inestimable 
service‟.80  It may have been a Phoenician gift, but in moulding the alphabet to the needs of 
the Greek language, the Greeks „showed their genius‟.81  In this way, and consistent with a 
century of scholarship, Bury turns a Phoenician invention into a demonstration of Greek 
genius.  Apart from its eighteenth century provenance this assertion seems to have had some 
grounding in the literary evidence – Plato, after all, remarked that „whatever Greeks acquire 
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from foreigners is finally turned by them into something nobler‟ (Epinomis 987e).82  Where 
Bury departs from earlier works
83
 is in his omission of any mention of „rude‟ Greeks 
receiving civilisation from the Phoenicians.  Instead he concentrates on the matter of art: 
 
The Phoenicians exerted little or insignificant influence upon Greek art; on the 
contrary, it was probably from Aegean art that they learned much of what they 
know.  They had no artistic genius; they were imitators, not creators.
84
   
 
Art would not have been considered as an aspect of material civilisation – i.e. that which the 
east could teach.  More importantly here is that if we combine these views of Bury‟s on 
eastern influences with his views on Greece in A History of Freedom of Thought we see the 
rationale behind such dismissals.  Greek art could not be derived from the east because the 
east was not free.  Bury thought that „our deepest gratitude is due to them [the Greeks] as the 
originators of liberty of thought and discussion.‟  This is crucial because „this freedom of 
spirit was not only the condition of their speculations in philosophy, their progress in science, 
their experiments in political institutions; it was also a condition of their literary and artistic 
excellence. Their literature, for instance, could not have been what it is if they had been 
debarred from free criticism of life.‟  Here glimpse of an idea that became a pervasive part of 
the self-identification of free societies from Bury‟s day to the Cold War: that open societies 
are not only better places in which to live, but they are also more likely to innovative, 
prosperous, and successful.  In this way Bury built on earlier ideas of the essential difference 
between a free and innovative west and a despotic and stagnant east evident with Grote.  
Perhaps his Greeks spoke to the idealism, rather than the anxiety, of pre-war liberal Britain.  
Would it be going too far to say that Bury‟s Athens offered a direct parallel to Britain at its 
height?   
 
But apart from what they actually accomplished, even if they had not achieved 
the wonderful things they did in most of the realms of human activity, their 
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assertion of the principle of liberty would place them in the highest rank among 
the benefactors of the race; for it was one of the greatest steps in human 
progress.
85
  
 
This is possible, indeed, considering the tendency of previous scholarship, most notably 
George Grote, to see equivalence between democratic Athens and liberal England, even 
likely.  
 As one should now come to expect from liberal scholarship, Bury is no simple 
eulogist of Britain and of Greece, and nor are his views on empire either as simple as 
denunciation or uncritical praise.  Bury‟s views about the nature of civilisation are as 
suffused in critical reflection as any of his predecessors.  It may seem strange, in view of his 
image of Greek and Athenian superiority vis-à-vis the Phoenicians, that he also credits the 
Greeks with the creation of the very idea of prejudiced cultural supremacism towards others 
denigrated as „barbarians‟: an idea „quite new‟ and „destined to control the future‟.  He 
thought that it was in the fourth century BC that the term „barbarian‟ acquired its 
„depreciatory meaning‟: what was once a neutral term „equivalent to non-Greek‟ came to 
„imply moral and intellectual inferiority‟.  This „prejudice‟ had its roots in the fifth century 
and was diffused by the Athenians.  It was present in Euripides‟ Medea, Andromache, and 
Iphigenia in Aulis, and Bury quotes from the latter: “It accords with the fitness of things that 
barbarians should be subject to Greeks, for Greeks are freemen and barbarians are slaves by 
nature”.  This notion of barbarian inferiority which began after the Persian Wars, „probably at 
Athens, was propagated from this “School of Hellas,” and became in the fourth century a 
dogma accepted throughout the Greek world, firmly held by men like Aristotle and 
Isocrates.‟  This belief in „their privileged position‟ was „as strong as the belief of the white 
races in their superiority to the coloured races to-day‟: others were permitted to learn from 
their example, but to be „kept in their place‟.86  Was Bury making a direct yet not 
unambiguously flattering parallel with contemporary Europe? 
 
Their eminent intellectual and artistic attainments, all they did for our own 
civilization, may prompt us to be indulgent to this self-exaltation; but the idea 
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degenerated into an intolerant bigotry which a modern writer has considered a 
leading cause of their political decline.
87
 
 
Bury then continues to describe quite positively how „there was born, however, in the 
generation after Alexander‟s death, another idea, sharply contrasted with this exclusiveness – 
the idea of mankind as one great community, the ideal of a state embracing the whole 
oecumene.‟  This was the philosophy of Zeno, whom Bury credited with introducing the idea 
of a cosmopolitanism „transcending patriotism‟ and „embracing all rational beings‟ „without 
regard to the distinction of Greek and barbarian‟ – of an „ideal state‟ where „all human beings 
were citizens‟.  This idea was born, says Bury, at an „opportune‟ moment, as it corresponded 
with what he saw as the revolutionary feature of Alexander‟s empire: that is the „breaking 
down‟ of „racial antagonisms and overcoming or softening the distinction between Greek and 
barbarian‟.  Even if Aristotle taught him to „treat the Greeks as a leader, but the barbarians as 
a despot‟ in a way reminiscent of the British system of democracy at home, despotism 
abroad, Alexander „recognized non-Greeks as part of the human family with equal claims on 
a common ruler‟.88 
 If we recall, for George Grote the Hellenistic Empires and those Greeks who ventured 
to the East represented little but the corruption of the Athenian ideal: they achieved a 
superficial Hellenization and the price was that they „ceased to be hellenic‟ – or „real‟ Greeks 
like those of fifth century Athens.
89
  Bury‟s view of the Hellenistic world is radically 
different.  To begin with, unlike Grote, and in spite of the downfall of Athenian democracy, 
Bury appears to have seen the Hellenistic world as one of progress: it was a tolerant society 
where „thought was perfectly free‟ and the power of the gods much diminished.  Philosophic 
and scientific advances once ridiculed (that the earth moved and was round) were now 
accepted rather than scorned.
90
 Bury expressed admiration for Alexander‟s desire to rule 
Greeks and barbarians on a basis of equality in A History of Greece, in 1900, and he argues in 
the closing paragraphs of that book that had Aristotle had his way, and implemented his 
„ideal‟ city (which was an egalitarian community of citizens with non-Greek slaves tilling 
their fields), then Greece would not „have done what they did for European civilisation‟.91  In 
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this we can recognise a glimpse of things to come – the idea that a certain loss of purity is the 
price of being part of a greater thing. 
This is entirely at odds with Grote.  Grote drew parallels between Aristotle‟s advice to 
Alexander (i.e. to treat the Greeks as a leader, barbarians as a despot), and Edmund Burke‟s 
suggested policy for the British government in America and India respectively.
92
  Grote, 
influenced by James Mill,
93
 was evidently of the liberal school of thought regarding India – if 
it had to be done, there needed to be a strict separation between the two spheres so as to avoid 
the contamination of the democracy at home by the despotism abroad.
94
  Alexander‟s actions, 
to him, were as though the British government had decided to unite the empire as one, 
governing all its subjects on a basis of equality – and since „no Greek [or British] thinker 
believed the Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity upon which the march of every 
Grecian [or British] community was based‟95 – this would have meant degrading the status of 
the white empire to the despotism appropriate to the rest.  This was the defining trait of 
liberal reservations about empire: that despotism abroad would soon mean despotism at 
home.  The corrupting influence of exercising despotic rule over lesser races, along with the 
exaggerated importance of military institutions, would one day threaten liberal democracy at 
home.   
Why, therefore, did Bury, no less a believer in the magnificence of Athenian 
democratic ideal, think differently?  That Bury thought differently in 1900 indicates that it 
was not the Great War which made him shun Grote‟s segregationist view of empire, or give 
him his internationalism and distaste for chauvinism – but the war may well have confirmed 
these ideas.  Come 1923, Bury was much more explicit: 
 
... has there been any more salient feature in the advancing movement of human 
society than the linking up of all parts of the oecumene and the propagation of 
Western civilization, of which the foundations were laid in Greece, to all the 
margins of the world?  In that movement Alexander took the first step.  And in 
modern times the confederate idea of the solidarity and fellowship of the human 
race has become an active and driving force.  It has expressed itself as 
Internationalism which breaks down barriers and disowns country.  It has 
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expressed itself in the League of Nations.  It is the intellectual basis of 
humanitarianism.  It was Zeno who first taught men to think in terms of the 
oecumene.
96
 
 
What this says about Bury‟s views regarding empire and the spreading of civilisation to other 
peoples is ambiguous, and will be discussed shortly.  Perhaps the most important thing to 
note here is Bury‟s open avowal of internationalism and disavowal of nation, and considering 
how this argument is developed in his text – as stemming from Athenian and wider Greek 
conceit and chauvinism – it is tempting to think that Bury‟s Greece is a direct reflection of 
modern Britain and Europe where the forces of a belligerent and chauvinistic nationalism on 
the part of all nations led to a catastrophe.   
In this internationalism, Bury looks to the next generation of liberal scholars, and as 
we shall see, an internationalism informed by what could be called a „liberal Hellenism‟ 
became the creed of such individuals as Gilbert Murray.  But what of Bury and empire – 
should we see the criticism of chauvinism as connecting indirectly to the conflicts within 
Europe?  Or should we take it more directly, and assume instead, or additionally, to refer to 
European – indeed British – prejudice towards the „coloured races‟?  The way that Bury 
describes Alexander‟s conquests in a positive light, and refers to the challenges faced by 
Rome in ruling Oriental nations and „wild backward sections of mankind‟,97 suggests that he 
did not have much objection towards empire per se – but only against the kind of empire 
which was founded on prejudice and slavery. In this he is consistent with earlier, and rather 
hopeful, liberal thought about what the imperial rule in the east and elsewhere should be.  He 
does mention the British Empire in connection to Roman imperialism, mainly, it seems, to 
discredit the claims of both to have been in any way „defensive‟, and also to advise some 
caution to what has already been hinted earlier in this chapter – that Classical antiquity 
offered the pleasing vision for middle class Britons of (often eastern) despots being dictated 
to by free citizens.  He could appreciate how „in modern times, since the rise of democracies‟, 
„it has been exhilarating and edifying to see proud monarchs trembling at the word of a plain 
Roman‟, but suggested that „the government of the Republic was an oligarchy as grasping 
and greedy as any of the majesties whom its consuls and ambassadors humiliated.‟98  Was 
Bury representative?  He presents us with a plausible view of what the assumptions and 
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outlook of liberal scholars, both at the turn of the century and after the calamity of 1914-18, 
would be like.  Bury admired Athens and Greece, and thought them the pinnacle of ancient 
civilisation as much as did Grote, yet he was more willing to see the good in other societies, 
in other periods, and to recognise the flaws in those liberal idols.  As a historian of 
Byzantium, his horizons were as broad as those of E.A. Freeman in that both sought to 
appreciate the unity of history rather than focus on one brilliant moment in the history of 
western civilisation – not that they doubted it.  Unlike Freeman, he seems to have been 
critical of chauvinism – nationalist and racist – yet reconciled to „good‟ empire as a form of 
internationalism and a civilising force.  He appears also to embody a classic liberal 
conception of progress as tied to increasing liberalism, secularisation, and democratisation, 
yet Bury also very much belongs to the twentieth century, and seems consistent with what 
would be the British self-image for years to come: as a benign, moderating force in the world, 
the head of a vast multi-ethnic empire, guarantor of European peace. 
 
Having defined the context, it is now time to turn to the way these scholars wrote 
about Greek colonisation.  Scholarship from the age of high empire might be expected to 
reflect contemporary views about colonisation in writings about the ancient world in the most 
immediate way – seeing Greek colonisation as mirroring the links between Britain and its 
white settler colonies.  It is far from clear, however, that views of British colonisation in this 
era matchup to what more recent scholarship supposes them to have been, and as we have 
seen, there was in fact in this very period debate as to what form that relationship, whatever it 
was, should in future take.  Recent work on the historiography of colonisation seems to 
overlook how even on a general level „most of the energy behind British expansion was 
private, not public.‟99  This means that although colonies were under nominally under British 
control, much of the energy for colonisation came from the colonies themselves and private 
initiative in Britain.  Therefore, it will be argued that if there is any „statist‟ bias in 
scholarship from this period, then it might have little to do with modern British colonisation, 
and all to do with the retrojections of ancient writers.  This discussion will follow the format 
used with scholarship from 1780-1870 in examining the views of various scholars on the 
three themes of colonial dependence, colonisation as an act of state, and native peoples.  
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British Scholarship and Greek Colonisation 1870-1914 
 
Colonisation as an Act of State 1870-1914 
 
 In order to understand the way these scholars wrote about this specific aspect of 
Greek colonisation it is important to appreciate firstly the esteem in which Greece was held 
by liberal Britons and the interest it held as a model of a western civilisation‟s rise, secondly 
that scholars were faithful to what were (significantly) incomplete ancient accounts, and 
thirdly the nature of British colonisation itself in this period.  It will be demonstrated that 
Greek colonisation was seen as symptomatic of the dynamic energies released by a rising 
civilisation, mirroring modern Britain.  The literary evidence, depicting a strange and 
fragmented mixture of state involvement in certain cases (namely Herodotus on Cyrene), 
discontented individuals (the bulk of the evidence), and overseas adventure, at once offered 
parallels with British colonisation itself.  This, far from an uniform state-organised 
phenomenon, instead a similarly variable blend of fortune-seeking, discontent, and state 
backing, was so complex a thing that it demanded the vaguest of explanations: a colonising 
„spirit‟.  The incomplete nature of the literary evidence further invited scholars to „fill in the 
blanks‟ with elements of the colonising movement they knew best – that of their own 
country.   
Edward Bunbury began his discussion of Greek colonisation with a direct comparison 
with British expansion.  He wrote of a „remarkable movement of the Hellenic mind‟, an 
„early development‟ of „national energies‟ the results of which were displayed „in almost 
every direction during the period in question‟: 
 
Nowhere is this more strikingly shown than in the rapid extension of their 
colonies around the shores of the Mediterranean and the Euxine, until they had 
laid the foundations of a colonial empire, which bore much the same relation to 
the narrow and limited area of the parent country, as does the British Empire at 
the present day to the British Islands.
100
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This was an exciting period in Greek history, and Bunbury‟s depiction of it finds resonance in 
the other works from this period.  Evelyn Abbott wrote of Greek colonisation as stimulated 
by commerce as the Hellenes outdid the Phoenicians who had in earlier times introduced it.  
Populations rose, noble power „counterbalanced that of the monarchs‟, trade and commerce 
created a wealthy class which demanded a share in government – „Money, not birth, now 
made the man.‟  The prospect of a better life and better status attracted the impoverished, 
discontented, and „ruined aristocrats‟ alike.  Meanwhile the suppression of piracy and 
improvements in shipbuilding „allowed the mariners to become acquainted with distant 
shores, and productive regions, whose wealth was but imperfectly known to the ignorant and 
barbarous natives.  Such were the general causes from which the new impulse to colonisation 
arose…‟.101  For J.B. Bury, Greek colonisation was something more than commercial gain: 
 
The cause of Greek colonisation is not to be found in mere trade interests.  These 
indeed were in most cases a motive, and in some of the settlements of the Black 
Sea they were perhaps a leading motive.  But the great difference between Greek 
and Phoenician colonisation is that, while the Phoenicians aimed solely at 
promoting their commerce, and only a few of their settlements, notably Carthage, 
became more than mere trading-stations or factories, Greek colonisation satisfied 
other needs than desire of commercial profit.  It was the expression of the 
adventurous spirit which has been poetically reflected in the legends of the 
“Sailing of the Argo” and the “Home-coming of Odysseus” – the same spirit, not 
to be expressed in any commercial formula, which prompted English 
colonisation.
102
 
 
In all three of these images of colonisation, there is a sense that the period in question 
represented a release of national energies, or a colonising spirit which could not be reduced to 
mere economics.  Instead, its ardour was derived of national vitality outgrowing the 
constraints of the home country, an urge to escape deprivation both in material terms and in 
rights, and an impulse to take up new opportunities, to explore, to adventure.  The image, 
without doubt, owes something to the authors‟ conceptions of Europe‟s, but more especially 
Britain‟s own history – yet, as such, and taking into account how „most of the energy behind 
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British expansion was private, not public‟,103 this image was necessarily not of a colonial 
world formed by calculations of state , but a rather more ethereal notion of colonising spirit.  
This is perhaps best captured by the idea of private initiative as the driving force, though 
quite naturally supported by the state.  
 The causes and the impulses behind the expansion of Greece mirror those earlier 
conceptions of Thirlwall (and Ionian Greece), and of Grote, which are themselves a mirror 
image of the rise of England depicted by Mill.  When Abbott wrote that „Money, not birth, 
now made the man‟, he was deviating little from the idea of the rise of Greece formed half a 
century earlier.
104
  Let us recall Thirlwall‟s „ancient aristocracies‟ giving way to a „growing 
commonality‟ – an oligarchy grounding its political claims solely on its wealth – enabling 
„the Ionian genius‟, and which was tied to a maritime commerce which not only provided 
economic enhancement, but also stimulated „the nobler arts‟ and „new intellectual fields‟ in „a 
degree to which history affords no parallel before the beginning of the latest period of 
European civilisation.‟105  Colonisation was a symptom of a civilisation‟s rise – by definition, 
according to Mill, an increasing democratisation – as middle classes demanded political 
rights commensurate with their means.  Colonisation opened new worlds, literally and 
metaphorically broadening horizons, further stimulating this change, and in doing so became 
a cause as well as a symptom of European ascendancy – intellectually, politically, and 
economically.  Colonisation offered the disenfranchised – economically as well as politically 
– the opportunity of creating a new and better version of their home countries where they 
could attain the means and thus the status to enjoy those free institutions and political rights 
they did not qualify for at home.  Coupled to this spirit which valued freedom so highly was a 
taste for adventure and discovery.  The rise of modern Europe and especially England was the 
rise of Greece.  This was the view, be it in 1830 or 1900.  In 1900 J.B. Bury could look back 
on a long process further advanced, when the English speaking race had already „shown an 
unexampled energy and capacity for colonisation.‟106 
If, then, the portrayal of Greek and English colonisation alike is very much more 
enterprising than strategic, what did Bunbury mean by referring to a „colonial empire‟?  
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Although he wrote of Corinthian colonies as „mere dependencies‟, Corinth was seen as an 
exception, and Milesian colonies are simply said to have maintained contacts with their 
parent cities.  The implication therein is that although the state had some hand in the 
establishment of colonies – in facilitating their departure, perhaps – they were not intended to 
remain subject.
107
   It is important to consider that British colonisation, as the debates from 
the 1870s about varying degrees of unity or separation between Britain and her colonies 
show, offered a wide range of possible concepts which could influence ideas about ancient 
colonisation.  Abbott drew a distinction between earlier colonisation – „isolated band of 
pirates‟ and „colonisation in the later sense – i.e. settlements intended to form cities, and 
generally confirmed by divine sanction‟ from the eighth century.108  This may appear 
somewhat statist, yet he quite explicitly stated that Greek colonies „were not, like those of 
Rome,
109
 established to extend and secure Hellenic dominion, however great the part which 
they played in diffusing Hellenic civilisation.‟ More than trading posts they became 
independent cities with histories of their own, often surpassing their mother cities.  He 
appears to draw an implied distinction between Greek colonising experiences and those of 
colonists who looked forward to returning home with their wealth.  In other words he is not 
simply applying a nineteenth century framework of colonisation onto the ancient world but 
seems to make distinctions using knowledge of the ancient literary evidence and what he 
knew of some colonisers contemporary to himself.
110
 
 Attempts to determine whether accounts of ancient colonisation were modelled on 
more recent experiences are made difficult by the relative obscurity of what the scholars in 
question thought about modern colonisation.  Take E.A. Freeman‟s definition of „colonisation 
„as opposed to „migration‟.111  To put it simply, migrating peoples leave their own lands to 
flourish in new ones.  Colonisation constitutes „a higher stage‟: „a band of men goes forth 
from an established city or kingdom to seek homes in another land; but the city or kingdom 
                                                 
107
 Bunbury (1883), Vol 1, 107-109. 
108
 Abbott (1888), Part I, 335. 
109
 If this is a simplification of Roman colonisation it is one which remained highly uncontroversial for much of 
the twentieth century. 
110
 Abbott (1888), Part I, 355.  „For the Greek colonist did not look forward to returning home with wealth 
which he had amassed, and closing his life in the haunts of his childhood.  When he left his native city he ceased 
to be a member of it, his fortunes being henceforth bound up with the fate of the colony of which he had become 
a member.  For this reason the prosperity of the mother cities was not in proportion to the prosperity of the 
colonies which emanated from them.‟ 
111
 Note that in making a distinction between migration and colonisation Freeman prefigured what came a 
century later: see Demand (1990). 
148 
 
from which they set forth is neither destroyed nor weakened by their going forth‟.112  He 
compared the English settlement of Britain to Greek settlement in Sicily: the former was a 
migration, the latter a colonisation resembling later English settlement in America.  In 
instances of real colonisation „the settler is almost sure to belong to a more advanced race 
than those among whom he settles‟.113  Freeman does not mention whether or not those 
established cities of kingdoms made the decision to colonise or whether they sought to gain 
any future advantage from their colonies.  J.B. Bury was more explicit – „the colony was a 
private enterprise‟, although the „bond of kinship‟ with the mother-city was „carefully 
fostered‟.114 
 These scholars appear to be in general agreement that Greek colonisation,
115
 even if it 
was not a solely private affair, was certainly not a strategic act of state.  How do we then 
explain the image of colonisation which emerges from these works?  The somewhat vague, 
even romantic idea of national energies and a burgeoning civilisation expanding and founding 
colonies does not appear to be tied with the state action and strategic foresight.  It may be that 
the basis of this image lies in an interplay between the literary evidence – which mainly 
concerns individuals – and contemporary rationalisations (or imaginations) substituting what 
that evidence cannot tell us.  No scholar attempts to claim for Greek colonies a strategic 
significance – in most cases that would be going against the grain of the literary evidence, 
and instead colonies are afforded a civilisational significance (i.e. they spread Greek 
civilisation) independent of their mother-city.  There is also the suggestion that people leave 
for individual reasons – as is supported by the literary evidence (for instance Battos‟ 
lameness, Archias‟ crime) – yet this is explained, or rationalised in contemporary terms as the 
search for economic opportunities and political rights overseas when they are lacking at 
home.  Furthermore, the lack of evidence of state design in archaic Greek colonisation invites 
scholars to imagine it to have been a movement not unlike British colonisation – which in 
spite of the high degree of state involvement at varying stages (for instance the actions of 
colonial governments in Canada and Australia to encourage immigration, and the foundation 
of penal colonies by the British government), is overwhelmingly depicted as the result of the 
„spirit‟ of the English people.  This may be an idea with particular cultural origins – it is not 
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expressed in statist terms, it is in some ways disassociated with „empire‟, and it reflects a 
typically English capacity for „self-organisation‟. 
The suggestion that plausible invention, or conjecture, comes into play when the 
literary evidence is largely silent is most evident with the causes of colonisation.  For Abbott 
colonisation could prove the salvation of the „ruined aristocrat‟.116  Bury thought trade and 
political repression at home to have been reasons behind colonisation: „political discontent 
was an immediate cause of Greek colonisation and conversely it may be said that colonisation 
was a palladium of aristocracy‟; without the safety valve of colonisation Greek aristocracies 
might not have lasted as long as they did.
117
  Abbott‟s notion of colonisation as another 
chance for failed aristocrats may have had some contemporary colouring – yet the British 
settler colonies were, surely, more commonly seen as a worthy expansion of England with 
new lands tilled by industrious Anglo-Saxons.  The image of discontented aristocrats in fact 
has surer grounding in the literary evidence.  Bury‟s idea of trade and repression on the face 
of it bears little similarity to a liberal view of British history in which colonisation was seen 
as a desirable alternative to a restive British underclass, yet perhaps what this shows is that 
the idea of colonisation as a safety valve could be applied to other societies deemed 
aristocratic.  Thus the application of modern ideas onto the past was never rigid.  Parallels 
and analogies are meant to elucidate not constrain, and so it was with the scholars concerned.  
They were equally at home with drawing distinctions between the ancient past and present 
(e.g. the lower degree of colonial dependence in Greek colonisation) as they were with 
drawing parallels – in this case between Greek and English colonisation on a more general 
level: both represented a similar spirit of expansion symptomatic of two civilisations on an 
upward historical trajectory. 
 
Colonial Dependence 
 
The question to be addressed here is whether scholars from this period depicted Greek 
colonies as culturally and politically dependent upon their mother cities, and if so, whether 
they went further than the ancient texts justify.  Although Sir Edward Bunbury wrote of a 
Corinthian „colonial empire‟, its colonies founded by Corinth as „mere dependencies‟ which 
would for a long time enjoy friendly relations with their mother city (with the exception of 
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Corcyra),
 118
 it is important to remember that Corinth had long been seen as an exceptional 
case.  On Milesian colonisation he seems less convinced of colonial dependence, instead 
stating how the colonies maintained permanent relations with the parent city,
119
 and his more 
general impressions of Greek colonisation convey far less an impression of dependence: 
although never cut off from the rest of the Hellenic world, „it cannot be assumed that the 
colonies in all cases maintained much continuous intercourse with the parent cities‟.120  
Evelyn Abbot went a step further, as for him Greek colonies were more than trading posts; 
they became independent cities with histories of their own, often surpassing their mother 
cities.
121
  There is little to suggest that either author modelled Greek colonisation on 
contemporary colonial experiences – in terms of colonial dependence, at least.  The ancient 
sources implied in most cases cultural ties and political independence, and that is what these 
two scholars accepted.  Such a reading of the ancient sources was at the heart of E.A. 
Freeman‟s clear cut distinction between ancient Greek and modern colonisation.  Freeman 
thought relations between Corinth and Corcyra exceptional, precisely because they were 
similar to what one found in the modern world: „relations so rare in Greece though so familiar 
in modern times, in which the colony was a separate city with the usual attributes of a 
separate city, while the metropolis still claimed some authority inconsistent with the perfect 
independence of the colony.‟122  The latter may represent the colonies of other colonial 
powers, or somewhat of an echo of Freeman‟s fears for Britain‟s colonies were Britain to 
deviate from the „natural‟ course of gradually loosening poltical control so as to ensure 
lasting  friendship. 
  As we have seen, the colonies of Corinth and (its colony) Syracuse presented the 
dangers inherent in the alternative tightening of political ties between colony and metropolis, 
an idea which as we have seen was very much part of a contemporary imperial debate (the 
idea of Greater Britain) in which Freeman was a notable participant.  Both Corcyra and  
Camarina ended up revolting against their mother cities, and as the French and Spanish 
supported the revolt of the English colonies, the Greek cities of Sicily supported the revolt of 
Camarina. Significantly, what the Corinthians and Syracusans did was a „departure from 
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common Hellenic practice‟,123 and as such supplies „one of the most instructive lessons in all 
political history.‟  Whereas relations between Corinth and her independent colony of 
Syracuse „form a touching and beautiful tale of abiding friendship between two independent 
commonwealths‟, those between Corinth and the dependent colony of Corcyra ended up with 
the colony winning its independence at the cost of „bitter and abiding hatred between colony 
and metropolis.‟124  For the relations between Corinth and Syracuse we should read instead 
the ideal projected course of relations between Britain and Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand.  For relations between Corinth and Corcyra, we should read Britain and the 
American colonies.  The significant point to remember is that Corinthian and Syracusan 
colonisation, due to the high degree of colonial dependence, was at the same time a 
„departure from common Hellenic practice‟125 and analogous to modern colonisation.  
Therefore, it follows, Freeman could not have modelled Greek colonisation (other than that 
of Corinth and Syracuse) on that of his own day as he saw them as opposite policies, the 
Greek in fact being the superior. 
Of course Freeman, as an individual who campaigned against imperial federation and 
the political union of Britain and her colonies – and who indeed persuaded Gladstone against 
such ideas – had a political axe to grind.126  In writings produced as part of that debate he in 
fact employed the example of the cordial relations between Greek mother cities and their 
independent offspring in support of his argument.
127
  In this way, his views on modern events 
were shaped by his reading of ancient history, and vice versa perhaps.  Freeman clearly used 
modern parallels, but more to the point, what of it?  In this particular instance it seems less a 
case of retrojecting modern ideas onto the past as applying ancient political lessons to the 
modern world.  In any case, as Malkin wrote, history must speak to the present.
128
  Whatever 
Freeman‟s agenda, he appears to have been making valid points out of a sensible reading of 
the ancient texts.  The inclusion of modern parallels is not enough to justify charges of 
anachronism and a failure to carefully consider what is actually said.   
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Each scholar, Bunbury, Abbot, and Freeman, would most likely be in agreement with 
Bury‟s treatment of relations between colony and mother city: Greeks retained their customs 
and language wherever they went.  Colonies may have been private enterprises, but 
nonetheless there existed a „carefully fostered‟ bond of kinship between them and their 
mother cities.  If the settlers left because of political discontent, future relations with their 
homelands were characterised by reconciliation.
129
  Certain aspects of this description – the 
maintenance of customs and the unhappy causes of colonisation – could equally apply to 
modern British colonisation, but then again they might also apply to virtually any significant 
movement of peoples.   To conclude, there is scant evidence of these scholars departing from 
the ancient literary evidence in order to make antiquity „fit‟ the present, to present Greek 
colonies as unduly dependent on their mother cities.  What we have is in large part a faithful 
representation of the literary evidence elucidated with reference to contemporary British 
colonisation.  
 
E.A. Freeman and Colonial Inferiority 
 
Slight evidence for ideas of colonial dependence need not mean no notion of colonial 
inferiority.  In order to explore this idea, the discussion will now focus on Freeman, partly 
because his History of Sicily by its very nature has much more to say about Greek colonies, 
and partly because Freeman in particular has been subject to criticism on this particular 
count.  First of all let us consider Freeman as a historian.  He did not simply accept what the 
literary evidence told him, and it is far from clear that his interpretations, his decisions as to 
what to believe and not to believe, were simplistically directed by his contemporary 
preoccupations about race and colonies.  In fact some of this ideas relating to foundation 
traditions, and how they relate to retrospective claims of colonial dependence, prefigure by a 
hundred years some recent examples.  For example, he believed that the origins of the settlers 
who colonised Sicilian Naxos were to be found in Euboean Chalcis, yet chose to disbelieve 
the version of the story in which the founder, Theocles, is an Athenian.  In his eyes this was 
„one of a crowd of stories devised to claim for Athens in early times a position in Greece like 
that which she won only long after,‟ especially at a time when she became interested in 
having a so-called „past‟ in Sicily.130  Compare this with what John-Paul Wilson wrote in a 
work published in 2006: Thucydides presents the Athenians as colonisers of Ionia (Thuc. 
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1.12), a myth allowing Athens to make much of her supposed position as mother city of the 
Ionians, thus legitimising her rule over a mainly Ionian empire.
131
  Ideas which may have 
originated with Freeman are still useful today, in works dealing critically with foundation 
traditions and the later claims of colonial dependence on the part of mainland Greek states.  
To put it crudely, Freeman was not a bad historian. 
To turn to the issue at hand, that of colonial inferiority, Shepherd argued that 
Freeman‟s work replicated contemporary hierarchies, not only between colonists and natives, 
but also between the mother-country and the colonies: „however successful it may be, a 
colony will never match up to its mother-city and must be to some degree subservient‟. 132  It 
will be argued here that although Freeman did indeed consider the colonial achievement to 
have been a lesser one, there is evidence to suggest that this may have been less to do with a 
set, preconceived idea that colonies are and always will be lesser polities, and more to do 
with the course of specific colonial histories, ancient Greek and modern English, and how 
they relate to a very old theme: political freedom.    
The colonial achievement was a lesser one in that mainland Greece enjoyed fuller and 
more lasting freedom and prosperity.  Sybaris, for instance, surpassed Athens and Argos „in 
the more tangible results of wide commerce and wide dominion‟, whereas the latter two had 
greater „traditional and religious honour‟,133 but „if for a while the cities of colonial Hellas 
outstripped those of the motherland, it was only for a while.  Neither their political freedom 
nor their material prosperity was so lasting‟ – Greece, after all, had remained Greek to his 
day.
134
   
According to Shepherd, Freeman saw two tiers of Greeks: those in Greece, and the 
colonials.  In support of the argument that a colony, in Freeman‟s mind, could never compare 
to its mother-city, he is quoted as having written that „each owed to its special mother city the 
reverence of a child‟.135  This, in fact followed by „but neither the submission of a subject nor 
even the lighter allegiance of a vassal‟,136 obscures the fact that Freeman, as we have already 
seen, did not see Greek colonies as politically dependent.  This does not alter the fact that he 
did nonetheless see the Greek colonies as inferior, but the vital question is why he thought so.  
Perhaps the central theme of Freeman‟s work is the idea of political freedom – his racial ideas 
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are formed by this chief concern – and it is in this defining aspect that he saw colonial Greece 
lacking.  If the colonies „for a while‟ surpassed mainland Greece, „neither their political 
freedom nor their material prosperity was so lasting‟.137  Why did he think this?  The answer 
appears to be because, quite simply, „tyranny was more abiding in Sicily‟, with tyrants ruling 
there when „the tyrant was in old Greece all but unknown‟:  
 
This is one of the many marks of difference between Greece and her colonies.  
Brilliant as are some periods of the life of Hellas transplanted to other shores, 
more brilliant at some times than the lie of Hellas on its own ancient soil, the 
freedom of the colonial cities, like their greatness, had not the same abiding root 
as the freedom of the cities of old Greece. 
 
Tyrannical government was part of the turbulent nature of Sicilian history, in which 
governments and populations changed constantly – „the tyrants of Sicily became 
proverbial.‟138  It is their lack of lasting political freedom, exemplified, as ever, as with Grote, 
by Athens, which makes colonial Greece inferior in Freeman‟s eyes.  What of, then, 
Freeman‟s assertion that  
 
...at Syracuse, in the city itself and in its history, we see the highest point to which 
the Greek colony could rise.  The greatness of Syracuse is essentially of the 
colonial kind.  It was a greatness which could for a while outstrip the cities of old 
Greece in prosperity and splendour, but which was still a greatness essentially 
inferior in kind and less lasting in duration. 
 
Does this, as Shepherd argues, serve to explain away the successes of colonial Greece?
139
  
Surely the point is that for Freeman, as with other scholars writing from a similar perspective 
(e.g. Grote, Bury), the definition of success, and of greatness, was political freedom – not 
vast temples, but highly refined ones.  The definition of refined is perhaps more dependent on 
the level of freedom shown by the creator rather than the product itself.  As it was, for 
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Freeman, colonial Greece – where tyranny was rife – simply did not achieve the level of 
political freedom thought to have been demonstrated by Athens.   
What of Freeman‟s idea that there was such a thing as a greatness of a colonial kind?  
His reasons for believing colonial Greece to have been second-rate were determined by the 
specific nature of its history – steeped in tyranny.  This would suggest, therefore, that the 
distorting influence at work is not that of a modern idea of colonial inferiority, but rather a 
liberal conception of civilisation in which progress towards political freedom was paramount.  
There remains the need to account for his explicitly stating that „North America‟ had become 
the greatest home of the English „folk‟ – but „only in the sense in which for a whole Sicily 
contained the greatest power of Hellas‟.140  At first glance this appears to show that he did 
have some general idea of colonial inferiority spanning the ancient and modern worlds.  
Questioning whether his views on America were, in fact, less to do with a preconceived 
hierarchy, and more to do with what he saw in the America of his day, offers a different 
conclusion.  His travels there alerted him to the dangers of its vast Negro – and Irish – 
population: the former, according to his conception of race, entirely incapable of civilisation 
let alone Anglo-Saxon freedoms, the other a troublesome white race which threatened the 
great Anglo-Saxon democracy.  Negroes, for Freeman, could not be assimilated – not even 
Rome faced such a challenge as the United States as the peoples it assimilated did not exhibit 
„eternal physical and intellectual differences‟.141  Rather than this being a case of a schema of 
colonial inferiority being applied to both past and present, it seems more a case of reading 
them through the prism of a certain conception of political freedom (in which races were 
judged by their perceived capacity for it).  The theory of colonial inferiority was made to fit 
the facts, albeit facts interpreted according to the prevailing liberal idea of civilisation as the 
arduous march towards political freedom. 
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How did scholarship from this era differ from that which preceded it in its approach to 
colonial dependence and inferiority?  Clearly these accounts bear little relation to the Tory 
admiration for a monarchical colonial Greece seen with Gillies in the 1780s.  Having said 
that, they appear less critical than was Grote.  Freeman, although he believed in the superior 
freedoms of democratic Athens vis-à-vis colonial Greece, did not seem to attribute the 
tendency of the latter towards despotism to their intermingling with native peoples – as Grote 
very clearly did.  Perhaps part of the explanation for this difference lies in entirely different 
ideas about the influence of native peoples.  Grote saw Greek colonisation as some kind of a 
fusion between Colonial and Indian versions of empire – although responsible for the better 
cultivation of the land in a manner reminiscent of New Zealand, its political freedom and 
hence development was stunted by inassimilable natives and their corrupting influences, 
resembling certain contemporary views of the empire of rule.  Freeman, on the other hand (as 
his previously discussed views on the Carthaginians attest), was far more open to the 
possibility of changing and assimilating others, certain racial parameters having been met: as 
he saw racial affinity between the Greeks and indigenous inhabitants of Sicily (they were all 
Aryan), this was no significant problem: Sikels „could be made into artificial Greeks‟. 142  The 
perceptions of individual scholars cannot be reduced to a line on a graph, certain ideas 
becoming more prominent with time.  What each scholar wrote has to be seen in the very 
specific historical contexts in which they wrote, contexts which influenced but did not 
override a judicious reading of the ancient evidence.   
 
Civilising the Natives 1870-1914 
 
In Egypt the existence of a long-established native civilization precluded the 
settlement of Greek colonies; but here also the Greeks had succeeded in 
establishing commercial relations – E.H. Bunbury143 
 
Scholars writing in the age of high Empire saw Greek colonies as distinct from those of 
England due to their political independence, yet saw the colonising movement itself as 
reflecting an English spirit of colonisation.  How then did they perceive relations between 
Greeks and native peoples?  How did the contemporary perspective of writing in the age of 
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high Empire colour these accounts?  It will be argued that the ancient world was seen to 
mirror the modern in terms of the different types of societies, or civilisations, they contained, 
and that this had specific consequences for the way scholars saw colonisation.  Colonisation, 
in the British and Greek sense, was more often than not carried out in lands either 
uninhabited or inhabited by „savages‟.  It was not practicable among what were deemed to 
constitute civilisations.  Scholars were not shy to depict colonisation as a violent process, 
often as the imposition of a higher over a lesser culture, contributing to this coherent structure 
of thought regarding the nature of civilisation.  However, far from representing late Victorian 
Britain‟s certainty concerning the progress and its ascendancy over lesser races, accounts of 
colonial Greece also betray perceptions of civilisation in which the highest type, meaning the 
most free, would not necessarily always prevail.  Certain other, non-Greek cultures, though 
forgoing the most priceless gift of civilisation – political freedom – could assimilate 
civilisation‟s more material and even organisational traits, and use them to overcome its 
highest embodiment: Greece.  It will also be shown that as is consistent with these histories, 
the retrojection of contemporary colonial experiences occur due to the relative silence of the 
ancient texts.   
 
If the ancient world was used to construct the modern European self-image, then that 
self-image and the concepts related to it were projected back onto the ancient.  In certain key 
ways nineteenth century scholars understood the ancient world in very similar terms to the 
modern.   An important aspect was the concept of civilisation, constructed using ideas about 
the ancient world as well as supposed European ascendancy in the modern; it was thought to 
be applicable to both.  In the above passage Bunbury, while quite clearly demonstrating this 
tendency, does so with a direct implication for views of colonisation.  The Greeks did not 
colonise Egypt in the real sense, as there was already an established civilisation in place, yet, 
Bunbury continued, after the „jealousy of all intercourse with foreigners‟ had given way to 
Psammetichus‟ more open policy, Naucratis became an important „emporium of Greek 
commerce‟ with „traders of that nation‟ settling there is such numbers that it could be 
considered a Greek colony.
144
  This is, of course, appears a tale strikingly similar to the 
European experience in India and China, suggesting equivalence between the Oriental 
civilisations of Bunbury‟s day and those of the ancient world.  There is also the implication 
that where Greeks do settle and establish colonies, then they do so where there is no 
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established civilisation.
145
  As so often with these works, this invites a parallel between Greek 
colonisation and the British colonisation of such places as Australia and New Zealand where 
they perceived the indigenous peoples to have been savages lacking in civilisation. 
Furthermore, this serves to create a coherent structure of thought whereby each aspect 
of Britain‟s contemporary imperial and colonial experiences can find an ancient equivalent 
from which lessons can be drawn.  What this passage demonstrates is that it was never as 
simple as a straightforward banding of Greek and English colonisation and Roman and 
British imperialism; in addition to the example of Alexander‟s imperialism, there is the 
possibility of making ancient history correspond to the modern in a way which even made 
chronological sense.  Greek colonisation could relate to both English colonisation in so-called 
uninhabited lands, and earlier English and European maritime and commercial involvement 
in the midst of ancient oriental civilisations – in the modern world Britain‟s commercial 
interests eventually ended up in a colossal Indian empire, in the ancient east Greek traders 
gave way to Alexander‟s conquests and centuries of Hellenistic rule.  In other words, modern 
British intellectuals saw in antiquity a model of societal development which recurs – as it had 
in the modern world. 
For Bunbury, in writing about colonisation in the first place, therefore, certain 
assumptions were implicit: it necessarily meant writing about the incursions of a higher 
culture amidst one which did not qualify as a civilisation.  This has clear implications in 
terms of relations with such indigenous peoples.  We saw that George Grote was highly 
sceptical about the possibility of successfully incorporating native peoples into a colonial 
civilisation – the attempt would end in disaster for the coloniser as his own civilisation would 
be held back by such backward elements incapable of political freedom – critical in liberal 
conceptions of the higher forms of civilisation.  We have seen that E.A. Freeman, in spite of 
his greater concern for racial ideas (largely, but significantly not solely, linguistic) was more 
open to the possibility of assimilation: Sikels could become Greeks as both were of Aryan 
stock.  Certain peoples, however, could never be assimilated to civilised standards: heathen 
destroyers, „slaughtering and burning‟ as they went, were in the end less destructive than „the 
missionary of the highest civilization when he settles among a people by whom that 
civilization cannot be received‟.  This comments on both the unchangeable nature of certain 
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uncivilised peoples, and the consequences for such peoples when an advanced civilisation 
colonises in their midst.    
Freeman saw both American Indians and native Britons (both of whom would have 
been considered barbarian peoples) as having died out in certain areas following the coming 
of the English – but the British population survived in Cornwall and other parts of the British 
isles, and as with the Hellenised Sikels of Sicily, the descendants of the ancient Britons of 
Cornwall and the English of Kent could see English history as a „common possession‟ – but 
no native American had written a history of America in English.
146
  The idea that certain 
peoples, on the grounds of an Aryan racial provenance, are capable of being successfully 
assimilated whereas others – non-Aryans – are not, is very much a reflection of the late-
Victorian historical context in which Freeman was writing.  It is also striking that Freeman is 
quite candid as to the consequences for savage races when a civilised race colonises – they 
die out. This is not the act of denial implicit in descriptions of settling in „uninhabited‟ lands, 
and Freeman‟s openness may well reflect his highly uncharitable views regarding peoples 
deemed lower than the Aryan and even the Semitic race.   
How did the natives of western Greece fit into Freeman‟s hierarchy of civilisation?  We 
have seen that he held the Sikels to be Aryan – „an undeveloped Latin‟.147  As such they were 
of a lower level of civilisation to the Greeks, yet assimilable.  Indeed, contact and strife with 
barbarian peoples was the defining feature of western Greece.  Elsewhere, Freeman wrote, 
Greek colonies found barbarian neighbours either so much stronger or so much weaker – 
„over native tribes of inferior civilization and slight material power the Greek colony could 
easily establish its supremacy‟.148  The distinction is made between material power and 
civilization, and one may infer that in those situations where the Greeks were weaker than 
barbarians it was because of their lack of material power rather than inferior civilisation.  
This would, however, be misleading.  Civilisation itself could be subdivided into that which 
was material and that which was not: 
 
Indeed we never doubted that many of the Eastern nations were, in material 
prosperity, even in material civilization, far ahead of the men of early Hellas.  
Only we doubted, and we still doubt, whether all the wealth and splendour, even 
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all the art, of a lord of slaves can be put alongside of the higher powers of the 
mind of man, the powers which were wielded when a free assembly bowed 
willingly to the magic speech of Periklês or Hermokratês.
149
 
 
As we have seen with previous treatments of Greek civilisation, this distinction between 
material civilisation (frequently conceived as civilisation in mass)  and the more values-based 
aspects of civilisation (expressed as political and intellectual freedom) allowed scholars to 
maintain a privileged place for Greeks even when they were on the losing side of history. 
 Another, more empathetic way of looking at this way of thinking is that it is possible 
to write a history of a civilisation which embodied all one‟s own society most valued without 
it descending into a meaningless and uninstructive eulogy.  By drawing a distinction between 
firstly the more intangible qualities of high civilisation (namely political freedom and an open 
society), then the slightly more tangible aspects of a more sophisticated civilisation (political 
and military organisation), and finally the most tangible qualities of material wealth and the 
raw power of mass, it is possible to explain why those who attain the highest levels of 
civilisation do not always win, and that progress is not inevitable. 
 Freeman‟s History of Sicily is far from being a tale of Greeks arriving, conquering, 
and effortlessly dominating other peoples.  The barbarians the Greeks encountered in Italy 
and Sicily were far more „on their own level‟ than those Greeks encountered in Gaul, Libya, 
and even the great kingdoms of Asia.
 150
 In Italy and Sicily the Greeks were confronted by 
„barbarian commonwealths [native Italians and Phoenicians respectively] whose physical 
strength, greater than that of the Greeks, was guided by a political and military skill 
approaching to that of the Greeks themselves.‟151  Freeman identified what he thought a 
„deeply instructive‟ „doctrine‟ in the very different relations between Greeks in Italy and 
those in Sicily.  Whereas those who settled in Sicily were able to overcome and hellenise an 
„Aryan‟ population caught in an undeveloped stage but then had to fight advanced Asiatic 
colonisers, those who made their homes in southern Italy had to contend with an Aryan 
people who had progressed too far along their own path to be either conquered or assimilated.  
Italian peoples were open to a degree of Greek influence, yet received it as „something 
foreign‟, and could not be Hellenised.  The „ruder branches‟ of the Italian peoples, such as the 
Lucanians, in fact sought to act „as destroying enemies‟, to „root out‟, to annihilate Greek 
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presences – in much the same way as did the Carthaginians.  The lot of Italian Greeks was to 
live in a perpetual if intermittent state of conflict, some being destroyed and enslaved, others 
prospering.
152
  Freeman nevertheless did like to believe that however „utterly unthought of‟ it 
may have been to people at the time, there was still a distinction to be drawn between 
„kindred‟ Italians and „alien barbarian‟ Carthaginians.153 
 Freeman‟s depiction of relations between Greeks and natives is at once an affirmation 
of the colonial stereotype we have in our minds when thinking of earlier scholarship and 
evidence for a more complex reading of antiquity than we have hitherto allowed.  Freeman 
did indeed believe in a hierarchical conception of civilisation, with those lower down the 
ladder subject to conquest and assimilation by their betters, or alternatively receiving 
civilisation from the more advanced.  An antagonistic opposition between east and west also 
pervades his history.  This is however far too limited, oversimplified, picture, which even if 
correct in a general sense, overlooks details which are significant and without which we 
cannot understand the full meaning and significance of the work.  Freeman‟s framework of 
civilisation is guided by his (and most other scholars‟) overriding concern – political 
freedom.  If races are ranked, Aryans deemed superior to Semites, Greeks to barbarians, they 
are judged according to their aptitude for freedom.  The framework is more complex than 
this, however.  The highest civilisations may be the freest, yet Freeman allows for peoples 
ostensibly less free some of the useful corollaries of advancing civilisation in terms of 
superior political and military organisation (things which J.S. Mill appears to have regarded 
as associated with and necessarily dependent upon democratisation).  Thus civilisations that 
are less free can be militarily as adept as Greeks and even bring about their demise.  
Furthermore, given sufficient wealth, numbers, and power – general mass – even the basest, 
crudest, most autocratic civilisations can overwhelm Greeks.  To provide further 
complication, even though advances in organisational and political (as opposed to material) 
civilisation are western, European, or Aryan in origin, Asiatics can, if they live in proximity 
to Europeans, assume some of these characteristics and prove formidable foes to Greeks.   
 In short Freeman‟s colonising Greeks offer could find themselves in various 
circumstances, conquering natives or being conquered by them, even if the assumption that it 
was only Greek culture which would be spread remained.  In his candid words about the 
possible consequences for the colonised, he is similar in his outlook to Abbott, whose 
portrayal of the relations between Greek colonists and native peoples is an altogether 
                                                 
152
 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 19-21. 
153
 Freeman (1891), Vol. 1, 21-23. 
162 
 
unpleasant one.  His Greeks were not clear-cut benevolent benefactors of civilisation.  Greek 
colonisation meant „severe conflicts‟ with native peoples whose „hostility was natural‟: 
 
The natives resented the occupation of their territory; they became aware that the 
products of their country would pass into other hands, with little, or at any rate 
very little remuneration to themselves.  They must expect either to be driven off 
the ground or reduced to the position of slaves where they had been the masters.  
Nor was the conduct of the new-comers such as to inspire confidence.  Any kind 
of treachery was considered lawful in dealing with the natives.
154
  
 
This view owes something to British colonisation in the Americas and Antipodes.  The 
seizure of land, the treachery employed in doing so, is familiar, yet Abbott uses ancient 
evidence: the Locrians cheating Sicels (Polybius, 12.6).
155
  He assumes that Greeks did 
conquer, yet openly admits the morally ambiguous nature of the way they did, making his 
portrayal a curious one.  Considering the way he highlights the intermarriage between 
Thracians and Greeks – and the fact that Themistocles and Thucydides were thought to be 
products of such unions – this is still more so the case.156  These elements sit uncomfortably 
alongside his descriptions of such things as the great influence of the Greek colonists in 
spreading the alphabet and setting up centres of civilisation, of their religious tolerance yet 
the retention of a Greek identity and an „independence of feeling‟ which prevented their 
„becoming degraded by barbarous practices‟, social or religious.157    This is not an account of 
Greek colonisation distorted by self-congratulatory ideas about British colonisation, although 
it is surely in some senses informed by its concerns.  Most likely it is an honest attempt to 
engage with the literary evidence, with contemporary ideas slipping in to text where that 
evidence is unclear, and perhaps also dictating the type of questions Abbott wanted to ask – 
that he saw fit to mention the fact that the colonies had remained uncorrupted is in itself 
significant and very different to Grote‟s earlier castigation of colonial impurity.   
A similar sense of seeming inconsistency – notions of Greek superiority mixed with 
acknowledgements of intermingling with native peoples – is also visible with J.B. Bury.  
Following Freeman, who thought the true Sicily to be Greek, its greatness of a colonial 
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kind,
158
 Bury wrote that „Sicilian, like Italian history, really opens with the coming of the 
Greeks‟.159  He also saw an oppositional relationship between native peoples and Greeks.  So 
much so, in fact, that „...colonisation tended to promote a feeling of unity among the Greek 
peoples‟.  There was a sense of kinship between Greeks of the kind which occurs in colonial 
contexts: „by the wide diffusion of their race on the fringe of barbarous lands, it brought 
home to them more fully the contrast between Greek and barbarian, and, by consequence, the 
community of the Greeks...‟.160  This might easily have been said at the time of the sense of 
community felt by the white man in Africa – yet, still, Bury thought that „perhaps Sicel 
natives joined in founding the western Megara‟ – Megara Hyblaia.161  Ideas derived from 
colonisation and empire colour, but to not appear to unduly distort, his image of Greek 
colonisation.  This is to say that contemporary notions lend themselves to an attempt to better 
understand the past in a way relevant and comprehensible in the present – but do not seem to 
override the framework of the ancient evidence.     
 
 All in all, views on the interactions between Greeks and natives conform to familiar 
patterns of Greek superiority, yet it is important not to oversimplify this.  Although 
nineteenth and twentieth century concepts are in evidence, they rarely appear to conflict with 
the ancient evidence.  Crucially, distinctions between various civilisations, and different 
forms of civilisation, allowed Freeman, specifically, to recognise Greek superiority even in 
defeat.  These distinctions laid the conceptual foundations for the foreboding of the interwar 
years, when the highest level of material civilisation was used to further inherently primitive 
political aims.   
 
Conclusions 
  
In broad terms, there exists a good deal of continuity between scholarship from this 
period and that of the period which preceded it.  This continuity is most apparent in the great 
frameworks identified in scholarship up to 1870.  The overarching narrative of the west 
learning from the east, before surpassing it due to an innately superior capacity for political 
freedom, remains.  The possibility of making the rise of Greece, as a civilisation, in the eighth 
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century BC equate to the rise of the modern west to an ascendant position by the eighteenth 
century AD, also remains.  The difference was that scholars writing in the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century wrote at the zenith of European power; their rise was thus 
a more distant thing.  Conceiving their civilisation to have been at a point of maturation – 
inevitably to be followed by a decline and fall – the need to learn lessons from antiquity was 
all the more urgent.  This historical conception of the world and the course of empire, 
compounded by the very real geopolitical fears of a maritime empire surrounded by territorial 
giants near the turn of the century, meant that making the most of colonisation, as a means of 
replicating the home country, was an altogether more pressing component of contemporary 
imperial debate for those of a more Liberal outlook.  In a more assuredly liberal age, this – 
the fate of empires – overtook constitutional debate as the primary reason for using and 
learning from antiquity.  In this broadly liberal age, histories of Greece had lost the 
controversial edge they once had, which is not to say that a laudatory history of Greece and 
Athens did not remain an important aspect of the liberal British self-image, as did a more 
critical one to the conservative.  In this age when colonisation was such an important part of 
imperial debate, and when liberal Britain, modern mirror of Athens, was at its height, it is 
astonishing how little scholars made the history of Greek colonisation look like that of 
Britain.  This is a testament to the fact that Freeman and colonial inferiority apart, scholars 
did not unduly distort the evidence they had – but rather used contemporary experiences to 
attempt to bring to life the mysterious and poorly documented past.  This is why Greek 
colonisation is portrayed as a specific thing in the manner suggested by the ancient texts 
(individual founder, act of settlement, reverence to the mother city), but as those are largely 
silent on its causes, Greek colonisation it is also portrayed, quite vaguely, as the product of a 
certain kind of spirit – the spirit which drove the English speaking peoples to shape the 
modern world. 
Apart from that of east and west, and those themes which streamed from this 
historical idea, the other framework highlighted in scholarship before 1870 is that of cultural 
interactions.  There again appears to be continuity, with some candid admissions regarding 
the fate of colonised peoples – a fate which does not seem discordant with that most 
commonly described in the literary evidence.  Yet, as with Grote, who bemoaned the 
corruption of the colonial Greek civilisation, certain forms of disquiet are discernible.  First 
we have Freeman‟s distinctions between various forms of civilisation, laden with the 
implication that the highest type of civilisation – that which is free – may not prevail in the 
face of those who though politically less civilised, are in material power and even material 
165 
 
civilisation preponderant.  Such was the fate of colonial Greece as depicted by Grote.  
Barbarians learned from the Greeks not only the more material elements of civilisation but 
also some of its organisational benefits, things which they used to extinguish colonial Greece.  
Freeman‟s account bears similarities, no doubt derived from Grote‟s history, and the 
implications, though perhaps clearer with Freeman, are also broadly similar: progress towards 
political freedom, and the apogee of civilisation, is far from inevitable.  Moreover, even 
„liberal‟ civilisations can sow the seeds of their own demise. 
Another inkling of disquiet is to be seen in Bury‟s balance sheet of Hellenism.  
Though he never doubted the brilliance of classical Athens, he nonetheless felt obliged to 
criticise Hellenic contempt for the barbarian – an „intolerant bigotry‟ and leading cause of 
their political decline.  He much preferred Alexander‟s diffusion of Hellenic culture among 
the peoples of the east.  This quite possibly reflects Bury‟s internationalism, and perhaps also 
a hint of the idea that the narrow nationalism of the polis and its attendant sin, internecine 
conflict, was to be the cause of a downfall: that of free Greece and modern Europe.  It would 
be fair to conclude that scholarship from this period contained a subliminal sense of 
foreboding about what the future held.  This is ironic considering Britain‟s ascendant position 
in the world, yet it is also true that those circumstances made such apprehension all the more 
appropriate.  It is also ironic that this fear for the future was most apparent at the very time 
this liberal conception of civilisation had found its clearest expression: 
 
...we doubted, and we still doubt, whether all the wealth and splendour, even all 
the art, of a lord of slaves can be put alongside of the higher powers of the mind 
of man, the powers which were wielded when a free assembly bowed willingly to 
the magic speech of Periklês or Hermokratês.
162
 
 
To conclude, scholarship from this period, a period in which colonisation was a more integral 
part of imperial debate than ever before, scholars did not model ancient colonisation on the 
modern.  It would also be misleading to assume antiquity to have been used to further the 
self-congratulation of a complacent great power: on the contrary, we can detect fears and 
foreboding which were to become realities come the age of world war.  
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Chapter 6: World War to Cold War 1914-1990 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will look to provide a context for British scholarship concerned with 
Greek colonisation, from the Great War to the Cold War, before proceeding to discuss that 
scholarship in accordance with the three themes – colonial dependence, colonisation as an act 
of state, and civilising the natives – which have constituted the framework of previous 
discussions.  As before, there will be an emphasis on contemporary political and imperial 
debate.  Where possible the discussion will centre on the involvement of prominent classical 
scholars in such issues, but will also consider the use of antiquity by other political and 
intellectual figures.  There will be a division into five thematic sub-sections each important in 
order to understand scholarly perceptions of ancient Greece in general and Greek colonisation 
specifically during this period.   The discussion will encompass the following: foreboding 
about the future of civilisation on the part of liberal intellectuals and classical scholars; 
opposition to liberal understandings of civilisation; liberal intellectuals and their attitudes 
towards the British Empire; the changing status of the settler colonies; and finally the 
diminishing importance of ancient Greece as a means of thinking about empire and 
colonisation  at a time of a growing importance as a metaphor for European political 
fragmentation and arguments for and against the creation of larger political units. 
It will be argued that for liberal classical scholars the interwar years and indeed 
beyond represented a period in which civilisation – understood in very liberal terms, and 
profoundly informed by liberal readings of antiquity – was under immediate threat.  The 
accusations of barbarism levelled towards the extreme left and right were much more than 
mere insults, and were in fact a manifestation of the sincerely held belief that such political 
creeds represented a regression and a renunciation of the Greco-Roman heritage of Western 
civilisation.  It will also be put that similar responses of the left and the extreme right to the 
problems of liberal civilisation reveal a liberal myopia, and unwillingness to think about 
economic inequality, which constituted the Achilles heel of liberalism.  This was reflected by 
an unprecedented challenge to liberal conceptions of antiquity which privileged Athens and 
classical Greece, and the rapid disappearance of political Liberalism as a force in its own 
right due to the rise of the Labour party and a shift to more conservative positions on the part 
of many, but not all, liberals.  Furthermore, liberal opposition to the open class based politics 
of the left in domestic terms was mirrored in international terms by a thorough acceptance of 
167 
 
the British Empire as the guarantor of the liberal order.  Liberal intellectuals opposed colonial 
nationalism, left wing anti-imperialism, and any attempt to curtail the sovereignty of the 
Western powers primarily because they saw such objectives as a threat to the geopolitical 
strength of the British Empire and thus the security of liberal civilisation.  Such debates 
occurred at a time when the white dominions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand were 
increasingly asserting their status as individual nations with a voice in the government of the 
Empire and in international affairs.  Though this development did not much worry liberal 
intellectuals, similar aspirations on the part of other, lesser nations, did.  Come the 1940s and 
beyond, when imperialism and colonisation were less projects under way than enterprises on 
the wane, such subjects also became less important to classical scholars.  Of greater relevance 
were debates surrounding political integration, be it in terms of international organisations to 
preserve peace, such as the League of Nations, or more closely European solutions to the 
imperative of preventing war.  In this context, classical Greece, understood as having 
succumbed due to political fragmentation and internecine conflict, became an informative 
metaphor.   
 It will be demonstrated that in spite of the continuing relevance of antiquity to 
contemporary political, imperial, and colonial debates, and in spite of the prominent positions 
held by classical scholars and classically trained intellectuals in public life, this wider context 
would leave but a marginal imprint upon the way in which British scholarship wrote about 
colonisation in this period.  Whereas political fragmentation or integration became a 
significant intellectual theme after the Great War, a theme to which Greece of the poleis was 
seen to speak presciently, colonisation and colonial issues diminished in importance.  If 
works of ancient history intended for general audiences were full of references to linking the 
fall of the poleis to European predicaments, and public intellectuals used the example of 
Greece as forewarning, colonisation was simply not discussed with any seriousness.  The 
great debates of the late Victorian era concerning a Greater Britain, an Imperial Federation, 
were long gone.  Not only were the very clear imperial and colonial debates which permeated 
British discussions of Greek colonisation absent come this period, but so is the clear 
influence of domestic politics and political liberalism.  Studies of Greek colonisation really 
do appear not to make any political point at all.  This is not to deny the persistence of certain 
ideas, for notions of Greek superiority and of unequal relations with native peoples remain – 
the difference is that these can no longer be seen to correspond to contemporary political and 
colonial debates, and are rather more of an echo of longstanding mentalities.  It is important 
to note that not all scholars were so disinterested, and that the way scholars approached Greek 
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colonisation could still be influenced by their background and contemporary concerns, as the 
example of T.J. Dunbabin demonstrates.  All in all, however, the influence of contemporary 
colonial debates is not felt on scholarship – both a reflection of decline in the importance of 
colonial politics in an age of sovereign dominions, and the changing nature of academic 
practice.   
 
A Political, Intellectual, Imperial and Colonial Context 
 
Liberal Civilisation in Danger 
 
Can Liberty Survive? – H.A.L. Fisher 
 
 In 1923, J.B. Bury wrote glowingly of Alexander‟s heterogeneous empire, contrasting 
it to Aristotle‟s narrow vision of a small, self-sufficient polis where barbarians were to be no 
more than slaves.  Alexander‟s work was to be continued in modern times: „the confederate 
idea of the solidarity and fellowship of the human race has become an active and driving 
force.  It has expressed itself as Internationalism which breaks down barriers and disowns 
country.  It has expressed itself in the League of Nations.  It is the intellectual basis of 
humanitarianism‟1  Bury‟s disavowal of nationalism, and his internationalist inclinations, 
were a feature of his thought before the war, but the war gave them this more immediate 
relevance.  Other scholars had been more optimistic than Bury, and less critical of the Greek 
poleis, in their pre-war writings, but then turned to similar internationalist sentiments.  In 
1907 the distinguished Australian born scholar of Greek, Gilbert Murray, wrote how „the 
direction in which Western civilization has moved is on the whole a good one‟. 2  This 
civilisation, and progress, had its seeds in Greece, and in Greek literature – itself an 
„embodiment of the progressive spirit, an expression of the struggle of the human soul 
towards freedom and ennoblement.‟3  Hellenism, for Murray, represented civilisation, „the 
opposite of savagery‟, yet also something which always had savagery very near it.4  The 
darker side of Greek society – for instance slavery and the subjection of women – were the 
„remnants of that primaeval slime from which Hellenism was trying to make mankind 
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clean‟.5  In other words, the bad things about Greek civilisation were not Greek at all.  
Considering the strength of the association between Greece and liberal English civilisation, 
come the Great War that fragility of that Hellenic civilisation, struggling in the midst of 
barbarism, may well have gained resonance as Britain descended into the abyss of a conflict 
often portrayed as a war for civilisation itself.
6
   
Murray, after the narrow victory, became actively committed to internationalism and 
a founding member of the League of Nations Union,
7
 a body which concerned itself with 
promoting international cooperation.  Come the 1930s, however, liberal civilisation was once 
again under threat.  H.A.L Fisher, historian, education minister, and friend of Murray,
8
 serves 
as a good illustration of the foreboding that the proponents of liberal civilisation felt in these 
years.  Murray would have concurred with the opening lines of Fisher‟s A History of Europe, 
a work which would become the standard history textbook for a generation of post-war 
schoolchildren:  „We Europeans are the children of Hellas.  Our civilization, which has its 
roots in the brilliant city life of the eastern Aegean, has never lost traces of its origin, and 
stamps us with a character by which we are distinguished from the other great civilizations of 
the human family...‟.9  That civilisation, Fisher continued, was preponderant.  To Asia 
modern knowledge owed little, to Africa (excluding Egypt) nothing.  Europe was almost 
solely responsible for the gifts of modern science.  Its science, along with its big ideas – 
„nationality and responsible government, of freedom and progress, of democracy and 
democratic education‟ – had exerted a profound influence on the rest of the world.  The 
„material fabric of modern civilized life‟ was the result of the „intellectual daring and tenacity 
of the European peoples‟.10  Yet crucially, this was not all there was to say.  Fisher‟s history 
is no complacent boast:  
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Yet this astounding supremacy in the field of scientific discovery has not always 
existed and may not always continue.  Judged by the length of years during 
which human life has existed on this planet, the intellectual ascendancy of the 
white European races is a very recent phenomenon.  Europe has not always 
been the tutor, nor Asia always the pupil.  There was a time when these relations 
were reversed, and the men of Europe (the land of the setting sun) were deeply 
influenced by the far older and more sumptuous civilizations of Babylon and 
Egypt.
11
 
 
„...and may not always continue‟: in spite of the prevalence of theories of progress, variously 
construed, this suggests the persistence of more cyclical conceptions of history in which 
progress is much less of a certainty.  It had been evident since the eighteenth century that 
Europe‟s rise was recent, and this consciousness, informed by antiquity, could all too easily 
result in the belief that this ascendancy, like those of many other civilisations, may be 
followed by maturation, decline, and a fall.  The notion that European (and liberal British) 
civilisation may not always be ascendant in the longue durée was a historical perspective of 
some pedigree – British statesmen had long feared what the future held, even when Britain 
was at its strongest, and as we have seen with dreams of a Greater Britain sought strategies to 
evade the fate of ancient empires.  The difference is that for Fisher, like many other 1930s 
intellectuals, the potential causes of this downfall were not hypothetical, some obscure future 
menace, but rather very real, and very immediate indeed. 
 The war had changed everything.  It had undermined belief in the liberal system: 
„there passed also by insensible degrees out of the average thinking of average men that 
strong belief in civil liberty and peaceful persuasion which had been a distinct feature of the 
nineteenth century.‟  Once it seemed as though parliamentary institutions would be the 
blueprint from which the future would be formed – even Russia had had to adopt the façade 
of liberal civilisation, and people assumed that political progress meant „extending the 
franchise, educating the voters, and improving the machinery of parliamentary government‟ – 
a „Liberal faith which Conservatives were compelled in varying degrees of readiness to 
accept‟.12    These certainties of the nineteenth century did not endure.  The assured political 
superiority of an aloof liberal Britain over its continental rivals, a steady progress in which 
advancements in material civilisation went hand in hand with increasing democratisation, and 
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a complacent supremacy over a stagnant East with a past but no future – were all evaporating.  
Such foreboding about the future of their civilisation caused liberal intellectuals to enunciate 
more clearly than ever its precise nature.  As they did so, they also betrayed more plainly than 
ever before the influence of antiquity on their conceptions of the present, and also explained 
more fully, more explicitly, the debt they believed the modern west to owe to classical 
civilisation.  As P.A. Brunt would write of Cicero‟s declamations of Republican liberty: „they 
were articulated so clearly and their practical implications brought out so explicitly, precisely 
because they were under challenge; men seldom feel the need to state justify their beliefs 
when those beliefs are universally shared.‟13  
Fisher‟s lost liberal vision mirrors Murray‟s Hellenic civilisation. For Fisher, the mark 
of the „civilized polity‟ was that „every citizen should be able to think as he liked, to speak as 
he liked, and to vote as he liked... Some dangers there might be in the practice of liberty, but 
they were nothing to the risk of allowing discontents to fester under a system of repression.‟14  
Murray, for his part, conceived „Hellenism‟ as depending „not upon force but upon free 
speech and persuasion‟15 flowing from a very liberal understanding of what caused and 
constituted civilised life: 
 
... the unsacerdotal and unsuperstituous background, the consequent absence of 
dogmatism and censorship, the freedom of thought and speech, the consciousness 
that our enemies have something to say for themselves and ought to be 
understood...
16
 
 
Indeed, in „Hellenism‟, a lecture delivered to the Royal Institution in 1941, but written years 
previously, he delivered a poignant account of the values of Greek civilisation – values 
Britain shared and fought for.
17
    
This centred on Greeks acknowledging no divine, absolute, or arbitrary rulers; transient 
tropaion  standing in marked contras to Assyrian reliefs and their atrocities, and the „horrible 
triumphs‟ of Rome;  freedom from  „the paralysing grasp of the supernatural‟; and liberty 
from „authoritative orthodoxy and censorship‟.  These qualities, along with a culture of 
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debate and a „readiness to hear and understand the other side‟, made the Greeks free to 
proclaim eleutheria and parresia: „the Greeks really did let people say what they believed 
without censorship or punishment‟. In this, Greece resembled Britain, and contrasted with 
certain other European states.  The Greeks, of course, had their failures – political and social.  
With added poignancy, like the nations of modern Europe, the Greeks knew that nothing but 
order and concord could save them, „but found the goal too hard to reach‟: „They failed to 
abolish war and war ruined them.‟ 18 As we shall see, this aspect of Greek history – the 
conflicting demands of sovereignty and unity, war and peace – became an increasingly 
important historical topos in the interwar and post-war years.   
The question of how representative a single author can be is a valid one, and the answer 
very difficult to determine.  On the other hand, through his association with several major 
pubic intellectuals such as Alfred Zimmern, Arnold J. Toynbee, H.A.L. Fisher, and Bertrand 
Russell – not to mention his frequent contributions as a liberal voice in The Times, and 
leading position in the League of Nations Union – it is not unreasonable to judge Murray an 
important and respected voice within a broadly liberal canon.  For this reason we should take 
note of „Hellenism‟ and how in his concluding remarks in particular we are given a rare 
glimpse of an early twentieth century liberal scholar explicitly stating what he thought of the 
relationship between ancient Greece and Britain, and what he thought that civilisation stood 
for.   More than that, he explicitly stated how he „could not help feeling, in detail after detail, 
how closely the spirit of ancient Hellenism represents the cause for which this country now 
stands as champion before the world‟: 
 
We stand for freedom, for man‟s right to use his supreme gifts of thought, speech, 
and creative art, as the spirit moves him, not because we are blind to the dangers 
involved in freedom, but because we have confidence in the general patriotism 
and social conscience of our community, and know that the human spirit withers 
if it is not free.  We stand for law, law untouched by threats and supreme over the 
arbitrary will or ambition of any ruler or political party, subservient only to the 
continual and never completed search for true justice.  We want to live and to let 
all mankind live in such a way as to be able to seek truth, to enjoy and create 
beauty, and to foster that goodwill between man and man which casts out fear, 
and is to a great extent the main secret both of political stability and of personal 
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happiness.  Above all, we have seen the moral dangers of Hubris and fanaticism 
and will not for the sake of any national pride or cherished dogma of our own 
allow the altar of pity to be overturned in our market-place. 
 
Freedom of thought and expression, law and freedom from arbitrary rule, a creative energy 
and concern for excellence, a spirit of humanity which caused Demonax to tell the Athenians 
they must remove the altar of pity should they insist on staging gladiatorial games (Lucian, 
Demonax).  These central themes, connecting ancient Greece with a liberal Britain, were 
those continuously identified over the course of the past century.   
George Grote contrasted the energy, flexibility, and self-organisation of the Greek, 
capable of the „highest walks of intellect, and the full creative agency of art‟ to the 
„submission to regal and priestly sway‟ and whims of kings which characterised the ancient 
civilisations of the East. As for his humanity, the Greek was „gentler by far in his private 
sympathies and dealings than his contemporaries on the Euphrates, the Jordan, or the Nile‟. 19  
Similarly E.A. Freeman held „the pre-eminence of Athens in literature, philosophy, and art‟ 
to be „simply the natural result of her pre-eminence in freedom and good government‟,20 and 
as did Grote he too believed that it was the Greek who demonstrated „the higher powers of 
the mind of man‟ – powers „wielded when a free assembly bowed willingly to the magic 
speech of Periklês or Hermokratês‟.21  The distinction was again made between the West, 
best embodied by Greece and Athens, and an East which knew „no government but the will 
of arbitrary rulers‟, checked by nothing but religion.22  J.B. Bury applauded the Greeks as the 
„originators of liberty of thought and discussion‟, their literature and philosophy made what 
they were by openness to the „free criticism of life‟.23  Greece is again distinguished from the 
East by virtue of the „absence of sacerdotalism‟: priests „never became powerful castes, 
tyrannizing over the community in their own interests and able to silence voices raised 
against religious beliefs‟.24   
By the 1930s and 1940s it had become clear and clearly expressed what were the 
values and ideals which made Greece what it was, and how they now made Britain and the 
liberal civilisation of the West what it was.  Freedom of thought and expression, enabled by 
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freedom from arbitrary punishment and religious power, resulted in an essentially humane 
culture alone capable of attaining the highest reaches of art, intellect, and thus civilisation.  
Only now, this civilisation was at risk, its ideals openly rejected: 
 
I think most people would agree that in so far as nations like Russia and Germany 
in various ways turned their backs on the normal Greco-Roman tradition of 
western Europe and reverted to the supposed worships of their proto-historic 
ancestors, all were in their degrees slipping away from civilisation. 
 
These states abided by principles which were the direct opposites of those upon which 
ancient Greek and modern liberal civilisations were founded.  The „will‟ of party leader took 
precedence over the rule of law, those to who „might become centres of thought in a nation‟ 
were killed, all information censored to further a „propagandist myth‟, and the lesson of the 
Great War: that men can „impose their by violence upon others‟, or „as Dr. Goebbels phrased 
it, the important thing is not who is right but who wins‟.25  Arbitrary rule, censorship and 
suppression, and the triumph of will and power over reason as an ideal not a nightmare.  
These things were not „bright, new, creative ideas‟, but a regression to the „slough‟ from 
which western civilisation – „based on its Greco-Roman predecessor‟ – was thought to have 
saved Europe forever.  The Great War nearly brought about a „real collapse of civilization‟ – 
so much so that it was possible to „glimpse down into the gulf beyond the precipice‟.  No 
doubt what lay there looked very much like the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, and Fascist 
Italy.   
Fisher‟s analysis of the nature of that threat, and what Europe stood to lose, mirrored 
Murray‟s in most of its essential features.  Like Murray, Fisher feared a future where a 
(political) religion reigned, when dogma and censorship prevailed, when freedom of thought 
and speech were eroded, and when opponents were eliminated by force rather than won over 
by persuasion. He feared, in short, the totalitarian regimes which so absurdly yet tragically 
inverted the liberal idea of progress that the final chapter of A History of Europe bore the title 
„New Dictatorships and Old Democracies‟. 
 This chapter was concluded by a question – „Can liberty survive?‟, and an outline of 
the problem.  New „scientific technique and apparatus for propaganda‟ had come into 
politics, and antiquity had „never beheld despotisms‟ as „penetrating and all-pervasive as 
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those which with the help of modern mechanism it has been so easy to set up in Russia, in 
Italy, and in Germany.‟  These regimes had (ab)used the material elements of civilisation, and 
of progress, while forgoing its political and social advances.  They used modern technology 
to further despotism, arbitrary rule, and primeval hatreds which history was supposed to have 
shown not only to be a feature of the past, but also to belong to it.  Civilisation had been 
subverted to such an extent that the despotisms of the present were even worse than those of 
antiquity.  Fisher also feared the impending consequences of such regimes, and the ill-use of 
modern technology, to Europe as a whole: aviation meant that war was more destructive than 
it had ever been, destructive enough, in fact, to make the quarrels which had been a feature of 
past centuries, should they erupt once more, fatal to European civilisation – the most 
„splendid possession of man.‟26  This interpretation of the present led to an epilogue in which 
the search for some basis of European unity and a permanent peace, the struggle to harness 
the material benefits of civilisation to advance it politically rather than destroy it, and the 
imperative of remaining economically competitive amidst the rise of the East, were seen as 
the defining concerns of the day.
27
   
To sum up, when in 1941 Alfred Zimmern wrote that Britain held the „frontier 
between civilization and barbarism‟, this was no thoughtless jibe.  The frontier was that 
„between lands living under the rule of law and lands where brute force was supreme‟.28  The 
charge of barbarism meant something very specific – Nazi Germany was barbaric because it 
was rescinding on the values, lessons, and heritage of a precisely defined liberal civilisation 
consciously descended from Greece and Rome. Were it not for the British Commonwealth, 
Zimmern wrote, „Hitler would have established his “New Order,” inaugurating a fresh Dark 
Age for Europe and perhaps for the world as a whole.‟29  Britain was committed to the rule of 
law, freedom of expression, religious and political moderation, and international peace.  The 
Third Reich was arbitrary, closed, fanatical, and militaristic.  Murray, Fisher, and Zimmern 
were remarkably consistent over what liberal civilisation stood for and the threats it faced.  
Less obvious is precisely why Europe was beset with these threats in the first place.   
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The Problem with Liberal Civilization 
 
These were of course the concerns outlined by a select group of liberal scholars who 
happen to be, for the most part,
30
 silent with regards to what part liberal civilisation and its 
failings had in bringing about those very problems they identify.   Others from both within
31
 
and without this liberal tradition would be more forthright.  E.H. Carr would rail against the 
cant of the liberal democracies, and their scholars-cum-international envoys such as Murray 
and Alfred Zimmern, who preached peace, yet failed to see how the division of the world by 
the western powers into nations who were haves, and have-nots, undermined any prospect of 
achieving one that endured.
32
  Equally, liberalism, hitherto known for its progressive stance 
in domestic politics
33
 would come to be seen as both remarkably blind and ideologically 
impotent in the face of the social inequities which plagued interwar Britain and Europe more 
widely.  Identified at the time as the „ghost of liberalism walking‟,34 and revealed in recent 
academic studies as relying on obfuscation and an increasingly bizarre paternalism to avoid 
the prospect of confronting such unpleasant realities as class inequalities in Britain and 
national inequalities within the Empire,
35
 Gilbert Murray can be identified as emblematic of 
this problem with liberalism. Revanchist powers, colonial nationalism, fascism, communism, 
and even domestic socialism, represented both the bêtes noires and the guilty conscience of 
liberal civilisation – born of its greatest failings, poised to destroy its greatest achievements.36  
We must bear in mind, however, that neither Murray nor Zimmern were simply relics of the 
Victorian era – „orthodox‟ liberals in the sense of believing that societies were like markets: 
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they would right themselves eventually and ought not to be interfered with regardless of the 
social cost.  Rather, they were liberals with a social conscience who attempted to reconcile 
their liberalism – with its emphasis on the freedom of the individual – with what they saw as 
a need for more welfare provision and solidarity, something usually associated with the state.  
In this they shared something of that „powerful tension‟ between „competing individualistic 
and collectivist instincts‟ that also troubled the ostensibly socialist H.G. Wells.37  Zimmern, 
in fact, went so far as to contest the Caernarfon parliamentary seat – then held by David 
Lloyd George – on behalf of the Labour party.  That we are not dealing with an ossified 
Victorian liberalism in these two scholars makes the fact that their ideas were nonetheless 
highly contested all the more significant.   
In 1956 Murray wrote how „we older men who were grown up or growing up before 
1914 know what a civilised society really is‟, whereas the younger generation had known its 
„remains‟ after „fifty years of strain‟.38  His friend Bertrand Russell related how it had been „a 
difficult time for those who grew up amid Victorian solidities‟, when „outbreaks of 
barbarism‟ were „making nineteenth century optimism look shallow.‟39  Victorian certainties 
were certainly being called to question, and outside the works of liberalism‟s staunchest 
defenders, this is reflected in the more diverse range of perceptions of antiquity which 
developed in the period following the Great War.   
Among these certainties to be questioned was the canonical status of democratic 
Athens as the embodiment of all that was best about western civilisation in antiquity.  In 
What Happened In History (first published in 1942), Gordon Childe, archaeologist and 
socialist, painted a much less idealised picture of Athens than that which had long 
characterised liberal scholarship – even allowing for J.B. Bury‟s reservations.  Childe saw no 
need to resort to Murray‟s solution of labelling all that was bad about Greece as either 
remnants of a darker age, or not authentically Greek.  Fifth-century Athens was the first well-
documented example of a popular government, but this was not to be exaggerated.  Women 
„had no place in public life‟, and were in fact „almost as completely secluded as women in 
Mahommedan countries today‟ – in law they were „in a worse position than their Assyrian 
and Babylonian sisters.‟  In a democracy that was „not only politically conceded but also 
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economically established‟, the Athenian citizen „secured leisure for politics and culture 
largely at the expense of their wives, of aliens who had no share in government, and of slaves 
who had no rights whatsoever‟ – and even this was supplemented by „exceptional sources‟ of 
wealth in the silver of Laurion and the tribute of Empire: thus the so-called Athenian „people‟ 
was „in a sense only an exceptionally large and diversified ruling class‟.40  Less romantic 
scholars than Murray (for whom Hellenism had an almost „spiritual‟ quality)41 had long 
identified these foundational facets of Athenian democracy.  In the eighteenth century the 
slave-owning Whig, William Young, found in a slave-owning Athenian democracy a neat 
parallel for his own situation and political beliefs.
42
  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
Roman historian Warde-Fowler, while acknowledging that by nineteenth century terms 
Athens was „not really a democracy, but a slave-holding aristocracy‟, would nonetheless 
attempt to exculpate her – it was „hard to grudge‟ Athens her slaves, essential as they were to 
the “good life” of „the free minority which has left us such an invaluable legacy to modern 
civilisation‟.43  Childe, his history replete with such terms as „class struggle‟ and 
„bourgeoisie‟,44 saw no such saving grace, and his work can be seen as one small 
manifestation of a broader and deeper questioning of liberal certainties – and their intellectual 
foundations – by newer creeds.   
That left and right tended to identify similar problems with liberal civilisation – albeit 
offering differing solutions – is well illustrated by Oswald Mosley‟s migration from the 
Labour Party to the leadership of British fascism.  While hardly representative of 1930s 
political thought, his criticism of the liberal order – the values of a „senescent civilisation‟ –  
is cutting, and in substance echoes Childe‟s socialist critique45 of a „democratic‟ Athens in 
which a minority enjoyed a political freedom founded on the servitude of the majority: 
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Real freedom means good wages, short hours, security in employment, good 
houses, opportunity for leisure and recreation with family and friends. Modern 
Science enables us to build such a civilisation. It is not built, because Democracy 
prefers talk to action. We have to choose between the freedom of a few 
professional politicians to talk and the freedom of the people to live. In 
choosing the latter, Fascism makes freedom possible and releases the people 
from the economic slavery riveted upon them by the Democracy of talk.
46
 
 
The claim that fascism seeks to use modern science to create a new „civilisation‟ is an 
illustration of the claim to modernity apparent with most European fascist movements, 
reveals more precisely why Fisher insisted (see above) that fascism uses the material 
advances of civilisation to take it back to barbarism, and demonstrates the prevalence of the 
idea of „civilisation‟ in 1930s political thought.  Most important, however, and echoing in 
some respects Ronald Syme‟s account of the fall of the Roman Republic,47 is the charge that 
political freedom is meaningless without economic security: this struck to the heart of the 
liberal beliefs embodied by Murray, and in two ways.  Firstly it questioned the fundamental 
precepts of liberalism: hard won political liberty.  Secondly, it identified liberalism‟s most 
dangerous flaw – an aversion to addressing social inequalities, partly out of distaste for class 
politics (and a self-interest that dared not speak its name), and partly out of historic liberal 
aversion to state-power which would be the necessary corollary of government-led social 
reform.
48
  In 1939 an American reviewer, considering several books addressing the rise of 
fascism, devastatingly dismissed Murray‟s Liberality and Civilization in two sentences:  
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Liberality and Civilization is a good example of the ghost of liberalism walking. 
It offers only beautiful sentiments hitched to no program of reality. Fascism will 
not be stopped by preaching the virtues of democracy, as Lerner has fully 
demonstrated. 
 
The latter, Max Lerner, had, in the reviewer‟s estimation offered a solution – the goals of 
liberalism were „permanently valid‟, but „new methods, new economics, and new political 
tactics „ were „required to win them‟ – liberals must fuse economic planning with a 
commitment to democracy.
49
 
Mercifully for liberals, such a path was open, even if it was not actually taken until 
1945.
50
  Britain was not simply faced with the stark alternatives of fascism and communism – 
but was instead fortunate enough to have a labour movement sufficiently reconciled to the 
establishment and, as Murray himself observed, not particularly indebted to Marx.
51
  Indeed, 
the middle road of Social Democracy was one Murray identified, writing to The Times of 
possible cooperation between the Liberal and Labour parties – the former would act as a 
moderating influence upon the latter.
52
  In the event, Britain turned out to be one of those 
1930s liberal democracies identified by Gregory Luebbert as having succeeded in repelling 
both fascism and social democracy by undercutting the latter with concessions and its 
absorption into the mainstream political establishment.
53
  This nonetheless serves to 
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demonstrate how liberal intellectuals such as Murray and Zimmern – but perhaps even more 
so their continental counterparts – were increasingly being challenged over the failure of their 
cherished liberal civilisation to ensure domestic stability.  They would respond in turn by 
accusing their political opponents of subverting the hard won gains of liberalism, and in 
doing so of moving away from civilisation itself.  Their brand of liberalism – well-
intentioned, ostensibly reformist, yet incapable of countenancing state-induced social reform, 
preferring instead to speak vaguely of voluntary associations in a manner reminiscent of 
today‟s liberal-conservative politics54 – led them to rely more and more on seeking to avoid 
the uncomfortable realities of class-inequality by focusing instead on the obfuscating 
language of family, community, and the harmony of traditional social roles.
55
  In this way one 
could evade the need for anything more but unbinding and symbolic reform, and this way of 
thinking was transferred onto their understanding of international politics, and informed their 
thinking on the form the League of Nations should take, and the place of the British Empire 
within it.   
 
The Place of the British Empire 
 
If European civilization as a whole is a child of the Greco-Roman tradition, it is roughly true 
that at home England is Greek, in the Empire she is Roman – Gilbert Murray 
 
The liberal myopia concerning the realities of power and social inequality extended 
beyond the realms of domestic politics and into the international sphere.  As Jeanne 
Morefield has demonstrated in her study of Gilbert Murray, Alfred Zimmern, and their 
involvement in international relations after the Great War, liberal intellectuals took a strongly 
paternalistic attitude towards colonial peoples in a manner which resembled their thinking 
about domestic politics.   Using the language of family and community they tacitly accepted 
the fact that the post-war international order they envisaged would in fact remain hierarchical 
and dominated by western imperial powers retaining control over the colonial peoples under 
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their exploitative rule, or benevolent tutelage – depending on one‟s point of view.  This was 
not particularly new.  What was new was that these men occupied influential positions at a 
time when Britain had a key part to play in formulating a new international order as 
negotiations took place over what form a future League of Nations should take.
56
  This was 
an opportunity to put liberal ideas into practice, and the type of League of Nations these men 
argued for – and got – is illustrative of the extent to which British liberalism had become not 
only reconciled to the British Empire, prone to see it as an essential guarantor of Western 
Civilisation, but also the extent to which liberalism had become acquiescent in the relations 
between different peoples upon which imperial power rested, and the manner in which such 
an understanding informed their geopolitical vision.   
There had been some discomfiture earlier in the nineteenth century, with Grote, with 
Freeman, over the nature, purpose, and consequences of Empire.  This it seems had 
diminished with Bury, who although he appeared critical of the „belief of the white races in 
their superiority to the coloured‟, was reconciled to the idea of a benign empire, like 
Alexander‟s, extending civilisation to all ethnicities.57  Indeed, the opposite vision – the 
Aristotle presented in A History of Greece – has the likeness of a Little Englander.58  Any 
unease that may have been present in the thoughts of those three liberal scholars was, it 
would seem, entirely absent in Murray‟s comments about the British Empire.   There 
occurred after the Great War a shift in the way Empire was presented.  Rather than promoting 
its militaristic glory, the emphasis came to rest on presenting it as caring and conservative – 
and this was reflected, argues Porter, in a desire to move on from a crude militarism to the 
idea of the Commonwealth.  The family metaphor was employed to make the Commonwealth 
seem a benevolent institution „anticipating‟ internationalism.  Its justification pointed to the 
hard facts of international affairs: in a world dominated by empires – good and bad – colonial 
nations would fall prey to more rapacious conquerors were they to break free from the 
„kindly British Empire‟.  It is in this context of the softening idea of Commonwealth that 
Murray‟s ideas should be positioned – an idea which, ironically enough, coincided with one 
of the most brutal periods of imperial rule: the age of Amritsar and the Black and Tans.
59
  It is 
not that Murray believed empire, per-se, to be an inherently good thing – his admiration lay 
with a humane Greece rather than a militaristic Rome.  Rather, Murray‟s thinking about 
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empire is emblematic of a twentieth century liberal acceptance of empire as a geopolitical 
necessity on the one hand, and a civilising influence for lesser races on the other.  The former 
was more usually an implicit understanding, or presented in terms of the stabilising influence 
of the Empire rather than as being in Britain‟s interests.  When Murray, therefore, engaged 
with the subject of the British Empire, he did so in a manner which acknowledged the 
drawbacks inherent in imperial rule, but which depicted it as of advantage to the ruled.  
Implied by his opposition to colonial nationalism is that empire was also necessity for its 
rulers.
60
 
He acknowledged the problematic nature of empire in this way: „the rule of one race 
over another is always a fearful problem.  When the ruling nation is a democracy the 
difficulties are greater.‟  He also articulates the often quoted but rarely attributed truism about 
British imperial thought: „if European civilization as a whole is a child of the Greco-Roman 
tradition, it is roughly true that at home England is Greek, in the Empire she is Roman‟.61  
This division of Britain and her settler colonies on the one hand, and the empire of rule on the 
other, into Greek and Roman models, could draw on considerable precedent, and served an 
useful purpose.  In so doing, the British Empire could be portrayed as upholding „Greek‟ 
freedoms in Britain and the colonies, while extending the benefits of a beneficial Roman 
imperium to the multitudes of ruled peoples.  The latter achievement was hardly as noble as 
the first, but it had merits of its own, long presented in British historiography as the 
preservation of peace and the spread of law and civilisation.  
This is not all, however, for the justification does not rest on a simple division of 
services rendered.  Rather, the very nature of the British Empire as a Greco-Roman hybrid 
offered further possibilities which neither Greece nor Rome could have presented by 
themselves: „if under a democracy the difficulties [of empire] are greater, the hopes of a 
successful issue are greater too‟.  The British Empire was no ordinary empire but, „the only 
empire known to history which has deliberately pursued the policy of training her 
dependencies to become independent‟.  Parts of the „Roman‟ Empire would one day become 
„Greek,‟ and in which case, under Britain, empire need not even be a necessary evil. This, of 
course, presupposes that there are those who enjoy democratic freedoms while ruling and 
teaching others, while at the same time there are those who are ruled, taught, and exist under 
what was in effect a despotic government.  This might be temporary, but as certain studies of 
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British imperial thought have shown, this could all too easily be very much „temporary‟ in a 
somewhat indefinite sense, and of course any decision concerning the fitness of a given 
people for self-government rested at the whim of the imperial power.
62
   
The aftermath of the Great War, the ensuing peace negotiations, and debates over a 
future League of Nations – both of which involved the presence of representatives from a 
host of new, small, nations, alongside the more established powers – serve as a good 
illustration of the British outlook and the British self-image.  Men like Murray and Fisher 
who became involved in such international negotiations discovered to their dismay that this 
necessarily involved dealing with foreigners.
63
  Writing to South African leader Jan Smuts 
about the League of Nations Assembly, Murray lamented the presence of „a rather large 
proportion of small dark Latin nations‟.  Similarly, Fisher, writing to Murray, mentioned how 
the „Latin races love grandiloquent platitude‟.64  For the Spanish diplomat, Salvador de 
Madariaga, the problem such liberals now faced was this: international gatherings such as 
those of the League of Nations were no longer characterised by deference to wise and 
disinterested British advice, but were rather: 
 
... a tumultuous agora of nations obtaining an equality of status far ahead of any 
claims to natural or cultural equality.  Was it for this that the lofty, disinterested 
British civic monks had striven so loyally for years?
65
 
 
Here the Spanish diplomat strikes to the heart of the matter – various and variously oppressed 
nations, each with their respective axes to grind, were claiming an equality of status before 
they merited it. It was, of course, only benevolent and supposedly and disinterested Britons 
such as Murray, Zimmern, and Fisher – „civic monks‟ – who could make a judgement as to 
who was ready for that equality of status.  This also points to a certain problem, a potential 
divergence between liberal rhetoric and reality: it may be that men such as Murray would 
have been more than willing to treat on equal terms with formerly colonial peoples who had 
made the grade, but the trouble is that it seems such a judgement rested solely with the 
disinterested British.  A people, needless to say, who looked far more disinterested to 
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themselves that to others, and who were able to claim to be disinterested precisely because 
the existing system was their system.
66
  
What, then, happened when the day came, and colonial peoples demanded their self-
government, instead of it being proffered upon them by a Britain which had judged them to 
be ready?  To understand the response of liberals of Murray‟s generation to this problem, we 
can turn to Arnold J. Toynbee,
67
  a man who knew him well.  In a passage which deserves to 
be quoted at length, Toynbee effectively captures not only Murray‟s outlook, but a wider 
liberal predicament:  
 
Murray never wavered in his devotion to the cause of the weak and the oppressed, 
whether these were men or women, Boers or Bantu, human beings birds, or 
beasts.  But he did begin to jib – and this more and more decidedly towards the 
end of his life – at the spectacle of certain under-dogs, who would once have been 
a liberal‟s protégés, now championing their own cause, sometimes rather 
aggressively, and turning against top-dog and all his work and values, sometimes 
without showing much discrimination.  Of course, Murray‟s own Irish ancestors 
had reacted like this.  They had not been willing to leave their destiny to be 
decided by English liberals.  But this ancestral reaction did not always win 
Murray‟s sympathy when he encountered it in contemporary Asians and Africans.  
His growing anxiety to see modern liberalism save itself from meeting Hellenic 
liberalism‟s fate led him, in his latest years, to take a line on more than one 
controversial issue that distressed some liberals, gratified some conservatives, and 
perhaps surprised both.  The explanation of this is to be found in his increasing 
concern to see the spark of civilization saved from extinction.
68
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There are some key things to note here.  First is the benevolent attitude towards downtrodden 
groups on the part of liberals who wished to see themselves as reformers – reforming, that is, 
on behalf of the disadvantaged.  Second is the liberal-British self-image as disinterested 
arbiter in the affairs of others.  Third is the distaste at the presumption, at times grotesque, of 
underprivileged groups (most notably Asians and Africans) insistent on „championing their 
own cause‟.  Fourth, and perhaps most important, is the dismay at the manner, and the 
consequences, of such action. At the manner because of its anti-western spirit, and rejection 
of western civilisation and its (presumably liberal) values. At the consequences because of 
what a post-colonial future would mean: formerly colonial nations who had shown 
themselves as yet incapable of appreciating western liberal secular democratic freedoms 
taking their place as equals at the United Nations, their demographic and material resources 
no longer at the disposal of Great Britain, and thus civilisation, but instead threatening to 
further the interests of the Soviet Union, and thus a barbarism ever present in spite of the 
defeat of the Third Reich.
69
 
In this way, the aspirations of colonial peoples were an ideological threat to liberal 
civilisation because they either renounced it in fact by active opposition to its ideals, or 
renounced it in effect by forgoing further tutelage in something they understood imperfectly, 
if at all.  In turn, by threatening to undermine the integrity of the British Empire, their 
aspirations would also threaten the geopolitical basis of liberal civilisation in the world at a 
time when the threat of barbarism, Nazi and then Soviet, loomed large.  These were very 
much the sentiments behind Murray‟s article in The Sunday Times of the 16th of December 
1956, titled „The Shadow of Barbarism‟, written during the Premiership of Eden, and after it 
had become apparent that British involvement in the Suez crisis had become a diplomatic 
catastrophe, and the victorious Franco-British force obliged to withdraw.  Murray wrote that 
the practice of one nation one vote at the United Nations was absurd – more so with the 
„recent universal clamour for equality and the “anti-West” enthusiasm of nearly all Asia and 
Africa.‟  New additions to the General Assembly in the 1950s included nations which „had 
not reached the standard of government that we call “civilisation” – and yet they were in a 
majority.  The Franco-British attack was a „daring attempt to stop the “anti-West” conspiracy 
of Nasser‟s usurpation‟, thwarted by an „anti-white‟ or „anti-colonial‟ majority at the UN.  
This strange, unthinkable situation, caused him to reflect on the spirit of this new age, and it 
was not to his liking: it was no longer „permitted to say that some nations are less advanced 
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than others‟, and he seems to have longed for the „age which still dared to say that unequal 
things were unequal‟.  To proceed in the same „equalitarian‟ direction as was „now 
fashionable‟ risked making not only the British Empire but “Western” or “Christian” 
civilisation in its entirety „of less and less account‟.  Of increasingly more account were the 
enemies of civilisation, preaching communism, led by Russia.  The „great danger‟, he 
warned, was that „we may all look on and see the civilised world rebarbarised‟.70  This 
nightmare situation explains the desires of Murray, Zimmern, and indeed the British 
government to keep the League of Nations they had such a hand in designing in the 1930s as 
a toothless organisation unable to bind the western colonial powers to the wishes of lesser 
nations.
71
  Perhaps the most important thing to grasp here is not that Murray had become 
reactionary, or conservative, near the end of his life – or as Ceadel argued, that his liberalism 
did not last as long as his mental powers.
72
  Rather, Murray remained committed, and 
consistently committed to that understanding of liberalism – informed by Greece – with 
which we have become familiar during the course of this discussion.  For Murray, liberalism 
had become something which needed conserving; conservative politics simply better 
represented his liberalism. Much has been made in certain works over this „exclusionary 
potential of liberalism‟ – that liberalism necessarily excluded certain group who, in the liberal 
eye, did not adhere to liberal principles.  Perhaps such a condemnation could only have been 
written in an age which privileges inclusion above what were once considered essential and 
universal moral and political values.  
 
Britain‟s Colonies and the Turn to Europe 
 
True to the standard practice adopted in this thesis, the above has provided a 
discussion of the relationship between antiquity and liberal thought concerning domestic and 
imperial politics and how these in turn help inform a historical imagination mapping out the 
past, present, and future of liberal civilisation.  What has not yet been discussed is colonies 
and colonisation, understood purely in terms of the white Dominions, of course, and their 
place in this particular vision.  The answer, in short, is that they played a very marginal role 
in British intellectual responses broaching the great questions of the day with reference to 
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antiquity.  This does not, of course, necessarily apply to the views of the political leadership, 
more and more detached from intellectual debates and increasingly professionalised academic 
purists.  British and Dominion leaders still saw the imperial connection as critical to their 
respective national interests (the Dominions were formally sovereign since the Statute of 
Westminster of 1931) from the 1930s through to the post-war era, but the continuing 
cooperation and assent of independent Dominions could not make up for the loss of the most 
important part of the imperial edifice with the independence of India in 1947.  This, along 
with Suez marked the collapse of British world power.  The semblance of Empire remained 
in African and the Far East, individual states breaking away in what was a protracted process 
continuing well into the 1960s.  Britain‟s hopes that the Commonwealth would serve as some 
vehicle for British power proved ill-founded, and a reorientation of British foreign policy 
towards Europe saw Britain turning its back on what was to all intents and purposes a 
symbolic collection of wildly differing states.
73
  If colonisation could no longer inspire or 
provoke intellectual responses as it was no longer one of the big questions facing civilisation, 
this turn to Europe, in forcing new thinking about the respective needs for security and 
sovereignty, most certainly did.   
 
Freedom or Security? 
Modern Europe and the Decline of the Polis 
 
The demise of the Empire and Britain‟s inability to turn the post-war Commonwealth 
into anything resembling an adjunct to British power and influence, posed the question of 
how exactly Britain was to exert influence and maintain its security in a world dominated by 
two vast continental states.  Alliance with one of them was quite clearly going to be a major 
pillar of British policy for the foreseeable future, but American behaviour over Suez also 
demonstrated, quite clearly, that the British role in such an alliance would always be a junior 
one.  The importance of the United States for the economic well being and strategic security 
of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, along with the differing concerns of such widely 
dispersed and long independent nations meant that there could be no return to nineteenth 
century dreams of a Greater Britain transcending the mother-country‟s geopolitical weakness 
in the face of large territorial states.  There lay open, however, other possibilities, namely 
European integration.  This, of course, meant a political union of some form or another 
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between the fragmented states of Europe – whose very fragmentation had been a primary 
cause of half a century‟s internecine conflict.  Such integration would pose serious and 
tortuous questions of the sort which had long tormented liberal intellectuals.  In domestic 
politics it had been the dilemma as to where the correct balance lay between individual 
liberty and commitments to a wider community. In international terms it had been about the 
extent to which state sovereignty could be compromised in order to fulfil commitments to the 
community of nations and prevent conflict.  At the time the League of Nations was being 
constructed, Britain, its Empire intact, its power thought preeminent, saw little benefit in 
curtailing its sovereignty and thus altering an agreeable status-quo.  Times had now changed, 
and shorn of its Empire Britain was obliged to reflect on where it should now stand in 
relation to this enduring dilemma.   
The problem of sovereignty and the instability, leading to internecine conflict, which 
disunity could entail, was an important intellectual motif after the Great War.  War, its 
implications, and how to avoid it appears to have been a defining concern of liberal 
intellectuals from the end of the Great War, to the Second World War, and indeed beyond.  
More often than not it was associated with the debate about political fragmentation and its ill-
effects.  The classical parallel was obvious.  As Murray wrote: 
 
Strangely like the nations of modern Europe, the Greek communities knew that 
nothing but Cosmos and Homonoia [order and concord] could save them but 
found the goal too hard to reach.  They failed to abolish war and war ruined 
them.
74
 
 
Writings from the period after 1914 display a constant engagement with the dilemmas posed 
by inter-state relations and classical Greek parallels.  The sovereignty – or freedom – of 
individual European nation states could be compared to that of the Greek poleis.  That 
freedom entailed an inherent disunity which in modern as in ancient times left open the path 
to war – and eventually to the demise of the exhausted civilisation concerned.  This, in turn, 
of course, evoked the dilemma between posed by any possible solutions – ought Greece, like 
contemporary Europe was pondering, have restricted freedom of individual states – or 
sovereignty – in order to attain some greater security?  Examining a selection of works 
written by professional scholars but for general audiences reveals how ancient Greece 
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provided a prescient point of reference for British discussions of this problem.  We shall 
begin with two scholars of an older generation – Gilbert Murray (1866-1957) and William 
George de Burgh (1866-1943), before proceeding to consider the writings of a later 
generation with Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975), H.D.F. Kitto (1897-1982), V. Gordon 
Childe (1892-1957), and finally Moses Finley (1912-1986).  
  Gilbert Murray perceived the troubles of the interwar period in relation to that of the 
conflict in classical Greece, with the demise of Greek freedom in the face of Macedon most 
resonant in 1941, when Demosthenes could most profitably be compared with Churchill and 
his opposition to appeasement: 
 
The Philippics of Demosthenes, delivered in vain to a sluggish and wishfully-
thinking Assembly, remind one constantly of Mr Churchill‟s „Arms and the 
League‟ speeches which so long failed to stir the Baldwin and Chamberlain 
Governments. 
 
Philip takes on the mantle of Hitler, intimidating, shying just short of open war, whereas  the 
individual Greek state resembles those of modern Europe – congratulating itself on „being 
safe while Philip destroys its neighbour‟, never seeing „that they must unite for the common 
security, that their only chance of security is by union‟. When Demosthenes finally stirs 
Athens into action, it is too late: „there was no American arsenal then to redress the balance in 
support of democracy‟.75  The theme of unity and security is very much in evidence here, but 
Murray appears more concerned with relating the plight of Athens with that of Britain in a 
specific sense, rather than in making any broader historical or political point.  
 De Burgh, on the other hand, offers a much broader perspective.   Educated at Oxford, 
professor of philosophy at the University of Reading (but previously a lecturer in Greek and 
Latin), his most famous book was The Legacy of the Ancient World, first published in 1923.  
He was the same generation as Gilbert Murray (indeed, born in the same year), and like 
Murray would seek to explain the significance of antiquity, albeit differently, to the modern 
world.   
 
 
                                                 
75
 Gilbert Murray, „Greece and England‟ in G. Murray, Greek Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 200-
201.  Murray paraphrases Demosthenes‟ Philippics. 
191 
 
Whereas Murray‟s thinking focused on a „Hellenism‟ equated with political liberalism, De 
Burgh‟s main contention in The Legacy of the Ancient World was that the Hebrews, Greeks, 
and Romans each „bequeathed to after-ages one of the essentials in the idea of a complete 
civilization‟ – the Greeks demonstrated the value of liberty, the Romans discipline, the 
Hebrews a religious vision.  Thus „freedom, law, and the kingdom of God‟ formed the 
„threefold legacy of antiquity to the modern world‟.76  The characterisation of the debt to 
Greece as resting in a liberty allowing the intellect to „flourish‟, like the notion that polis was 
of „incalculable‟ significance for the future of civilisation, is both conventional and a constant 
from Grote to Bury and, it seems, beyond.
77
  The basis of this understanding of the 
significance of the polis is also very much in keeping with a classic liberal conception of the 
place of Greece in the history of civilisation: 
 
In distinction from Oriental kingdoms, the city-states of Greece achieved the 
union of civilized life and political liberty.  In the East, freedom of government is 
found, but only among rude tribes living in small communities.  Advance in 
culture is possible only through the formation of large aggregates of such 
communities under despotic rule, and is therefore purchased at the cost of 
liberty… Throughout antiquity, a large state meant despotism.  Till the Greeks 
appeared, progress in civilization meant the creation of a large state.  They were 
the first to solve the problem of uniting culture and freedom in a small 
community, and solved it through the city-state.  They willed to resemble one 
another and achieved a unique result, realizing in the free public life of the Polis a 
history that contrasts dramatically with the monotonous tale of despotism, caste-
privilege, and servitude recounted in the records of the East.
78
 
 
In this explanation the Greek polis is a unique progression in the course of civilisation.  It 
fuses the freedom previously associated with tribal societies with the sort of settled and 
sophisticated civilisation hitherto obtainable only under despotism and a large state.  This 
concept of Greece as the origin of a higher type of civilisation is in keeping with a century of 
British (liberal) thought.  Yet the polis suffered from a fatal weakness, for although it had 
transcended the impasse between freedom and civilisation, it could not bridge that between 
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freedom and the unity necessary for security.  Internal disunity among citizens and external 
disunity among poleis – and the failure to resolve such conflict by combining in „political 
union even in the face of a common foe‟ – „worked for the eventual dissolution of Greek 
independence‟.79  This „excess of liberty [domestic and among states] issued in bondage to 
and alien power‟, and in a comment very similar to Murray‟s outlook, De Burgh remarks how 
the Greeks „were not slow to diagnose their own disorder‟, but were „powerless to cure it‟: 
Greek history was „full of tragedy‟.80   
The very freedom behind Greek artistic genius „proved the ruin of their political 
independence‟ by fostering an „aversion from federal solidarity‟, thus making them „easy 
prey‟ to Macedon and then Rome.  Nonetheless, the „Greek spirit had its revenge‟: Alexander 
spread its culture in the East, that culture permeating Rome, and thus „moulded the thought 
and culture of the modern world‟.81  Rome itself was confronted with that problem „which 
beset ancient civilization throughout its history, of uniting civic liberty with the expansion of 
empire,‟82 and ended up as a „world-despotism‟83 realising, like Britain in India and Egypt, 
„the ideal of paternal government‟.84  Were paternal government the „last word in 
civilization‟, then the fall of the empire was „the most melancholy event in the annals of 
mankind‟, but such a government – a bureaucratic despotism – can „evoke no living 
response‟ from its people: „the spirit of man craves not comfort, but liberty, not economic 
stability or equitable administration, but the right, at the cost of infinite toil and tribulation, to 
work out its own salvation‟.  Rome could offer no „causes‟.85  Such was De Burgh‟s 
assessment of the course of ancient history, and understood as such it offers little scope for 
optimism (in parts it sounds positively cyclical).  This was not necessarily, however, how he 
conceived the present: if „throughout all antiquity a large state meant despotism‟, this was 
because the „devices employed by modern nations in order to reconcile an extended territory 
with the maintenance of political freedom, the printing-press, steam transit, communication 
by electricity, and, above all, representative government, were unknown to the ancients.‟86  
This might signal that De Burgh, for his part, had some confidence in the capacity of the 
                                                 
79
 De Burgh (1953), 106-107. 
80
 De Burgh (1953), 107. 
81
 De Burgh (1953), 4-5. 
82
 De Burgh (1953), 267. 
83
 De Burgh (1953), 312. 
84
 De Burgh (1953), 316. 
85
 De Burgh (1953), 316-17. 
86
 De Burgh (1953), 198.  De Burgh‟s explanation as to how technology made representative democracy 
possible mirrors J.S. Mill‟s thoughts in Considerations on Representative Government (1861). 
193 
 
modern world to reconcile liberty and a sufficiently large state.  His explanation as to the 
reasons why this was possible – technology and representative government – bears some 
similarities with late Victorian hopes for a Greater Britain melding Britain‟s colonies of 
settlement to the metropolis and thus transcending the frailty and transience of empires of 
rule.  De Burgh was, of course, a man of this very generation.  How, then, would a later 
generation broach this subject?  
As a promising classical scholar at Oxford Arnold J.Toynbee became a protégé of 
Gilbert Murray, and eventually his son in law.  He travelled extensively in Greece, and come 
the Great War he served as a propagandist and later analyst for the Foreign Office (compiling 
the Bryce reports on Turkish atrocities in Armenia and then German ones in Belgium).
87
  In 
the 1930s he started writing A Study of History – perhaps one of the most ambitious historical 
works ever written, and its theme of exploring the rise and fall of civilisations very much 
topical in interwar Britain with its concerns for the future of civilisation.  As with other 
civilisations, he sought to position „Hellenic Civilization‟ – by which he meant the 
civilisations of Greece and Rome as one – within a wider schema of civilisations, and as with 
those other civilisations, identify a pattern.  It is significant that he identified the chief 
problem with Hellenic civilisation as resting in its failure to create some sort of political order 
above that of the „parochial‟ sovereignty of the city-state – but even more significant, 
perhaps, that he identified this failure as being a common to most civilisations: 
 
… the challenge that worsted the Hellenic civilization is one which has been the 
common bane of most of the civilizations whose breakdowns and disintegrations 
are on record, and at the same time one which is nowhere more easy to identify 
than it is in the Hellenic case in point.  The challenge under which the Hellenic 
civilization broke down was manifestly the problem of creating some kind of 
political world order that would transcend the institution of Parochial 
Sovereignty.  And this problem, which defeated the generation that stumbled in 
the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 BC, never disappeared from the 
Hellenic society‟s agenda so long as such a thing as Hellenism survived in any 
recognizable form.
88
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Toynbee saw in the third century „constitutional experiments‟ of the Seleucid Empire, 
Aetolian and Achaean Confederacies, and the „Roman Commonwealth‟  attempts to 
„transcend the traditional sovereignty of the individual city-state‟ by creating from city-states 
either persuaded or coerced „political communities on a supra-city-state scale‟.89  In 
achieving conquests to the East, and thus increasing the „material scale‟ of the Hellenic 
world, these larger political units in fact aggravated the problem, merely continuing to wage 
the internecine warfare of the city states on a larger scale.‟90  Larger territorial units in a 
multi-polar world were not, therefore, a sufficient answer – wars would simply be bigger – 
and a „Pax Oecumenica‟ such as that imposed by Augustus represented a sort of rally on the 
part of a disintegrating civilisation, temporarily giving it life.   
 In spite of reservations, and the belief that a civilisations path could only be traced at 
a voyage‟s end, Toynbee did attempt to plot the position of Western civilisation – suggesting, 
revealingly, that as it was yet to achieved a „Pax Oecumenica‟ then it was possible to rule out 
it being at certain stages of the pattern.  His contemporaries, after all, were „acutely aware‟ 
that they had not achieved such a peace – and were no longer content to see society 
„partitioned among a number of parochial sovereign states that are apt to assert their 
sovereignty by going to war with one another.‟  In his day, the Pax Oecumenica  was seen as 
a „crying need‟ lest another catastrophe happen.  In an age of Total War, 91 resolving 
„parochialism‟ and establishing some form of world order was of the highest import to 
western civilisation as it then stood.
92
 
 Toynbee‟s A Study of History was written in a context in which Britons feared for the 
future of their civilisation.
93
  Its attempt to discern a pattern in the life of civilisations must 
owe something to the desire to identify where, along such a pattern the civilisation of the 
West then lay.  What is very striking indeed is the emphasis put on the need to overcome 
political parochialism, and the very clear equivalence drawn between that problem in 
antiquity – with a „Hellenic‟ civilisation encompassing both Greece and Rome – and the 
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predicament of Britain and Western Civilisation in the present.  In this way we can identify 
three important things: firstly, a very ambiguous attitude towards progress and the prevalence 
of the idea of a rise and fall; secondly, an enduring desire to draw lessons from classical (but 
not only classical, and not only European) antiquity; and thirdly, the significance of political 
fragmentation as a key factor in development and fall of civilisations.  This latter concern 
would prove to be a defining concern of British scholarship of antiquity, and it was almost 
certainly inspired by the predicament of Europe.  Toynbee‟s „The Dwarfing of Europe‟ is as 
clear an indication as any of the significance of this idea.
94
 
Kitto‟s polis was characterised by responsible government, public affairs with an 
„immediacy‟ incomprehensible to us, and as a form of political organisation which allowed 
the Greeks to develop their „genius‟ and become a „race of brilliant individuals and 
opportunists‟.  The alternative posed by an „intellectually barren‟ East – „irresponsible 
government‟, absorption into „the dull mass of a large empire‟ –was unacceptable; „arbitrary 
government offended the Greek in his very soul‟.95  In this way the polis performs a similar 
function to that it did with de Burgh – bridging the equally inadequate offerings of 
uncivilised tribal freedom and the despotism associated with Oriental civilisation.  The 
central point of Kitto‟s understanding of the polis, however, rests on understanding its nature 
in its own right, on its own terms, and by appreciating its „immediacy‟ and centrality to Greek 
life.  It is only by doing so that we can understand why „in spite of the promptings of 
commonsense the Greek could not being himself to sacrifice the polis, with its vivid and 
comprehensive life, to a wider but less interesting unity‟ – in other words, why the Greeks 
could not countenance the larger political unit so necessary for their own preservation.   
The Greeks is a very entertaining work, and Kitto‟s explanation of why the Greeks 
chose not to unite to save the polis is by way of a rather clever analogy.  He invites the reader 
to imagine a conversation between an ancient Greek and member of the Athenæum: 
 
The [Athenæum] member regrets the lack of political sense shown by the Greeks.  
The Greek replies, „How many clubs are there in London?‟ The member, at a 
guess, says about five hundred.  The Greek then says, „Now, if all these 
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combined, what splendid premises they could build.  They could have a club-
house as big as Hyde Park.‟  „But,‟ says the member, „that would no longer be a 
club.‟  „Precisely,‟ says the Greek, „and a polis as big as yours is no longer a 
polis.‟ 
 
Thus any attempt to „save‟ the polis by uniting in a larger body would necessarily mean the 
end of the polis.  Kitto‟s ideas can be interpreted as a rejoinder to modern attempts to „solve‟ 
the problem of the polis (and perhaps seeking to use such an understanding to solve their own 
difficulties) suggesting that such attempts were made, inspired no doubt by the position of 
post-war Britain and other European states.  They are echoed by Moses Finley, who wrote of 
such „solutions‟ that they „all have one thing in common: they all propose to rescue the polis 
by destroying it, by replacing it, in its root-sense of a community which is at the same time a 
self-governing state, by something else.‟96 
 Such scepticism about proscribing solutions to the predicament of ancient states does 
not extend to disinclination to making comparisons between those predicaments and the 
quandaries faced in the modern age.  Kitto, reflecting on the Greek reasoning for rejecting an 
unity which could perhaps have saved them, was drawn to think of modern Europe: 
 
After all, modern Europe, in spite  of its common culture, common interests, and 
ease of communication, finds it difficult to accept the idea of limiting national 
sovereignty, though this would increase the security of life without notably 
adding to its dullness; the Greek had possibly more to gain by watering down the 
polis – but how much more to lose.  It was not commonsense that made Achilles 
great, but certain other qualities.
97
 
 
The reference is most likely to the European Coal and Steel Community, proposed in 1950, 
and established with the Treaty of Paris a year later – the year The Greeks was first published.  
Britain was not a signatory.  One of the most interesting things about this passage is the 
assertion that the Greek poleis had more to lose from such a union than did modern European 
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states – and this is probably because the political life of the polis was that much more direct – 
immediate – than that of modern representative democracies.98   
One way of reading the above is that compared to the Greek polis, the representative 
democracy is already „watered down‟: a little more might do no harm.  Yet perhaps Kitto 
does see equivalence between the European – or British – nation-state and the polis.  It 
certainly wouldn‟t be the only instance in which he presents a conflict between an embattled, 
exceptionalistic, way of doing things.  His critiques of socialism – Kitto makes a scarcely 
veiled allusions to the Labour party‟s dream of a „perfectly planned and perfectly efficient 
national economy‟ which fell afoul of the Englishman‟s „strange addiction to personal 
freedom‟99 – and of other forms of egalitarian political utopianism,100  can be seen as 
illustrative of Kitto‟s resistance to overconfident new certainties, and nostalgia for better 
things which he realised were no longer possible.  Perhaps Kitto is a good illustration of how 
the ideal of ancient Greece, like a good proportion of the Liberal vote, had in the face of 
social democracy migrated to the Conservative party, or at least to more conservative 
positions – as is illustrated by the decision of Gilbert Murray, arch-liberal though he was, to 
vote Conservative for the first time in the 1950 general election.
101
   
His contempt for what might be called „utopian‟ solutions and the politics they 
sometimes require is clear.  So as to cast out any doubt as to his position on this, consider his 
assertion that while it may seem odd to us that the Athenian thought his life „something less 
than the life of a real man‟ were the walk to his political centre longer than a day, so too 
would it be for a Russian to know that „we prefer our notions of personal liberty to the 
triumphs, real or prospective, of their system.‟  That was the very choice faced by the Greeks 
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– to accept a lower quality of life by „diluting‟ and losing the polis, or to perish.  More telling 
is this: 
 
If – in the spirit of Cyrus at Croesus‟ pyre – we reflect that we too are an 
imperilled political society clinging desperately to a certain conception of life, our 
judgement on the Greeks may become a little less complacent.  Pericles‟ policy – 
that is to say, the policy which prevailed with the Athenian Assembly – was to try 
to make the best of both worlds, to enjoy to the full both polis and Empire.  We 
shall perhaps be able to condemn him with better heart when we ourselves have 
succeeded in reconciling love of liberty with survival. 
 
Suggesting a very real fear over the threat posed to „a certain conception of life‟,  this passage 
carries within it definite traces of that fear for the future of liberal civilisation which vexed 
liberal intellectuals such as Zimmern, Fisher, and Murray.  Kitto‟s idea of what the Greeks 
stood for corresponds in most of its essential features with what has been identified 
throughout this thesis as a liberal vision of Greece.
102
  Whether his liberalism was Liberal or 
Conservative, in the party-political sense, is unclear, but it is fairly clear that it, speaking 
through his Greeks, was not socialist.  In this way Kitto‟s work can be seen as illustrating 
how Greek studies had undergone a shifting of positions.  From being the intellectual 
underpinning of a liberalism at the forefront of reformist politics – and in direct political and 
intellectual opposition to Conservative politics – to being an uneasy Liberal bystander, or 
Conservative bedfellow, in the struggle to moderate or reverse the excesses of a potentially or 
actually illiberal and variously utopian politics at home and abroad.  For all its pithy 
dismissals of various types of left-wing politics, Kitto‟s work carries with it a somewhat 
fatalistic air – differing from the disbelieving immediacy which characterised 1930s liberal 
responses to the threat to their civilisation.   The „larger unit was not acceptable - a point of 
some interest to Western Europe today‟,103 he wrote of the Athenian Empire, yet elsewhere 
he writes how the polis was proving itself a failure, „no longer providing a tolerable way of 
life‟: 
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As today, in somewhat similar circumstances, Western Europe is trying to feel its 
way towards some larger political unit, so in the fourth century there were some 
who were turning away either from the polis itself or from the democratic 
principle.
104
 
 
One gets a definite sense of an order, be it liberal as opposed to socialist politics, or the 
nation-state as opposed to a more united Europe, inexorably passing away, as did the polis, 
and Athens, „clearly the most civilized society that has yet existed‟.105  Like that of the polis, 
this passing is not to be celebrated, even if it is inevitable: „Occidental man, beginning with 
the Greeks, has never been able to leave things alone. He must enquire, find out, improve, 
progress; and Progress broke the Polis.‟106 
 The appropriate counterpoint to Kitto is Vere Gordon Childe, the famous 
archaeologist of prehistory (who in fact had a classical background, holding a degree in Latin, 
Greek, and philosophy from Sydney University, and later winning a scholarship to study 
classical archaeology at Oxford).
107
 In keeping with liberal scholarship, his socialism also 
inspired a perception of Oriental states as stagnant, their lack of innovation the result of the 
„conservatism, mysticism and waste of a ruling class of priests and their bureaucracy of 
scribes in the Mesopotamian cities‟.108  His critical approach to Rome bears similarities to 
certain liberal elements, portraying it as a rapacious aristocracy under the Republic (Roman 
governors exploiting conquered territories like Oriental monarchs, accountable only to like-
minded capitalists),
109
 the worst excesses of Senatorial government curbed under Augustus 
(who provided a „reasonably efficient and honest administration‟, and above all peace), only 
for the increase in wealth that ensued to prove to be the result of  the „superficial expansion of 
civilization and the suspension of attritional warfare‟.  Come the later days of the empire 
(from circa 250AD), Rome would be an Oriental despotism.  His depiction does not quite, 
however, match Kitto‟s scathing summary and turn of phrase.110  Like Kitto, he attributes the 
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failure to adapt to social and economic change to be a critical factor in the demise of ancient 
political systems: „it [the polis] could not provide an ideology compatible with an economic 
system based inexorably on international trade on at least a Mediterranean scale.‟111  His 
interpretation, however, differs in being a socialist critique – there were „contradictions in the 
political and economic structure of the world of the Greek poleis‟ which had „fatal‟ 
outcomes. The prevalence of slavery caused unemployment and proletarianism, peasants lost 
their land by serving or losing in war, and the lack of any outlet save as mercenaries, while at 
the same time piracy was rife, thus providing more slaves, further „aggravated‟ the problem.  
These economic contradictions were complemented by the „parochialism of the City-States 
that split Greece into tiny units, each clinging to local autonomy with suicidal fanaticism‟.112   
Childe, as did De Burgh and also Kitto,
113
 did recognise the polis as having negotiated 
that impasse between primitive freedoms and despotic Oriental civilisation.  The polis 
„provided a conscious motive for self-sacrificing moral action such as a barbarian tribe did 
not need and an Oriental State could not evoke‟, inspiring „its citizens to deliberate valour, 
triumphant art, and noble generosity.‟  Yet the ideal, encapsulated in the philosophy of Plato 
and Aristotle, was but a „local patriotism‟, and as such it could not address prevailing 
economic conditions, caused Greece to have „squandered‟ its manpower, „dissipated its 
wealth‟, enslaved Greeks, diminished the labour of free men, and eventually „forfeited the 
autonomy of the poleis themselves‟.114 Considering this was a work first published in 1942, it 
is hard not to discern a scathing condemnation of the capitalist nation-states of Europe in this 
appraisal of the polis.  The decline of the Roman Empire is dealt a similar treatment.  Its 
economy died „having failed to stimulate proletarian and peasant demand by advertising and 
to make it effective by a redistribution of purchasing power‟, its middle-classes „doomed to 
proletarianism‟, restricting their families, as „only the great landlords escaped, and that by a 
reversion to Neolithic self-sufficiency‟.115  The only response to this „bankruptcy‟ was the 
revival of a „régime of Oriental centralization, often miscalled State Socialism‟ – but more 
accurately described as a „Nazional-Sozialismus‟, for the latter „employed almost identical 
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methods for the same purpose of maintaining its antiquated social system‟.116  The failings of 
the liberal capitalist order of the nation-states, and the purported fascist solutions, were writ 
large on Childe‟s impression of antiquity.   
 Another significant scholar of the post-war period was Moses Finley, who famously 
left the United Sates in 1954, having lost his job, and finding himself unable to find another, 
during McCarthy‟s „Red Scare‟.  With the help of the classical scholar Anthony Andrewes 
(author of The Greeks, 1967), he moved to Britain, where he lectured at Cambridge.
117
  
Although his works were clearly influenced by Marxism,
118
 his left-wing politics did not, it 
seems, manifest itself in the virulent condemnation of certain states as we have seen to have 
been the case with the older Childe.  This most apparent in his treatment of the polis in The 
Ancient Greeks, a popular book first published in 1963.  We have already encountered his 
sympathetic, or rather empathetic, account of its decline, questioning modern accusations that 
it was a „stupid failure to unite in a national state‟, and suggesting that the „solutions‟ offered 
up for its salvation in effect meant destroying the polis.  Rather than condemning the polis, as 
Childe seems to have done, as dying a deserved death, Finley instead chose to see the polis as 
an unique and unrepeatable episode which in its „fleeting moment‟ captured and recorded „as 
man has not often done in his history, the greatness of which the human mind and spirit are 
capable‟.119  Indeed, his treatment of classical Athens is overwhelmingly sympathetic.  His 
response to Greek laconophiles such as Plato was that „he and those who thought like him 
conveniently forgot that in Sparta they would never even have begun to think, let along been 
permitted to teach freely as they did‟.120  In spite of his experience of political persecution for 
leftwing beliefs – or rather perhaps precisely because of it – Finley wrote admiringly of 
Athens as an open society and the opposite of Sparta.  The latter was „the model of the closed 
society, admired by those who reject an open society with its factional politics, its acceptance 
of the demos as a political force, its frequent “lack of discipline”, its recognition of the 
dignity and claims of the individual‟.121  In contrast, and citing J.S. Mill, Finley mentions 
how remarkably tolerant the Athenians were of sedition in their midst.  Moreover, in spite of 
its critics, ancient and modern, Finley held the „overall record and achievement‟ of the 
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democracy and its Assembly as „creditable to the end‟, having shown itself capable of 
keeping to a „consistent line [of policy] for long periods‟.122  This sympathetic treatment of 
Athens, and reluctance to condemn the Greeks of the polis for political stupidity, did not 
mean that Finley was inclined to see the demise of the polis as anything other than inevitable.  
Phillip and Alexander demonstrated that „the political difficulties which were rooted in the 
fragmentation of Hellas were susceptible only to an imposed solution‟, be it from a leading 
Greek state such as Athens or an outsider force such as Macedon.  At no point did the Greeks, 
„even the proponents of pan-Hellenic peace and coalition‟ suggest the „political integration of 
the city-states into larger units‟.  Equally, and perhaps the clearest indication of a politically-
informed approach in The Ancient Greeks is his contention that no Greek ever suggested, 
„even hypothetically‟, how it might be possible to „overcome the poverty of natural resources 
and the low level of technology, except by moving out against Persia‟.  The connection 
between an inability to think creatively about economic affairs and a resort to violence, 
internal or external, to resolve domestic economic problems was a defining feature of the 
Greek: „whenever in Greek history economic difficulties became critical, and that meant 
agrarian crisis, they were solved either by revolutionary means or by looking abroad, whether 
by emigration to new lands, as in the long colonization period, or by one or another form of 
pressure on other Greeks.‟123  This corresponded to his view of the ancient economy as 
essentially primitive and exploitative, with the city a parasitic imposition upon the 
countryside – as more fully expounded in The Ancient Economy (1973).124  It may also be 
seen as revealing in terms of the influence of political inclinations on Finley‟s scholarship. 
Although usually seen as a Marxist émigré, Finley was not in fact a Marxist, but rather 
thought himself more „Marxisant‟125  – The Ancient Economy emphasised the importance of 
status over „class‟, of status as the determining force in ancient economies, and the primitive 
and hence pre-capitalist nature of the ancient economy – but his concern with unsustainable 
economic conditions leading to revolution or expansion must owe something to Marxist 
influences.  That is perhaps the point: Finley represents an age in which political ideas had 
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come to inform flexibly rather than dominate scholarship.  For Finley, scholarship was not, it 
seems, the continuation of politics by other means. 
 
Colonisation had by the end of the Second World War ceased to be an important 
debate to which scholars wanted to contribute.  This in turn would for the most part lead to a 
diminished influence of contemporary ideas, in deliberate terms at least, in scholarly 
discussions of colonisation; this went hand in hand with a tendency to avoid making obvious 
political statements in scholarly works.  The most important contemporary theme which 
scholars wished to engage with was now that of the relationship between political freedom, 
political fragmentation, and security.  As we have seen, this was a theme present in many 
discussions of the polis, and it was also a defining concern for those classically educated 
intellectuals prominent in public life.  Reponses to this theme, as we have seen, varied 
greatly, but there was irrespective of the specific viewpoint a common view that the polis, be 
it a repressive system or an inspiration, was ultimately unsustainable – and that for a variety 
of reasons relating directly to the author‟s particular viewpoint.   
 
British Scholarship and Greek Colonisation 1914-1990 
 
From the preceding discussion it will be clear to us that the political, imperial and 
colonial, and intellectual climates of the era following the Great War were substantially 
different to those which preceded it.  What had become by 1914 a dominant liberal 
conception of politics had faced and continued to face dangerous intellectual challenges.  A 
liberal reconciliation with empire as a bulwark against the barbarism of colonial peoples and 
extremist ideologies, and a softening of the empire‟s image at the time of some of its most 
brutal repressions, sets a markedly different context to that of the overt suspicion yet at times 
pragmatic and tacit acceptance of empire which characterised late nineteenth century 
liberalism.  Liberal responses to its demise varied, yet few of those considered in this study 
appeared to welcome the passing of an unjust system – instead they lamented the onset of 
barbarism or congratulated the culmination of a benign process of education.   
The effective independence of Britain‟s settler colonies, and reorientation of the 
Anglo-Saxon world under an American Aegis, meant that any future programme aimed at 
transcending Britain‟s growing geopolitical insignificance could not do so by recourse to 
schemes relating to colonisation and colonial integration.  Colonisation was now a nineteenth 
century anachronism of little significance in intellectual life.  Its results –  that is the colonies 
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of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – were now of more relevance as friendly and like-
minded states contributing to a shared world of Anglophone politics, military alliances, and 
intellectual life,  than as parts of any colonial programme centring on Britain.  Furthermore, 
intellectual life, as expressed through classical scholars and classically educated intellectuals, 
appears less concerned with colonial issues, instead betraying deep misgivings about the 
prospects of a Europe of nation-states divided like the Greece of the poleis, and the fate of 
such a Europe in a world rapidly reorienting itself back towards the East.   This is significant, 
because the changing context influenced what was – and was not – written, how it was 
written, and that this has a direct relevance to scholarly work about Greek colonisation.  As 
colonisation was no longer a significant part of any major political debates, or of any major 
geopolitical solutions centring on Britain as a mother country to settler colonies, studies of 
colonisation lost their political edge.  This is not to deny the persistence of certain ideas 
stemming from the legacy of British colonisation, but it does indicate the lack of a purposeful 
project of using scholarship and antiquity to further contemporary political agendas 
pertaining to colonies and colonisation.   
The following discussion will consider works relating specifically to Greek 
colonisation written from 1914 to the point, somewhere in the 1990s, when a revival in Greek 
colonisation studies began, ostensibly out of a critical reappraisal of a discipline still 
labouring under „colonial‟ ways of thinking.  It should be noted that this can be considered a 
study of „British‟ scholarship about Greek colonisation a somewhat loose sense – several of 
the key figures of the preceding and following discussion (e.g. Murray, Childe, Finley, and 
Dunbabin) were not born in Britain, even though they would to varying degrees become 
leading figures of British-based scholarship.  On this point, it is perhaps more appropriate in 
this era to speak of Anglophone scholarship written in a British cultural context.  The 
approach will be the same as with scholarship from previous eras: we will consider scholarly 
interpretations of Greek colonisation in accordance to the three key themes of colonisation as 
an act of state, colonial dependence, and relations between newcomers and natives.  The 
discussion will make use of a variety of sources – from monographs and articles focusing 
specifically on colonisation to the presentation of colonisation in more popular works. 
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Colonisation as an Act of State 
 
There appears to be a certain consensus that Greek colonisation was indeed an act of 
state.  H.D.F. Kitto wrote of how „the mother-city organized the swarm‟.126 Moses Finley 
contrasted the „new‟ colonising movement of the eighth century to that of earlier ages – if the 
latter were „haphazard and chancy, a flight rather than an orderly emigration‟, that of the 
eighth century and later „was certainly not‟.  He reasoned that „Archias‟ expedition to 
Syracuse would not have been possible unless Corinth had attained sufficient size, wealth and 
political organization to arrange it‟ – and indeed had Corinth not provided the „element of 
compulsion‟.127  Similarly, Alfred Zimmern wrote of colonisation as „a deliberate effort of 
state-craft‟ encouraged by the „healing influence of Delphi‟,128 whereas T.J. Dunbabin saw in 
the increasing segregation of Greek and native in the colonial (as opposed to pre-colonial) 
period  further „proof that colonization was not a series of accidents but a deliberate 
policy.‟129  Few would differ from Aubrey Gwynn‟s statement in 1918, that colonisation „was 
essentially a state-enterprise, organised for the public good‟ and led by a responsible oikist.130  
At first glance this picture appears conclusive – the dominant scholarly perception of Greek 
colonisation was that of a state organised affair.  The pressing questions, however, are how 
we are to account for this and to what extent this perception as due to the influence of a 
recent colonial past.  It will be demonstrated that in spite of an overwhelming consensus 
regarding the state oriented nature of Greek colonisation, the scholars concerned formed their 
views on the basis of the ancient (mainly literary) evidence available and were aided in their 
conclusions by their specific views concerning the causes of colonisation.  The influence of 
recent colonial experiences appear slight – to the extent that it is simply not possible to claim 
any broad „colonialist‟ influence on approaches to this specific aspect of Greek history. 
In order for these scholars to have stated so explicitly that Greek colonisation was an 
act of state, it follows that they must have thought of alternative conceptions, and that there 
may have been something significant in the very decision to favour so decisively a state 
oriented model.  As it happens, Gwynn, Zimmern, and Dunbabin explicitly discuss the 
alternative explanation which has gained ground in recent years: that of private initiative, and 
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its associated notions of a gradual process and lack of uniformity.  Furthermore, Gwynn and 
Zimmern do so with specific reference to modern colonisation – only their reasoning is not 
exactly what one might expect.  Zimmern wrote of the „profound and characteristic 
differences between ancient Greek and most modern forms of colonization, between ancient 
Marseilles, for instance, and the modern Greek quarter of New York.‟ That difference lay in 
their origins, for „a Greek colonizing expedition was not a private venture of individuals or 
groups of individuals, but embodied a carefully organized scheme of State-promoted 
emigration.‟  Rather having been founded  „by a few pioneers and then gradually built up by 
band after band of subsequent stragglers‟, a Greek colony was „planted once and for all, in its 
proper form and numbers, by a swarm going out, like bees, with a Queen or Head-colonist of 
their own.‟131  Therefore, in Zimmern‟s estimation, ancient Greek colonisation was an act of 
state, and in this – indeed precisely because of this – it differed from more recent colonising 
experiences.  Gwynn‟s view mirrors Zimmern‟s in both respects:  
 
To-day European expansion is a gradual process.  Men  go out, sometimes alone, 
sometimes in small groups, to make a private settlement in a new country; and in 
proportion to the steadiness with which this stream of emigration can be supplied 
from the mother-country is the success of each state in its work of colonisation… 
But Greek colonisation was conducted on different lines.  The need of expansion 
was a gradual growth, the discovery of a new home was also, probably, a gradual 
process; but the actual foundation of a colony was a single enterprise conducted 
by a single leader and shared in by a definite number of settlers… What is certain 
is that a Greek colony was never a motley gathering of adventurers, grouping 
themselves together under no definite leadership.  It was essentially a state-
enterprise, organised for the public good and placed under the leadership of a 
competent ὀίθηζηήο.132 
 
Again we see the central idea that Greek colonisation was not like modern colonisation.  The 
latter was gradual and largely the result of the efforts of private enterprise.  Greek 
colonisation was characterised by a single definable act of foundation conducted at the behest 
of a state and under leadership ratified by that state.  The not inconsiderable irony is that 
current scholarship advocates (not incorrectly, in my view) a way of seeing Greek 
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colonisation which interwar scholarship would have considered guilty of applying recent 
colonial experience onto the ancient past. 
 Interestingly, both Gwynn and Zimmern – and also Dunbabin – allowed for a 
situation more like that of the modern colonising experience – or that conceived by more 
recent scholarship – in their discussion of pre-colonial involvement in the West.  Zimmern 
wrote of the „adventurous forerunners‟ to the state organised colonising expeditions:  
 
… pioneers, part pirates, part dealers with the „shy traffickers‟ of the hinterland, 
sometimes an organized soldiery, sometimes explorers or wandering scholars just 
going out „to have a look‟, are at once the creators and the creatures of a new era 
of city economy.  The natives who watched them labouring shoreward from the 
blue distance and brought their treasures down to the beach for exchange at the 
recognized meeting-place, often dimly wondered what drove them so far abroad 
from their homes and gods. 
 
Such bands, „early trading visitors came without wives or families or gods or institutions‟ 
were „as different from the later colonizing swarm as the Hudson Bay trappers from the 
ordinary Canadian, or the early Vikings from the Normans.  They are, in fact, not immigrants 
but migrants‟.133  Gwynn saw the „commercial enterprise‟ of such groups and individuals as 
having „had its share in the origins of Greek colonisation‟ – „individual traders‟ playing a part 
in „the work of discovering new sites and of acting as guides to the emigrant community.‟134  
Dunbabin thought pre-colonial trading contacts meant that Greeks had visited many sites 
before the foundation of a colony, and the foundation of Zancle, an early colony founded by 
pirates from Cumae (Thucydides, 6.4.5) demonstrated „the line between piracy and trade was 
then, of course, not firmly drawn‟ in the eighth century.  To conform to the idea that Greek 
colonies proper were the deeds of states, he makes Thucydides‟ statement that colonists from 
Chalcis and Euboea followed and shared distribution of land to mean that Zancle was later 
„formed into a regular colony‟.135  The pre-colonial world presented distinctions to the 
colonial era in other ways too – in terms of relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples, 
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there occurred a „change from the freer intercourse of the pre-colonial period… at or very 
soon after the colonization, certainly within the eighth century.‟136   
It would seem that the crucial factor in determining this difference between current 
scholarly views regarding the private rather than statist nature of early Greek colonisation lies 
not in the distorting influence of colonial precedent on the part of earlier scholarship, but 
rather in a different approach to the later, fifth century, literary evidence.  Earlier scholarship, 
with the exception of Dunbabin, purposefully and deliberately rejected the application of 
recent colonial experiences (which they understood to be characterised as private and 
piecemeal) to the Greek because of the ancient evidence, which spoke of deliberate 
communal decisions and single acts of foundations under a single designated leader. The 
difference between more recent and earlier views on this particular subject is therefore 
largely due to scepticism about that ancient evidence and its authority over events hundreds 
of years prior.  
 
The Relevance of Causes 
 
It should also be noted that for earlier scholarship there was another reason to suppose 
Greek colonisation to have been a state organised affair.  Notwithstanding the (much later) 
ancient evidence, part of the rationale for believing colonisation to have been an act of state, 
rather than a gradual process brought about by private initiative which they themselves 
identified in the „pre-colonial‟ period, was that the latter was seen as incompatible with what 
they saw as the chief cause of colonisation:  overpopulation and the resulting desire for land – 
not trade. 
To be clear, there were exceptions to this view – in Dunbabin‟s analysis there appears 
to be a correlation between trade, state planning, and a foundation as an event on the one 
hand, and on the other, land, a more ambiguous view of state involvement, and the view of 
foundation as a process.  His depiction of Chalcidian colonisation,
137
 but much more clearly 
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that of Corinth,
138
 centres on state action in aid of trade.  Corinth in fact occupies a special (if 
somewhat farfetched) place in Dunbabin‟s account of the foundations of Greek colonies in 
general, and there is a clear emphasis on state action acting in concert with commercial 
motives.  Both Chalcidian and Corinthian colonies of Sicily appear, in general terms, to be 
founded for reasons of trade – a point of view no doubt influenced by his pioneering use of 
archaeological evidence, in this case heavily reliant on pottery.  This stands in stark contrast 
to the southern Italian colonies, which he sees as having been founded primarily for land.
139
  
This is not the only way in which these colonies are seen to differ, for while the foundation of 
Sicilian colonies appears as a „marked event‟ involving „a single body of colonists‟, southern 
Italian colonies had mixed foundation traditions and mixed populations.  Whereas it appeared 
that „colonization in Sicily was planned and directed by a few Greek states‟, many „colonial 
ventures‟ in southern Italy „just grew‟.140  Dunbabin appears to be unique in identifying some 
form of relationship between trade and state involvement in Greek colonisation: most 
scholars did not.  That Dunbabin did so may be the result of a misapplication of colonial 
ideas, the very tendency criticised by Graham.
141
 
Gwynn thought the first Greek colonies to have been „primarily communities of an 
agricultural people, only later centres of industrial or commercial activity.‟142  Zimmern 
drawing on Plato‟s remarks on colonisation,143 focused its function as relieving population 
pressures.  The eighth and seventh centuries saw „overpopulation in its acutest form‟, and 
colonists were mostly dispossessed cultivators crying for redistribution of land: „a Greek 
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colony was not primarily a trading centre…‟.144  Kitto, was certain that colonies were not 
founded for reasons of trade, but rather for land – colonisation was a safety-valve.145  R.M. 
Cook held that „the primary cause of Greek colonisation is usually and sensibly held to have 
been overpopulation‟, and „when one considers the Greek colonies of the eighth and seventh 
centuries, it is plain that those in the West were intended as economically independent states, 
as self-sufficient as any Greek city was likely to be: in other words, the purpose of this 
colonisation was simply to rid the motherland of surplus inhabitants.‟146  Finley, very much 
an advocate of the view that certain economic conditions, namely „agrarian difficulties‟ were 
at the heart of the colonising impulse, was perhaps bound to see Greek colonisation as 
primarily concerned with land.   
Colonisation,
147
 according to Finley, was a „safety-valve‟ which „took off surplus (and 
disaffected) sections of the population to new regions.‟148  Indeed, Finley‟s conviction that 
land was the chief cause of colonisation, and the way in which this conviction tied in a certain 
conception of the state of the early Greek economy, is also something reflected by an earlier 
scholar such as Gwynn.  While Finley commented on the small scale of trade in the eighth-
century Greek world, Gwynn drew attention to the agrarian nature of Greek society at this 
time to support the conclusion that Greek colonisation was, really, all about land:  „the earlier 
Greeks were, in the main, not traders but peasants, and the first Greek colonies did not owe 
their existence to reasons of commerce.‟149  This emphasis on the primitivism of early Greek 
conditions functions, for both Gwynn and Finley, to dim any enthusiasm for commercial 
explanations of early Greek colonisation.  Indeed, Gwynn was „tempted to ask whether they 
[early Greeks] were anything more than half-wild, healthy men, with an eye for beauty and 
an almost endless capacity for improving their minds‟.  Certainly, he thought, „they were not 
the men to organise a great national venture on a purely commercial basis, and for purely 
commercial ends‟.150  If for more recent scholarship this „primitive‟ depiction of early 
colonisers would seem to lend weight to more „private‟ visions of colonisation, it certainly 
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did not for scholars such as Gwynn, Zimmern, Kitto, or Finley – on the contrary there seems 
to be a direct link in their thinking between colonisation as a quest for land and colonisation 
as a state organised affair.  As Finley saw it, colonisation was the compulsory movement of 
peoples for social and economic reasons organised by ancient Greek states, and Archias‟ 
expedition to Syracuse simply would not have been possible without the wealth and political 
organisation of Corinth.
151
  Thus the reasoning was as follows: Greek colonisation was a 
response to overpopulation which afflicted early Greek communities.  Therefore those very 
communities took action and organised colonising expeditions which could be compulsory.  
In this way the connection between land as a cause and state action as the means becomes 
enshrined.   
A.J. Graham concurred with Gwynn‟s conviction that „in the main the great Greek 
colonizing movement was caused by overpopulation and desire for land.‟  Interestingly he 
believed this to be „a necessary correction of earlier ideas of colonization for trade, which 
arose largely from misapplying the analogy of modern colonization‟.    Graham also lamented 
that in spite of Gwynn‟s efforts scholars „continued to attribute commercial aims to early 
colonization‟ – for instance the idea that Corinth had clearly commercial aims in her 
colonisation of Sicily in the eighth century. For Graham, as for Finley and Gwynn, Greek 
colonies were to be self-sufficient poleis in possession of enough land to sustain 
themselves.
152
  There were nonetheless differences.  Although Graham considered land to be 
the chief motivating factor behind colonial expeditions, he did not so readily accept that also 
ought to mean that colonial expeditions were acts of states.  In what is a nuanced work 
throughout, he argued that „oversimplifications, such as that all early colonies were private, 
or that colonial enterprises were generally official, should be avoided‟.  There was literary 
evidence to support both positions, for although „the interest of ancient writers in individuals‟ 
meant that they stressed „the private nature of colonial undertakings‟, it seemed to him 
reasonable „to infer from two examples in Herodotus that both state and private enterprises 
existed throughout the historical colonizing period‟, but he despairs of drawing a „firm line in 
the early period between colonies founded on individual initiative and approved by the state 
and those established by a decision of the community‟.153   
 
                                                 
151
 Finley (1963), 37. 
152
 Graham (1999), 5.  
153
 Graham (1999), 7-8.  The examples from Herodotus Graham refers to are the foundation of Cyrene – „clearly 
described‟ as „a state act‟ – and Doreius‟ „abortive colonial expedition‟, which was „equally clearly a private 
enterprise‟. 
212 
 
To conclude, there was a general consensus among the scholars considered here that 
colonisation was an act of state. This belief was based on the later literary evidence, but also 
supported by reference to what was considered the chief cause of colonisation.  Most scholars 
appeared to have drawn a connection between overpopulation and land as a cause and an act 
of state as the consequence.  Dunbabin constituted an exception – for him it seems to have 
been precisely the commercial aims of colonisation which betrayed the hand of a state.  
Whether his emphasis on archaeological evidence with an emphasis on using pottery to infer 
commercial connections is behind this is not entirely clear.  As to whether colonial influences 
were in any way responsible for this consensus on the role of the state in colonisation, there is 
no clear evidence.  On the contrary, modern colonisation was seen as a private, piecemeal 
affair, and scholars such as Gwynn, aware of the distorting potential of modern analogies, it 
would seem, explicitly stated that Greek colonisation differed from that of the modern age 
precisely because it was an act of state.  The one possible argument which could be made is 
that in spite of the contemporary colonial experience being of a primarily private nature – 
something which to deny would mean flying in the face of evidence – scholars were 
nonetheless in some way prone to understanding historical events as the result of state 
actions, and were liable to do so in the absence of evidence to the contrary, and especially 
when there was some supporting evidence such as the later fifth century accounts of early 
colonisation.  This, however, is purely conjecture.   
 
Colonial Dependence 
 
The theme of colonial dependence is one which has drawn considerable attention in 
recent studies of earlier approaches to Greek colonisation.  Contributions by De Angelis and 
Shepherd have demonstrated in some detail how the work of T.J. Dunbabin, in particular, 
shows a marked tendency to equate the relationships between ancient Greek metropoleis and 
their colonies with those between Britain and her white settler colonies.  De Angelis drew 
attention to Dunbabin‟s depiction of the western Greeks as politically, economically, and 
artistically conservative.
154
  Their economic role was akin to that of the Dominions – 
producers of raw materials but importers of finished goods, and as a further parallel, the 
Greek colonies only came of age after Himera – as did Britain‟s colonies during the Great 
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War.
155
  Shepherd argued that the way in which the cultural dependence of colony to mother 
city that Dunbabin presented in his work served, in the absence of political dependence, to 
maintain cherished hierarchies with mainland Greece (and thus Britain) at the top.
156
  It will 
be argued that their treatment of Dunbabin‟s work in relation to the extent to which he 
portrays Greek colonies as dependent on their mother cities is largely well founded.  The 
main adjustment which ought to be made to this portrayal of Dunbabin and this aspect of his 
work is a deeper consideration of how his views were influenced by contemporary thinking 
on the part of residents of the Dominions towards their relations with Britain and the imperial 
question more generally.  Discussion of earlier scholarship relating to this theme has not been 
confined to Dunbabin, for the works of other scholars such as Aubrey Gwynn and A.G. 
Woodhead have also come under scrutiny.
157
 The following discussion will focus on the 
works of Gwynn, Dunbabin, and Graham, and focus specifically on the extent to which they 
conceived Greek colonies to have been dependent on their mother cities, and further question 
the depth of recent colonial influences in the ideas they contain.  It will be shown that 
Dunbabin is in fact somewhat of an exceptional figure in the degree to which he applies a 
conscious contemporary colonial model onto ancient colonisation, and that whatever 
misconceptions plague the works of others they are more the result of their approach to later 
literary evidence than to colonial retrojections.   
However much the scholars under consideration here would stress the differences 
between modern and ancient colonisation, they would continue to use the term „colony‟.  It is 
significant, therefore, that in 1975 Moses Finley set out the case against calling Greek 
settlements overseas „colonies‟: 
 
The so-called Greek and Phoenician colonies of the eighth, seventh and sixth 
centuries B.C., extending from the coasts of the Black Sea to Marseilles and 
Carthage, were more peaceful enterprises in some instances, less in others, but 
what is essential is that they were all, from the start, independent city-states, not 
colonies (apart from a small number of unimportant exceptions).
158
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This was a view he would repeat elsewhere, and the crucial distinction, for Finley, between a 
Greek settlement overseas and true colony was that the former was an independent political 
entity, and not, like the latter, a dependency.  Indeed, Finley remarked that it had been „well 
said that it was precisely because the colonies were independent from the start, both 
politically and economically, that on the whole they maintained close friendly relations with 
their respective mother-cities for many years – based on tradition and cult, free from the 
irritations and conflicts often aroused elsewhere by commercial disputes and rivalries.‟159  
The crucial point to take away from this comment is that Finley quite clearly believed in 
close and friendly relations between colony and mother city while at the same time directly 
rejecting the application of „colonial‟ terminology.  That the scholar who first made a big 
issue of the impropriety of such terminology and analogies could think so is as clear an 
indication as we are likely to get that perceptions of friendly relations between colony and 
mother city were not primarily reliant on any false colonial analogy.  This is not, it must be 
stressed, to deny the influence of colonial ideas on notions of colonial cultural dependence 
and inferiority as put forward by Dunbabin. 
 How, then, did other scholars conceive of the relationship between colony and mother 
city?  Was the dominant perception one of some loose notion of sentimental ties, or was there 
a tendency to see the sort of cultural dependence envisaged by Dunbabin?  If so, what was the 
influence of recent colonial experience?  There is certainly no obvious trace of either political 
or cultural dependence in Zimmern‟s brief treatment of Greek colonisation: „once planted, the 
colony became, of course, a full-fledged city, leading a new and independent life, associating 
much or little, according as it felt inclined, with its metropolis‟.160  This, one might, add, 
come from a scholar far from averse to making imperial analogies, stating that Athens could 
no more „step back‟ from her empire than most Englishmen felt they could leave India.161 
 Gwynn, discussed fairly briefly by Shepherd,
162
 wrote that „each colony felt itself 
bound by the strongest possible ties to foster its relations with the mother-state‟. Custom 
dictated that metropoleis be honoured, and „the universal respect accorded to this custom‟ 
was „only made more striking by the single flagrant exception of Corcyra‟s relations with her 
mother-state‟.163  There is no clear indication of colonial dependence, as such, in his account. 
Rather, the emphasis is on respect according to custom, which could be supported by 
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inferences derived from Thucydides and the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra.  Of 
course, it is possible that contemporary colonisation influenced his account – Shepherd refers 
to Gwynn‟s admiration for their tenacity in maintaining their traditions – in contrast to the 
„more Anglo-Saxon colonies, where progress has often been achieved at the cost of respect 
for tradition, and of much else that is beautiful.‟164  Of course, the inference here is that Greek 
colonisation was not like the modern British experience – but there is the added complexity 
that in stating the difference Gwynn was simultaneously revealing a contemporary attitude 
towards the course of British colonisation.  The relationship between the colony and mother 
city represented, for him, a tension between a „natural desire‟ on the part of colonists to 
„reproduce, as far as possible, in their new homes the familiar institutions of the mother-city,‟ 
and the „reaction of a society where the exploitation of the resources of a new country 
counted for more than the traditions of the past and of family descent.‟165  One can with ease 
say that this is an expression of a modern dilemma, pure and simple, but it might also be said 
that it is not an unreasonable remark to make of any group which had transplanted itself to a 
different cultural and economic context.  More to the point, it is unclear as to whether such 
„colonial‟ influences in his thought were at all incompatible with what his chief source of 
evidence – literary texts – told him in any case.  Not that this discounts the possibility that it 
was certain ideas about contemporary colonisation which led him to more readily accept fifth 
century accounts for earlier events in the first place.   
A closer examination of his reasoning can also shed light on precisely why he saw 
colony-mother city relations in this light.  At the heart of his thinking is that „each colony 
acquired from the first a distinctly individual character‟, and that this was because, in his 
estimation, because most early colonies were drawn from once city only, and the result of a 
single act of foundation.  In fact, the very distinctive identities of Greek colonies were 
„decisive‟ evidence in showing that the Greek settlements were not the result of haphazard 
emigration, and the closeness of colonies to their mother-cities was something which could 
not be „reconciled with the theory that the early settlements grew out of motley 
gatherings‟.166  Apart from demonstrating how interconnected were Gwynn‟s ideas about 
colony-mother city relationships, and the concept of colonisation as a single, state organised 
act of state, this further highlights the primary importance of fifth century literary evidence 
for Gwynn‟s views on earlier colonisation.   
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Critically, his main reason for believing in the strength of the colonial ties was 
„religious sentiment‟:  „any act of hostility or contempt [on the part of the colony towards the 
mother city] was looked on as an act of impiety.
167
  His evidence was Herodotus and 
Thucydides.  Thus religious reverence, attested by fifth century sources, justified the 
perception that colonies and mother cities were bound by strong ties of custom.  This in turn 
was something which could only have come about had colonies been comprised of settlers 
from a single state, and as an act of state.  Such a view lead to the conclusion the colonisation 
was a single event, and not a piecemeal emigration.  This is a fairly complex argument, all 
based on the later literary evidence, in this case concerned with fifth century debates 
concerning the relations then considered appropriate between colony and mother city.  To add 
a further dimension, Gwynn believed those colonies founded in an earlier era when religion 
was of greater account (and also when colonies were politically independent) maintained 
friendlier relations with their mother cities than those founded later for imperial purposes.
168
  
This tied in with the composition of the colonists – homogenous in early colonies, mixed in 
imperial ones – which in turn corresponded to the motivations of earlier and later colonies: 
 
The days were past when the states of Greece sent out colonists from the sheer 
necessity of finding some outlet for a growing populace.  It had rather now 
become a difficulty to find men in sufficient numbers to enable them to develop 
their resources; and, like Australia and Rhodesia in similar circumstances to-day, 
Corinth and Sparta took refuge in a vigorous campaign of advertisement.
169
 
 
The early colony was caused by overpopulation, had as its aim land, was accordingly settled 
by one state in a single act of foundation, and was due to political independence and religious 
reverence able to maintain friendly relations with the mother city.  The imperial colony of the 
fifth century was founded in order to make use of land, was consequently in need of settlers 
irrespective of origin, was politically dependent, and due to this and the lack of religious 
reverence typical with a mixed population failed to maintain as firm a friendship with its 
mother city as did the colonies of old.  Gwynn‟s conception of Greek colonisation was built 
upon an awareness that the sources available at the time meant that little was known of early 
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colonisation.  His response was to construct elaborate models based on the readings of those 
fifth century texts available to him.  He did not retroject the evidence for fifth century 
colonisation onto the archaic past, but he did accept, as perhaps he had little choice but to, the 
writings of fifth century sources about earlier events as more credible than would now be the 
case.  The influence of colonial ideas on his work in relation to the theme of colonial 
dependence are far from clear, and cannot be proved to have been behind his  tendency to 
identify strong ties of custom between colony and mother city.  If anything, as far as this 
theme is concerned Gwynn appears more interested in exploring the differences between 
ancient and modern colonisation than he is in using contemporary ideas to form his 
interpretations.
170
   
The most important work to consider the relationship between colony and mother city 
was Graham‟s.  One part of his thesis was that the „changing role of the oikist reflects the 
increasing dependence of the colony, or the increasing interference of the mother city.‟  Early 
colonies were independent, and their oikists „all-responsible, even monarchical‟; the 
dependent colonies of archaic tyrants were „closely attached to the ruler of the metropolis‟; 
while in the imperial colonies of the fifth century the oikist was „no longer even a participant 
in the new community‟.171  For Graham, therefore, political dependence increases from the 
eighth century to the fifth, but political dependence, as we have seen, was not a controversial 
topic among scholars of this period – it was taken for granted that most early colonies were 
state acts (Dunbabin and Corinth apart) from the outset politically independent of their 
mother cities, in stark contrast to modern European colonies which were politically 
dependent yet the result of private initiative. 
Nonetheless, Graham was sceptical about our ability to pronounce with any 
confidence on early colonisation due to the nature of the evidence. He though the evidence 
„so predominantly from the fifth century or later that it is impossible to give a satisfactory and 
convincing general picture of the state of relations between Greek colonies and mother cities 
in, say, the seventh century‟.172  As a consequence, he decided against taking a purely 
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chronological approach, and against simply looking at relations between colonies and mother 
cities from the eighth century to the fourth, for „this principle of arrangement would involve a 
great deal of repetition and continual discussion of the question whether later evidence or 
later analogies are applicable to the earlier periods.‟  His solution was to separate the act of 
foundation, where ideas and practices „varied much less than the subsequent relations 
between colonies and mother cities.‟ 173  The dilemma of whether, in the absence of evidence, 
one could assume fifth century relations were present in the eights or seventh, would 
nevertheless be a critical one in Graham‟s work, and his reasoning for, in the end, deciding 
that there were indeed relations between colonies and mother cities from the beginning,
174
 
requires closer scrutiny. 
Graham shows how interest in the colony-mother city relationship was evident among 
classical authors, but considers the important question to be „whether the interest in colonies 
and active relations between colonies and mother cities found in the fifth century arose at that 
time, or existed in the previous two centuries, only hidden by the lack of source material 
capable of revealing it.‟  He refers to arguments that relationships between colonies and 
mother cities „became politically effective in the sixth century‟, and were part of a trend 
towards acquiring overseas empires.  Early colonies, in this view, were entirely 
independent.
175
 Graham refers to the idea of independence (by which we should assume not 
political independence – which surely he accepted – but rather a connection) in the early 
period as an assumption, and proceeds to search for evidence of the importance of the 
relationship from the beginning.  The justification upon which he appears to base most of his 
case is that of a concern for origins and competing claims for the status of metropolis within 
mixed foundations – as expressed in fifth century sources.  If „distinctions of origin remained 
important in mixed colonies and that an attempt was sometimes made to monopolize the 
position of mother city‟, then this, in his view, made „it is reasonable to proceed to the further 
conclusion that the relations between colonies and mother cities were considered important 
from the beginning of the great colonizing movement.‟  Such an argument, he thought, 
allowed „some confidence in accepting statements about earlier times in fifth century 
sources‟, and slightly weakened the „argument from silence implicit in the view that the idea 
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of the relationship between colony and metropolis was especially effective in the fifth 
century‟.176  The problem of course, is that those very quarrels over attempts to monopolise 
the status of mother city were expressed by later, fifth century sources, when such concerns 
were paramount and a part of inter-state conflicts.  The blunt conclusion is that Graham 
preferred to trust in the literary evidence which suggested that colonies and mother cities did 
maintain an active relationship, and distrust arguments from silence – that since there was no 
evidence for the relationship in the eighth century, it did not exist.  This decision on his part 
was most likely a consequence of earlier approaches more credulous of the claims of literary 
evidence and prone to subordinate archaeological evidence: nothing more, nothing less.  
There are no apparent colonial distortions in his work, in spite of such chapter headings as 
„Corinth and the Colonial Empire‟.177  In Colony and Mother City, first published in 1964, his 
argument was that there existed relationships based on common origin and common cult 
among colonies and mother cities, and there is little to suggest any notion of colonial 
dependence, political or cultural.   
To compare the works of Gwynn (1918) and Graham (1964) with that of Dunbabin is 
to become almost immediately aware of a different approach.  Gwynn sought to avoid 
imposing modern colonial analogies, and Graham scarcely mentions modern colonisation at 
all.  Dunbabin‟s approach is altogether different in drawing an open equivalence between 
colonials, ancient and modern.  Nowhere is this clearer than in the preface to The Western 
Greeks (1948).  Here is a portrayal of „colonial life‟ as something different and „larger‟.  It‟s 
„material circumstances‟ were easier, and thus „life less intense‟; this was „no place for 
fruitful political ideas‟.  As for the people, „colonials were a pleasure-loving people, 
sportsmen and athletes, and fond of good cheer‟.  This depiction in itself could for a certain 
audience have easily have been mistaken for one of modern „colonial‟ life.  Nonetheless the 
parallel is made explicit: 
 
I have drawn much on the parallel to the relations between colonies and mother 
country provided in Australia and New Zealand.  Here political independence is 
combined with almost complete cultural dependence, on which the colonials 
pride themselves.  Difference in manner of life is due to difference of material 
circumstances, and is not enough to destroy the essential unity.  This unity is the 
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pride of most colonials; so probably in antiquity.  The economic life of the 
ancient colonies also is illuminated by modern examples.  They were, like 
Australia until a few years ago, producers of raw materials, with a few staples on 
which they grew rich, and importers of manufactured goods.  They brought most 
of their luxuries and objects of art from the mother country.  In the period under 
study here, Corinth occupied the place of supplier of the rich western market and, 
we may believe, as chief port of consignment for corn and other exports, which 
Great Britain has held with the Dominions.  When Corinth‟s economic supremacy 
was challenged, her cultural supremacy also weakened.  The first stages in the 
emergence of a specifically colonial spirit are here studied.  But it is long before 
any of the arts produced work which had not Corinthian models. 
 
This is a very telling passage, worth quoting and analysing at length.  Much of this has 
already been examined,
178
 and various points made about Dunbabin‟s very clear – and 
decidedly inappropriate – application of modern colonial ideas onto ancient Greek 
experiences.  Dunbabin, as an Australian of a generation which maintained attachments to the 
„mother country‟, and who went to an Oxford known for its discussions about the British 
Empire, came from a milieu perhaps more likely than most to identify colonial connections 
spanning ancient and modern times.
179
  Yet there is more to be drawn from the above 
passage. Firstly, in extending to even the exact economic relations
180
 between colonies and 
the mother country in the modern world, the colonial parallel is a very close one. 
Furthermore, the apparent „colonial‟ pride in being culturally dependent on the mother 
country is striking, as is, perhaps, the connection made between the decline in economic 
superiority and cultural supremacy in antiquity.   
More importantly, Dunbabin‟s attitudes are best understood as one manifestation of 
what has been referred to as a „Britannic nationalism‟, or in other words the assertion of a 
national identity stressing British origins on the part of Canadians, Australians, and New 
Zealanders in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
181
  This could take the form of 
stressing how colonials were in fact the foremost bearers of British culture, or alternatively, 
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as seems the case with Dunbabin, an affirmation of a cultural dependence could be seen as an 
important part of that British identity.  In fact, Dunbabin‟s words appear to conform exactly 
to John Darwin‟s statement that „to most Australians, the stability of their own society and its 
cultural cohesion still seemed to derive mainly from its British origins and continuing 
“British” character‟.  Ironically enough, it could be said that it was precisely because of a 
context of diminishing British power, and consequent fears of isolation on the part of a white 
Australia which had always defined itself in opposition to a „native substratum‟182 and its 
Asiatic neighbours, that stressing the British connection became paramount.  Australian 
immigration policy seems to lend credence to both the sense of isolation, geopolitical and 
racial, as well as this attachment to the British connection: the post-war Australian 
government saw immigration as crucial to the future security of the country, and under the 
slogan „populate or perish‟ sought to encourage immigration from the British mainland while 
maintaining the „White Australia‟ policy which effectively excluded all non-European 
immigration.
183
  Rather than a confident articulation of secure colonial ties, perhaps it would 
be more appropriate to see the somewhat exaggerated nature of Dunbabin‟s attachment to 
colonial connections, Greek and British, as reflecting the growing geopolitical and racial 
anxieties which characterised Australian responses to the decline in British power and 
influence.  That is, a Britain no longer able to play the role of military protector or cultural 
symbol for an isolated colony in the midst of increasingly independent Asiatic peoples.
184
  In 
this way, maintaining the idea of cultural dependence was less about keeping Britain at the 
top of the hierarchy
185
 – although that was an important part of it – and more about using the 
British connection to maintain hierarchies closer to home, with both natives and neighbouring 
Asians. 
There will be no attempt here to go into any detail about the influence of Dunbabin‟s 
colonial mindset on his work in relation to the theme of colonial dependence on the part of 
                                                 
182
 De Angelis (1998), 541.  Note that although Dunbabin‟s book was published in1948, it was based on a thesis 
submitted in 1937 – whether the thesis was as stridently „colonial‟ in its outlook is an interesting question.  
Dunbabin (1948), ix. 
183
 See Darwin (2009), 575-76.  See also J.R. Roach, „Australia‟s Immigration Problem‟, Far Eastern Survey 
Vol. 21., No. 10. (June 1952), 102-108 for Arthur Calwell‟s speech to the Australian parliament explaining the 
need to increase the population for reasons of defence, and for the White Australia policy (existent in some 
guise since the turn of the century) as having effectively „effectively barred Asians and Negroes‟.  This is one of 
several articles about Australia and immigration written in this period for journals with a Far Eastern or Pacific 
focus: it was evidently a pressing concern.   
184
 It is perhaps noteworthy, in this context, that Dunbabin‟s book, published in 1948, followed soon after Indian 
independence.  That event, along with the Suez fiasco, the two critical nails in the imperial coffin.   
185
 Shepherd (2005), 35. 
222 
 
Western Greeks – this has already been done in some depth.  The key point made is that 
Dunbabin believed colonial Greeks to have been heavily reliant on the material culture of the 
mainland, a view derived in part from his preconceptions about colonial cultural dependence, 
and in part from the tendency of earlier archaeological methods in which painted pottery was 
considered a „faithful‟ indicator „in the reconstruction of cultural and economic history‟.186  
In conclusion, we have seen how of the three scholars considered in this discussion of 
colonial dependence – Gwynn writing in 1918, Dunbabin in 1948, and Graham in 1964 – it is 
in fact only Dunbabin who quite clearly allowed contemporary colonial ideas to influence his 
interpretation of the relations between colonies and their mother cities.  It is most likely his 
very status as a „colonial‟, along with the particular political and imperial context of concern 
to an Australian of his day, which is behind this marked difference.  Gwynn and Graham 
made mention of modern colonisation, and Gwynn more frequently than Graham.  This did 
was  not a primary cause of their assuming a relationship between colony and mother city – 
and even then that relationship was not conceived in the same ways as did Dunbabin with his 
obvious portrayal of colonial cultural dependence.  Gwynn wrote more of reverence, Graham 
of contact and religious ties.  Both owed their views, more than anything, to a manner of 
reading ancient literary evidence entirely common and conventional in their day.  Dunbabin 
is an exception in the degree to which he was influenced by contemporary colonial ideas, and 
this is a consequence of his background and the misconceptions his archaeological evidence 
was prone to in such a pioneering stage.
187
 
 
Civilising the Natives 
 
 This discussion of the relationships perceived between Greeks and indigenous peoples 
encompasses works of scholarship published at times corresponding to very different stages 
of British imperial history.  Gwynn (1918) wrote at the Empire‟s very height, Dunbabin 
(1948) at a time when the Empire had lost India but still ruled over a myriad of other African 
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countries,
188
 and Finley (1963) at a time when decolonisation was well underway.  In spite of 
allowances for specific instances, such as the cooperation between the founders of Megara 
Hyblaia and the native king Hyblon, all three, nevertheless, believed Greeks to have expelled 
and subjugated native Sikels.  That this is true for Finley, decidedly more unlikely than his 
earlier counterparts to have seen colonisation on such terms as a „good thing‟, is noteworthy.  
It is a clear indication that the belief in „asymmetrical power relations‟189 was not necessarily 
the result of a colonialist mindset on the part of the author, even if it were in part derived 
from the pervasive nature and longevity of such models long after the empire and mindset 
which produced them had ceased to be of account.
190
  It is also, of course, possible that the 
idea of violent colonisation was much a product of the later literary evidence and colonial 
retrojections from classical antiquity as of more modern ones.  In this discussion it will be 
argued that notions of Greek cultural and military superiority, of violent conquest, and of the 
degree of intermingling envisioned with native peoples each vary according to the scholar in 
question, but that the main theme to remain unchanged is the second – that of violent 
conquest. 
 According to Gwynn, writing in 1918, one difference of „the most profound 
significance‟ between modern and ancient colonisation was that the Greeks, although 
religious, lacked the missionary zeal of modern Europeans.  He dismissed Ernst Curtius‟ idea 
that „the priests of Delphi organised the movement of colonisation with the intention of 
creating a wide sphere of Hellenic influence in the Mediterranean world‟ as this was „as 
contrary to the psychology of the Greek religion‟ as it was „destitute of historical evidence‟.  
The Greek „had the spirit of a trader and adventurer, but he was never an apostle‟. This lack 
of a religious motivation would be very noticeable in the relations of Greek settlers „with the 
native tribes whom they displaced‟.  Presumably what Gwynn meant was that there was no 
notion that the Greek should attempt to convert or improve the native: „no Greek‟ of the 
eighth or seventh century „left his home with the thought that he was the bearer of a higher 
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faith as well as of a higher culture.‟ 191  Two important points are made here: firstly, Greek 
colonisation involves the brutal displacement of native peoples; secondly, Greek colonisation, 
because of its lack of missionary zeal, was not prone to the same tendency to cause cultural 
frictions
192
 with the dispossessed natives, and that in spite of the Greeks possessing a „higher 
culture‟.  This shows how Gwynn was interested in using modern parallels to explore the 
differences between ancient and modern colonisation, but in doing so the questions he asked 
of the Greek experience were necessarily defined by the modern colonial inspirations of his 
approach.   
 Nevertheless, that Greeks would usually conquer and subjugate indigenous peoples is 
not an assumption Gwynn made carelessly, but instead fits into longstanding ideas about the 
various „types‟ of societies one could expect to find in the world (ancient and modern).  He 
certainly did believe the Greeks would have generally overcome and subjugated native 
peoples, but this did not always happen: of all Greek settlements overseas, it was in Naucratis 
alone that the Greek settler „came into contact with a civilisation more advanced than his 
own‟.  Under such circumstanced, it was „natural that he should be unable to establish 
himself with full security on Egyptian soil.‟193  Compare Gwynn‟s words with those of 
Edward Bunbury from 1879, which we have already encountered: 
 
In Egypt the existence of a long-established native civilization precluded the 
settlement of Greek colonies; but here also the Greeks had succeeded in 
establishing commercial relations.
194
 
 
As we have seen, Bunbury‟s account of the Greek presence in Naucratis resembled that of 
early European involvement with the sophisticated Oriental states of the East.  In this way, 
Gwynn‟s conception of the ancient Mediterranean, and therefore the relations which Greeks 
would have with its various inhabitants, mirrored the same hierarchical model Europeans saw 
in the modern world.  The specifics could vary, but one generally had savages, tribal 
societies, sophisticated yet stagnant Oriental civilisations, and nascent western peoples who 
found colonisation and displacement far easier in the more primitive and unsophisticated 
contexts than they did with Oriental civilisations.  If the Greeks at this early stage of their 
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history
195
 found the Egyptians too hard to deal with, and instead resorted to trade, it was a 
different story in the west, for „as a rule, these settlers came into contact with native tribes of 
much ruder civilisation than their own… none were equal of the Greeks‟.196 
 This is not to say that Gwynn believed colonisation to have been easy. Greek fortunes 
varied greatly.  The „arrival of a Greek colony‟ was frequently „a signal for war‟, and 
settlements most likely survived „by force of arms‟, but „sometimes owing to the friendly 
attitude of some native tribe‟.  As testament to this general environment of insecurity many 
colonies were established on commanding sites: „powerful tribes‟ posed a real danger to 
Greek colonies, and those of southern Italy were eventually overrun by the „tribes of the 
interior‟.197  This does not constitute an uncritical assumption of asymmetrical power 
relations; the impression is of a very hostile environment.  Of course, the view is that Greeks 
would overcome most of the time – as bearers of a „higher culture‟ – and it may be that the 
hostile environment Gwynn draws serves to put the Greek tendency (as he saw it) to 
subjugate the natives and force them into a condition of serfdom into appropriate perspective.  
The imposition of serfdom is something for which there was „occasionally‟ evidence, for 
example the servile class at Syracuse to whom Herodotus referred as the Κπιιύξηνη 
(Herodotus 7.150), and who may have been subjugated Sikels.
198
  The lack of much direct 
evidence did not mean that no conclusions could be drawn, for „Greek colonisation rested 
primarily on conquest, and it is very natural to suppose that relations between land-lord and 
tiller of the soil may often have coincided with the relations of master and serf‟ – Aristotle, 
after all, would have approved of such a relationship as being „to the advantage of the serf.‟199  
Gwynn is obviously open to the charge that he makes assumptions with regards to conquest 
as being the basis of Greek colonisation.  It is of course quite plausible that his knowledge of 
modern European colonisation made such an assumption more likely – but it is worth bearing 
in mind that such an assumption is compatible with the way in classical authors saw their past 
as involving violent subjugation, be it from experience, ideology, or reasons of narrative: see 
for instance, Thucydides‟ description of how native peoples were expelled at the foundation 
of Syracuse.  Of course there was ancient evidence of an alternative nature, such as the 
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cooperation between Megara Hyblaia and its Sikel neighbours, but perhaps the most apt 
summing up of this problem is that the modern colonial mindset was more prone to accepting 
the view most common among classical authors that the foundation of a colony was a violent 
affair and an evil day for native peoples.   
 During this examination of Gwynn‟s portrayal of Greek-native relations it has been 
argued that he tended to see colonisation as a brutal affair taking place within a hostile wider 
environment; that he tended to attribute Greek colonial success (however hard fought) against 
native peoples to the position of the latter on a civilisational hierarchy applicable to antiquity 
and the modern world in equal measure; and that he was inclined to see natives as more often 
than not relegated to positions of serfdom by conquering Greeks, this based on the 
assumption that colonisation necessarily meant conquest, and that assumption sustained by a 
contemporary British tendency to read colonialism into antiquity and the use of later literary 
evidence.  Before closing this discussion it is necessary to look at one further aspect: that is 
intermarriage and mixing between Greeks and natives.  It has already been said that he saw 
Greek-native relations as predominantly characterised by hostility and the subjugation of the 
latter, but inequality does not necessarily preclude intermingling – and it did not for Gwynn.   
 In spite of his view that colonisation was based on conquest, he was quite prepared to 
think of Greeks coming into contact, for instance commercial, with the Sikels of the interior.  
Such commercial contacts „must often have led the Greeks to enter into the closest relations 
of daily life with the neighbouring tribes‟, he wrote, suggesting that it was „important to 
remember how many advantages in favour of easy intercourse with the natives were granted 
to the Greek settler, though they are now for the most part denied to modern colonists...‟.  
Such close relations between Greeks and natives is not something which would be familiar to 
anyone whose main source for western Greek history had been Dunbabin and his claims of 
Greek purity.  The more significant aspect however is the reason why Greeks were better able 
to mix with natives whereas modern colonists for the most part could not.  Gwynn‟s 
explanation draws on Lord Cromer‟s Ancient and Modern Imperialism (1909), and Cromer‟s 
claim that Rome enjoyed certain advantages in carrying out its work of assimilating its 
various peoples – „there was neither religious question nor colour-question in the ancient 
world‟.  The lack of a religious question mean that there would be no „embarrassing‟ 
situations as could arise due to the actions of missionaries; Greek-native relations would not 
be strained by cultural conflict.  The lack of a „colour-question‟ meant that Greeks could 
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enter into ever closer relations with indigenous peoples, even extending to intermarriage.
200
   
The latter was not, he stressed, a controversial issue for the Greeks, for to „understand how 
freely Greeks could intermarry with the natives not separated from them by any distinction of 
colour, we have only to remember that Cimon was the son of a Thracian woman...‟.201  There 
are several important points revealed to us from this.  Firstly, Gwynn did not see all aspects 
of Greek colonisation as unchangeably and invariably based on conquest and subjugation, but 
instead regarded Greeks as more capable of entering into productive relations with native 
peoples than moderns because of the lack of religious and racial divides.  Secondly, Gwynn 
conceived Greek superiority over natives they met to have been cultural, not racial; „the 
Greeks met races which, though socially and intellectually their inferiors, were still, in feature 
and colour, of the same general type.‟  Perhaps it should be emphasised that this related to the 
natives whom they met because Gwynn points out that „even the Libyan tribes, of which we 
have been speaking were, it is well to remind ourselves, not negroes, but Berbers.‟  It is not 
explicitly said, and not clear, whether the Greeks, had they encountered „negroes‟, would 
have been considered by Gwynn their intellectual and social superiors for racial reasons.   
Subsequently Gwynn refers to the way in which „fusion with native peoples was much 
facilitated by the absence of prejudice arising from differences either of colour or of religion‟.  
This could mean that Gwynn simply thought that mutual prejudice, rather than racial 
inferiority, was the cause of frictions in modern times: in truth there is not enough evidence 
to form a conclusion on this count.  The third and final point is that Gwynn again states the 
differences between ancient and modern colonisation, but in using modern colonisation as an 
interpretive tool certain modern colonial attitudes seep into his understanding of antiquity – 
such as the idea that the success or possibility of cultural contact depends on race.   
 All in all, Gwynn‟s portrayal of Greek colonisation is a both a nuanced attempt to 
understand the Greek experience and an example of the distorting potential of modern 
colonial ideas.  Greek colonisation is described as based on conquest and the subjugation of 
native peoples – the classical ancient evidence fusing with colonial ideas.  This subjugation is 
possible because the Sikels and other natives, frequently defined as „tribes‟, are on a lower 
rung of a civilisation hierarchy than both oriental civilisations and the Greeks themselves 
(something quite puzzling considering other comments about the undeveloped social, 
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political and economic organisation of the early colonists),
202
  but this is not to say that 
Gwynn presented the Greeks as untroubled, for they had to maintain their positions by 
military means in what was a very hostile environment.   Because of a lack of racial 
difference – and in stark contrast to modern colonising experiences – relations between Greek 
and native after colonisation were not exclusively hostile; intermarriage
203
 „broke down‟ 
barriers and  „the life of Greek settlers must gradually have become merged in the life of the 
surrounding nations.‟  Nonetheless, Greeks, as the bearers of a higher culture – this certainly 
evidence of a Hellenophilia typical of Britain in his day – remained „jealous of national 
tradition‟.204 
 There are points of similarity and of difference between the accounts that Gwynn and 
Dunbabin provide concerning Greek interactions with indigenous peoples.  Dunbabin, like 
Gwynn, thought it worth mentioning how the natives of Sicily and southern Italy were of 
„similar stock to the Greeks, speaking in the most general terms.‟  Another similarity is the 
forthright assumption of Greek civilisational superiority: the Greeks, according to Dunbabin 
„were no doubt more conscious of the differences than of the likeness to themselves in these 
barbarous peoples, and took little note of their capability for civilization.‟  Other similarities 
include the tendency to see Greek colonisation as violent – if first contacts were peaceful, 
come „the era of official colonization‟, the Greeks „preferred the sword to peaceful 
penetration‟: at least half of all Greek colonies were built on sites formerly occupied by 
native towns, „and it is likely that most were‟.  Greeks „drove out Sikels or Italians by force‟ 
in „every case of which we hear‟, he wrote.205  Where he does differ from Gwynn is in his 
fairly positive rejection of mixing between Greeks and natives – there is no mention of 
intermarriage in Dunbabin‟s account: „Archaic colonial culture was purely Greek‟, and any 
Sikels „among the colonials‟ were „completely hellenized‟ and without any material trace of 
their origins.
206
 
 One of the main differences in Dunbabin‟s account is the way in which he does not 
rely solely on the various scraps of information provided by the literary evidence, for he used 
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archaeological evidence extensively in order to support his arguments concerning Greeks and 
natives.  For example, there were „no Sikel remains of colonization date‟ in the vicinity of 
Syracuse, and no Sikel remains either in terms of votive deposits or the Greek cemeteries of 
Syracuse.‟207  Although the literary evidence related the tale of Sikels assisting the foundation 
of Megara Hyblaia, Dunbabin believed it „likely that they [the Megarans] soon rid themselves 
of their Sikel benefactors, for the Sikel Hybla disappears from history‟.  The apparent 
disappearance of the native settlement could not be accounted for by cohabitation between 
Greeks and Sikels: „there is no indication that Greeks and Sikels lived side by side at 
Megara... Megara has been thoroughly excavated and neither the town nor the cemetery has 
yielded a single Siculan vase or bronze.  Any admixture of Sikel blood was so slight as not to 
affect the purely Greek culture.‟208    More broadly, Dunbabin argued that „the strongest 
argument that Sikles and other native peoples‟ were prevented from taking part in colonial 
life, „except perhaps as slaves‟, lay in the colonial cemeteries.  Of the thousands of archaic 
graves excavated in a dozen Sicilian and Italian sites, „not more than one or two of them 
contain objects which can be regarded as Sikel or Italian...Archaic colonial culture was purely 
Greek‟.209  The assumption that Dunbabin made, of course, was that people could be 
identified by their pots, and it is unfortunate that such archaeological assumptions as were 
common in his day coincided with Dunbabin‟s unmistakable colonial agenda – be it in 
stressing the purity of colonial Greece vis-à-vis the natives, as in this case, or in affirming the 
dependence of the colonials to the mother country, as we have seen previously.
210
 
 That Dunbabin was so strongly against the idea of interactions between Greeks and 
natives is an important difference between his work, published in 1948, and Gwynn‟s, 
published in 1918.  It is not impossible that the very fact that archaeological evidence was 
available to him, in conjunction with the then prevalent tendency to equate peoples with 
certain types of material evidence, bear the main responsibility for this difference.  This may 
well be part of the explanation, but it is likely that Dunbabin‟s own background, set in the 
context of contemporary Australian concerns to stress the British connection so as to 
strengthen a sense of racial exclusivity in relation to indigenous peoples and neighbouring 
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aliens, is as if not more important in determining this direction in his work.  To argue as 
Finley did, that Greek „migrants were prepared to fight, subjugate or expel natives‟,211 is no 
evidence of colonial distortion; it is a conventional interpretation of the literary evidence.  
Even Gwynn‟s version, replete with references to modern colonisation and Greek cultural 
superiority, remains in good part a varied and nuanced appraisal of Greek-indigenous 
relations based on the literary evidence – for its time.  Dunbabin‟s account, on the other hand, 
appears pre-determined at every turn to dismiss any native influence and stress Greek purity 
that it may well warrant De Angelis‟ charge that it constitutes „imperialist archaeology‟.212 
   
Conclusions 
 
In spite of the very clear influence of antiquity on contemporary political and imperial debate, 
and the prominent positions of classical scholars and classically trained intellectuals in public 
life, it will be striking how little of the contextual discussion which preceded this analysis of 
Anglophone scholarship on Greek colonisation has any impact on the way the latter was 
written.  With the exception of Dunbabin‟s very clear application of colonial ideas, and those 
from the very particular perspective of a „colonial‟, and relating to contemporary ambitions 
and concerns on the part of post-war Australia, there is little trace of the great debates of the 
period 1914-1990 on the way this scholarship was written.  There are traces, the enduring 
presence of mentalities and ideas, but none of it is explicit enough to connect with the 
changing context in which they were written.  Scholarship from the period after the Second 
World War seems more and more reluctant to make open political points, however much they 
may bear the imprint of enduring mentalities.  A work such as Graham‟s, published in the 
1960s, demonstrates an almost complete lack of contemporary allusions, and no discernible 
attempt to consciously apply any colonial ideas.  What arguments there are in favour of 
colonisation as an act of state, for the idea of close relations between colonies and mother 
cities, and for hostile relationships between Greeks and natives are more the result of 
conventional readings of the ancient texts than any colonial agenda.  This must, again, be 
qualified by stating that there were exceptions to this tendency, and certain individual 
scholars were more prone than others to apply colonial ideas in relation to certain themes.
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Section III: Conclusions 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
This thesis aimed to address the way and extent to which contemporary ideas 
influenced the way British scholars wrote about Greek colonisation.  It aimed to do so by 
examining a series of texts from the late eighteenth to later twentieth centuries in relation to 
the contemporary political, intellectual, imperial and colonial context; the three interpretive 
themes derived from the apparent distortions identified by recent scholarship; and what image 
of Greek colonisation the ancient evidence could reasonably be interpreted to allow.  The 
contextual discussion also aimed to explore the significance of antiquity in shaping the 
British historical imagination from the eighteenth century to the later twentieth, with specific 
reference to issues relating to imperialism and colonisation.  We shall begin with some wider 
conclusions relating to the important themes identified and important historical points made 
before moving on the final conclusions on British scholarship and Greek colonisation 1780-
1990. 
Wider conclusions 
 
 Throughout this study there has been an attempt to set scholarship on Greek 
colonisation in the relevant colonial context, yet themes and ideas other than colonisation, 
colonialism, and imperialism were of critical importance in the studies of antiquity we have 
considered.  Conceptions of political freedom are the single most important set of ideas at 
work in scholarship on Greece.  If we refer to things which are in fact more to do with 
political freedom as „colonial‟, then we miss out on much complexity, miss out on 
understanding why, and may even misunderstand what is being said.  Another theme of 
crucial importance is the role of conceptions of societal development, civilisation, or 
civilisational advance.  Eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century British scholarship had 
a concept of the course of civilisation and civilisational development – most societies could 
move from a savage state, to a tribal one, to civilisation of the basic, Oriental, type.  They, 
would, however, remain fixed at that level without political freedom.  The Greek 
achievement in antiquity, the achievement of the polis, was to transcend the stagnation and 
despotism of Oriental civilisation on the one hand, and the lack of civilisation on the part of 
free but undeveloped tribal societies on the other.  Unfortunately the polis was too small, too 
exclusive a community to be viable and secure on an interstate level – the problem of 
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combining civilisation, political freedom, and geopolitical power would not be solved until 
the rise of British representative government in the modern era.  This is a broad schema, and 
naturally different scholars coming from different political perspectives would draw different 
conclusions, but the overarching idea still applies.   
 For this reason, the study of the history of classical scholarship needs to pay greater 
attention to firstly, changing concepts of political freedom in relation to the Greek poleis.  
Secondly, the way this interacted with a more general conception of what constituted 
„civilisation‟, and thirdly, the relationship between classical scholarship and anthropology, set 
within a context of colonisation, colonialism, and imperialism and their role in shaping ideas 
of societal development and thus civilisation.  These three areas are closely interconnected, as 
they are all, essentially, concerned with ideas and debates about the changing nature of 
political order.  These ideas impacted significantly on British intellectuals in the eighteenth, 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as they attempted to grapple with the question of political 
development and political conflict within and between states.   
 It has been mentioned on several occasions how important antiquity was to the British 
historical imagination.  As the most common form of historical knowledge for educated 
classes for much of the modern era, antiquity formed a critical basis by which politicians, 
intellectuals, and an educated public could think about contemporary issues.  Accepting, as 
has been argued, that British scholars perceived a schema of civilisational development, 
antiquity could thus present lessons for self-consciously  developing polities – it provided 
examples of past civilisations‟ journey through various stages of development.  It was 
therefore a discipline like no other, which could be interrogated for lessons and used to 
further arguments of unequalled relevance and validity.  It was by way of antiquity that one 
could find answers to contemporary political, imperial, colonial and civilisational 
predicaments – and forecast the future outcomes of current actions and tendencies.  In this 
way, intellectuals educated in ancient history had truly historically informed ways of thinking 
about and responding to the world around them. 
 Apart from these broader points, among the most important themes to emerge from 
this discussion has been the significance of British liberalism to scholarship about Greece, 
and the wider significance of Greece to a historically constituted liberal vision of civilisation.  
This has been ever present from the 1830s with Mill and Grote, through the nineteenth 
century with Freeman, and into the twentieth with Bury, Zimmern, and Murray.  With this 
comes another important point: a number of excellent studies have recently explored what 
has been identified as the „exclusionary potential‟ of liberalism and the tortuous relationship 
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between liberalism and empire.
1
   What has not been fully appreciated 
2
 is the importance of 
Greek antiquity in providing the historical and conceptual basis for liberal justifications of 
ostensibly illiberal politics and actions towards non-European peoples.   
For John Stuart Mill an idea of civilisation rooted in antiquity – in which progress was 
defined as increasing democratisation, and any deviant cultures such as those found in the 
East uncompromisingly dismissed as „barbarian‟ – served as the intellectual foundation for 
justifications for British imperial rule.  This is not to say that a liberal conception of 
civilisation, defined by political freedom, would necessarily be used to justify imperial rule – 
the example of George Grote demonstrates that if anything, colonial situations are to be 
avoided because of the corrupting nature of such encounters, be that due to the unassimilable 
nature of certain peoples and the debasement caused by cultural interaction (as is clearly his 
view of the Hellenistic era) or the corruption and degradation inherent in despotic rule.   
With E.A. Freeman, we have a different picture again, yet one which holds certain 
elements in common.  The primacy of a liberal conception of civilisation defined by political 
liberty caused Freeman to distort Sicilian Greek history, dismissing it as having a greatness of 
a „colonial kind‟ – the Sicily of the tyrants could not compare to Athens.  It would also cause 
him to adopt what was at times an extreme East-West dichotomy and contributed to his racial 
ideas centring on an Anglo-Saxon and Germanic ideal.  This did not, however, make him an 
imperialist – for the British Empire of rule he appears to have cared little.  More important is 
the way in which Freeman exhibits a civilisational vision which both affirms the superiority 
of politically free polities, yet which also betrays foreboding about their future.  In Freeman‟s 
view of antiquity, political freedom remains the thing which makes the higher reaches of 
civilisation possible, yet the material and organisational arts of civilisation can be mastered 
by peoples who have no use for it, and are more than capable of extinguishing a higher 
civilisation.  Both Grote and Freeman express fears about the future of a liberal civilisation in 
contexts in which it comes into contact with the uncivilised or non-European – political 
freedom cannot be understood by all, and must be guarded jealously.  
 For Gilbert Murray and Alfred Zimmern, the world after the Great War represented 
one threat after another to a liberal conception of civilisation most certainly from their point 
of view rooted in Greek (and to a lesser extent Roman) antiquity.  Fascism and Communism 
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were obvious and uncomplicated dangers – more instructive is their attitudes towards the 
British Empire and non-European peoples.  Their defence of the British world order centred 
on a belief that it stood guard over a liberal civilisation.  Colonial nationalisms threatened that 
order and thus had to be contained.  Moreover, their attitudes towards colonial peoples reveal 
a distinct element of continuity between their ideas and those of Grote and Freeman: Murray 
in particular saw peoples who were not yet ready, who did not yet understand liberal 
civilisation as not only making their claims for adulthood too early, but doing so in a manner 
of open hostility to the West.  In undermining the British Empire, guarantor of liberal 
civilisation, and in rejecting their tutelage in the ways of liberal civilisation (instead 
espousing more radical creeds), these peoples were a threat to that very civilisation.  Thus 
could Murray, at the time of Suez, in the death throes of the British Empire, write „The 
Shadow of Barbarism‟, and state that civilisation was in danger from those who did not fully 
understand it.   
Murray‟s fears were in a different way echoed by his son-in-law, Arnold J. Toynbee: 
as a disunited Europe stood to become dwarfed by far larger units in Asia and the Americas, 
Europeans took much pride in their Westernisation of the world.  Quantitatively, he had no 
doubt that Western culture had indeed spread far and wider – „but what about quality?‟ The 
example of Russia alone showed that „a social heritage will not readily bear transplantation.‟3  
Grote might have said that those non-Western nations „attained a certain civilisation in mass, 
without the acquisition of any high mental qualities or the development of any individual 
genius.‟4  Freeman would have agreed, and lamented that the civilisational superiority 
proffered by political freedom was no defence against „ruder‟ foes, equipped with the 
material and organisational elements of civilisation, who came „as destroying enemies‟.5  The 
young John Stuart Mill of 1830, and the elderly Gilbert Murray of 1957, though separated by 
more than a century would have warned of the resurgence of „barbarism‟.  The problem of 
how to deal with those who do not accept liberal values, so clearly for the beholder the goal 
of progressing civilisation, is something which troubled liberal intellectuals from the 1830s 
through to the demise of British power in the world in 1947-56.  All too often it caused 
conclusions to be drawn about the relative capacities and incapacities of different peoples, 
and that, frequently, on the part of intellectuals opposed to biological racism.
6
  Greek 
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antiquity, in providing the intellectual and historical basis for a liberal conception of 
civilisation, was a significant yet all too often underestimated foundation of this way of 
seeing the world.   
 
Final conclusions 
 
In chapter 2, current scholarship on Greek colonisation was examined, key themes 
relating to apparent distortions on the part of earlier work drawn out, and those themes 
formed the basis of much of this discussion.  A hypothetical „current scholar‟ was created, 
whose views represented a synthesis of recent views concerning the distortions identified in 
earlier scholarship and the study of Greek settlement overseas in general.  The aim of this 
thesis has not been to comment on the latter, but rather on the former.   
According to our „current scholar‟, the misconceptions apparent in earlier scholarship, 
guilty of anachronism and the retrojection of ideas derived from the modern European 
colonial experience, led to the following view of Greek settlement overseas.  Firstly too much 
emphasis was put on state involvement, not enough on private initiative.  Secondly, later 
foundation traditions were accepted uncritically and lead to a view of close and dependent 
relations between colony and mother city.  Furthermore the imposition of colonial ideas 
contributed to the perception that Greek colonies were inferior to their mother cities – 
colonial inferiority.  Thirdly, relations between Greeks and indigenous peoples were seen as 
mirroring later colonial (Classical Greek and modern European) experiences in which Greeks 
are superior agents of cultural change whereas indigenous peoples are unsophisticated and 
passive recipients.   
Because there has not been a systematic study of a broad range of scholars, across a 
wide chronological span, and according to a defined set of criteria (that is our three themes), 
recent scholarship has not been able to present a representative impression of the way British 
scholarship wrote about Greek colonisation.  We have seen how in the late eighteenth 
century, in the nineteenth century, and up until the period after the Great War, the dominant 
scholarly perception was that Greek colonisation was primarily the result of private initiative.  
Those scholars who suggested otherwise did so on a not entirely unreasonable understanding 
of Herodotus on Cyrene or perhaps in the belief references to individuals must have been 
mythical.  Come the period after the Great War, the shift to a state oriented explanation was 
caused by ideas concerning the primitive and agrarian nature of early Greek society, the 
236 
 
primacy of land as a motivation, and following from that, the view that colonisation was a 
deliberate act of state by communities plagued with overpopulation. 
It has been very rare indeed for any scholar throughout this period to suggest any 
political dependence on the part of Greek colonies – certain exceptions, understandable in 
view of the literary evidence, noted.  By far the most common view has been of political 
independence coupled with ties of friendship, reverence, or sentiment – again hardly 
controversial considering the literary evidence.  Of course, the criticism made by recent 
scholarship includes the suggestion of an uncritical attitude towards the literary evidence and 
foundation traditions.  In this they may have a point – but it is a point much more easily made 
in an age in which archaeology, a whole range of evidence unavailable to our earlier scholars, 
has progressed so far.  Criticisms of later, twentieth century, scholars in term of colonial 
dependence – for instance Dunbabin – are entirely justified and correct.  As for colonial 
inferiority, the unexpected views of eighteenth century scholars have been missed.  As for 
Freeman, recent scholarship has been correct to identify distortions and notions of colonial 
inferiority, but has not fully appreciated the exact reasoning behind the distortion.   
The relationship between Greeks and natives is one theme where there has been a 
consistent application of contemporary ideas.  Yet much of what was said in terms of violent 
conflict and the subjugation of natives was in good part consistent with the ancient evidence.  
Furthermore, accounts of Greek-native relations are influenced by much more than „colonial‟ 
ideas – to examine them through this prism can in itself be distorting, and oversimplifies the 
history of classical scholarship.  Moreover, earlier scholars, even if they applied 
contemporary ideas, could by very nuanced in their approaches, and did not tend to try to 
make antiquity fit the present.   
It is hoped that the thesis has shown that British scholarship did not, as a whole, 
simplistically distort ancient evidence so as to create a version of Greek colonisation which 
mirrored, in a self-congratulatory way, contemporary British experiences.  Thus our „current 
scholar‟ has been proven correct in some cases, wanting in others – largely because of a lack 
of systematic and comprehensive treatment, and because most recent contributors were quite 
understandably most interested in their more direct predecessors – or those, often later, 
scholars who had a defining impact on their field of study.  This thesis has looked to provide 
that systematic study, providing a much more comprehensive account which can be of use to 
those working on Greek settlement overseas and wish to understand its significance and prior 
approaches to it in classical scholarship.  It is important to emphasise that recent scholarship 
has been right to question the underlying assumptions behind the state of work on Greek 
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colonisation as it stood.  This has led to new perspectives and a better understanding.  It is 
also right to interrogate earlier work for „colonial‟ or „imperial‟ ideas – and indeed examine 
more recent works for ideas based on the continuing use of assumptions born in a previous 
historical context.  This does not mean, of course, that those ideas are necessarily to be 
dismissed – merely that they are identified and understood in context.  One of the key 
problems it is hoped this study has outlined is that we need to go beyond the approach of 
„looking for colonialism‟ in earlier works – the fact that we are looking at, say, accounts of 
Greek colonisation does not mean that it is only contemporary colonial ideas that we might 
find.  We need, instead, to look at the subject from a broader perspective, and be aware of a 
broader spectrum of influences and ideas.  Furthermore, we need to do so with reference to a 
deeper understanding of the contemporary context, without which we risk misunderstanding 
or oversimplifying the view in question.   
This leads to a second point.  This thesis was intended to contribute to the specific 
debate about the nature of earlier scholarship on Greek colonisation while also placing it in a 
wider context thereby making other points more relevant to the realms of the history of 
classical scholarship and debates in modern intellectual history.  The result has been to show 
the critical importance of ideas concerning political freedom to the study of Greek antiquity 
in the modern age, identify the significance of antiquity in British conceptions of societal 
development, and uncover the relevance of Greek antiquity in forming a liberal conception of 
civilisation which proved to have an enduring influence on the troubled encounters between 
British liberalism and non-European peoples.    
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